Posted inTrade

Will China’s zero-tariff policy actually boost our exports?

To capitalize on the two-year window, local exporters must fundamentally rethink how they approach the world’s largest consumer market

Egypt’s exporters have a two-year window to turn China’s lower tariffs into hard sales. The zero-tariff policy for Egypt and 52 other African countries took effect on 1 May, expanding a regime Beijing had previously reserved for least-developed African countries. For Egypt, the challenge is now entirely practical — turning preferential access into real China-bound sales and a narrower trade deficit.

DATA POINT- The test starts from a low base. Egyptian exports to China rose 41.9% in 2025 to roughly USD 819 mn, while imports from China climbed to USD 19.97 bn, leaving us with a trade deficit of over USD 19.15 bn.

Egypt is the bottleneck, not China, Secretary-General of the Egypt-China Chamber of Commerce Diaa Helmy tells us. “China is extending its hand to Egypt — and to any country that can offer an acceptable product,” he said. “The political will to import from Egypt is there, but political will alone is not enough. You need to give it something.”

The challenge: Zero-tariff access can make Egyptian goods more competitive, but exporters still need to understand what Chinese consumers actually want. Customs duties are not usually the main barrier to market entry, industrial analyst Mohamed El Bahi tells EnterpriseAM, explaining that “the most important thing is to understand demand on the other side.” With Egypt’s preferential treatment set to run until April 2028, exporters have a two-year window to show whether the policy is a commercial opening or just another unused trade preference.

China has also recently extended its local-currency swap line with Egypt, raising it to CNY 30 bn (c. USD 4.43 bn) from CNY 18 bn — giving bilateral trade more room to settle outside the USD. El Bahi sees that as the more important lever, saying local-currency settlement cuts out the cost of converting into USD and then into CNY. But the imbalance remains: without more China-bound Egyptian exports, smoother settlement mostly helps an import-heavy trade relationship work more efficiently.

The relationship runs deeper than trade. Egypt received USD 10.2 bn in Chinese Belt and Road (BRI) investment in 2025, according to the BRI Investment Report 2025 (pdf). More than 160 Chinese firms already operate in the country, and recent plans for trade and industrial hubs point to a broader attempt to position Egypt as a supply-chain base between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean — supporting Cairo’s annual export target of USD 145 bn for 2030.

What China will buy

Chinese officials have already pointed to Egyptian fresh citrus as one of the African products entering China under the zero-tariff regime, framing the shipments as early proof that the policy is being put to work. Helmy thinks the market opening can extend beyond one crop, noting “strawberries, and mangoes — they would take them by the ton.”

But citrus also reveals why the story is not just about tariffs: Exporters still need to meet China’s phytosanitary rules, farm and packhouse registration requirements, packaging standards, cold-chain needs, and buyer-distribution demands. To export citrus, producers must maintain the fruit’s internal pulp temperature below 1.6°C during transit to eliminate fruit flies — pointing at the real barrier to entry: advanced cold-chain logistics and heavy capital expenditure, not customs duties.

Other candidates: The next prospects may lie in products where Egypt already has production capacity. Flax, beet pulp, and cotton are early candidates, according to Khaled Milad, head of the Egyptian Commercial Office in Beijing. Head of the Internal Trade Committee of the Importers Division of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce Matta Bishay points to food and beverage, fabrics, cotton products, and engineering goods, while Helmy sees room for higher-value goods such as furniture, leather, ceramics, and finished marble. El Bahi adds pharma and dietary supplements to the list, arguing that even a small foothold in China’s consumer market could lift Egyptian exports sharply.

Turning access into orders

Demand first, or not at all. El Bahi says exporters cannot “hold an internal monologue,” take products to China, and then be surprised they are not competitive. The work starts with demand, competing products, and buyer requirements. Milad provides a tangible example, noting that Egyptian date exports to China are struggling because Chinese consumers are shifting away from high-sugar products. Helmy applies the same logic to compliance in the Chinese market: “The requirements are clear. They are not difficult or impossible — but trying to work around them is a disaster,” noting that exporters risk rejection if they treat the tariff break as a shortcut.

That puts the responsibility on the country’s export machinery. Helmy says export councils, the Cairo Chamber, and the Federation of Egyptian Industries need to identify serious exporters, study what China actually needs, and match companies with the right buyers. A Chinese trade delegation recently met with the Cairo Chamber and the Federation of Chambers, Bishay says, pointing out that exporters still need to follow exhibitions, visit the market, and turn the tariff preference into direct commercial relationships.

“This is not something that happens overnight,” Bishay says, noting the tariff break and CNY settlement could help narrow the imbalance over time, but only once exporters build market knowledge, production capacity, shipping cycles, and buyer relationships. “When you are talking about money flows, containers, shipping, and manufacturing, the cycle is long and slow.” The next test is whether Egypt can use the two-year tariff window to move from scattered interest to repeat orders — and from a China relationship built around imports to one where Egyptian exporters have a clearer lane in, he adds.