Good morning, friends. Between this week’s repricing of gas for fertilizer plants and Deutsche Bank’s 48-60 range for the EGP, I find myself thinking about how we’ve been living in a prolonged stretch of what pundits might call “calculated escalation,” where one wrong move could flip the switch back to war. The uncertainty in which we’re all living now has manufacturers spending much of their days bracing for an impact that may never come.
Two friends of mine are living that in real time. One owns a plastics factory that supplies some of the largest plants in the country, and the other is a senior exec at a multinational FMCG company with a big footprint here. I expected two very different answers, but each described the same thing: two businesses focused on protecting what they have, using every tool available.
The downside: Future planning, innovating, and expansion are being pushed aside.
The upside: They’re learning lessons in months that a company in calmer times could take a generation to absorb.
“It takes up my whole day,” the plastics factory owner told me. “Pretty much the whole time I’m awake.” Two years ago, he was planning to lift output by a third to 400 tons per month. Today, he produces 150-200 tons monthly with about 80 people, down from a peak of 100-120. Instead of growing sales 30%, he has watched them shrink by roughly the same amount, while his margin has slipped to 5-7% from c. 15%.
Ask him why, and he starts with raw materials. A ton of his main input cost EGP 130k a week ago and EGP 99k today, against EGP 60-80k before the crisis. “I sold cheap, then bought high just before the price dropped. I got hit on the way down and on the way up,” he says. Then there’s the EGP: with around 40% of his capital tied up in credit, a 10% slide in the EGP wipes out roughly 4% of his capital, which he estimates takes two months of profit to rebuild.
I know my friend as an aggressive decision-maker who usually backs his own calls with conviction, so what struck me most was how the current climate has changed him. “Right now I can’t make those aggressive decisions, so I take the middle ground,” he says.
At the multinational, it’s not just one stressed exec. Entire departments are now oriented around coping with uncertainty. The procurement team is locking in raw-material prices for six months instead of a quarter, measuring contracts against a forecast and booking the difference as “cost avoidance.”
“Sometimes it hits and sometimes it misses, and it has missed many times,” my other friend told me. During one of the FX fluctuations, as prices for one main input climbed every week from EGP 24k a ton, his team locked a six-month contract at EGP 27k. Two months later, the crunch eased and the market price fell back to EGP 24k, leaving them paying EGP 3k a ton over the market for the rest of the contract. “It was a disaster,” he says.
I asked both the same last question: What would you do if the US reached a deal with Iran and all of this ended tomorrow? The factory owner didn’t hesitate. “It’s like I’m driving at 20 km/h today, and I’d go to 150 to catch up,” he says, listing the hires, the new equipment, the new product, and the expansion he has been putting off. The guy at the multinational was more muted, but pointed the same way: a plan that holds for a full year would allow his teams to look for cheaper sourcing, renegotiate with suppliers, and finally work on efficiency.
In an odd way, it may be that the biggest line on a company’s hedging bill is the investment that never happened. The losses on a bad contract show up on your P&L, but a plant that stayed at 200 tons and the 40 people it never hired? There’s no line item for that. –Abdelhamid