Saudi Arabia holds the biggest piece of Gulf investment in Syria’s rebuild, but the pieces don’t yet link up

Saudi Arabia now has money in most layers of Syria’s rebuild, but doesn’t have a clear plan connecting the layers together. John Calabrese, an assistant professor at American University in Washington, DC, sees a broader strategy in how the projects are bundled and sequenced. “The clearest evidence is the bundling of agreements across sectors and the focus on the grid and technical capacity,” he tells EnterpriseAM. He isn’t sure it becomes coordinated infrastructure: “It is possible that this is a one-off, the exception rather than the rule.”

SilkLink is the one project that spans several layers of the same system. The SAR 3 bn project bundles more than 4.5k km of fiber with data centers and international submarine cable landing stations. STC owns 75% of the project vehicle, against 25% for the Syrian Sovereign Fund, and describes the investment as part of a wider cross-border connectivity strategy linking Arab, Asian, and European markets.

Two of the biggest Saudi commitments sit in the same city without a stated connection. Elaf plans to develop a new Aleppo airport with a SAR 7.5 bn investment, upgrade and operate the existing facility during development, and finance an integrated navigation radar system. Work on the existing airport is expected to begin in early 2027, with the first phase targeting more than 2 mn passengers annually. Flynas is also taking a 49% stake in flynas Syria, with Syria’s civil aviation authority holding the other 51%, and operations are slated to begin in 4Q 2026. Neither company has said whether the airline will base aircraft at Aleppo, ensure traffic to the Saudi-backed airport, or coordinate cargo operations with Elaf.

The Saudi-backed airport, telecoms, power, and water projects are moving through separate ministries and contracts, Mustafa Ajlyakin, general manager at Jad United Services, tells us. At Jad’s distribution center in Aleppo, weak internet already slows shipment tracking, inventory visibility, and document exchange with foreign partners — bottlenecks a reliable Saudi-backed fiber network could ease. Schedules and physical connections need aligning between Saudi investors, Syrian authorities, and private operators before individual projects come online, he says.

The missing 400 km

Saudi Arabia and Turkey want a rail route through Jordan and Syria to Europe in three to four years. The route would carry goods, oil, gas, and passengers, but roughly 400 km of rail is missing between Syria and Jordan. Turkey is investing around USD 100 mn to rebuild the northern Syrian connection toward Aleppo and Damascus, and no broader financing plan has emerged.

Riyadh and Damascus have six months to find where their projects connect. They signed four MoUs in August covering roads, railways, civil aviation, and postal services, and the six months are for preparing an implementation plan. Separately, Saudi Arabia’s Al Rawaf and Syria’s Al Kawati secured a USD 300 mn contract to rehabilitate the Damascus-Palmyra-Deir Ezzor road, linking the capital with eastern Syria and routes toward Iraq, Sana reported.

The grid and the gateways

Airports, data centers, industrial sites, and water systems all depend on the same grid. More generation won’t be enough without reliable transmission, infrastructure finance expert Ajay Pratap S. Hari tells EnterpriseAM. Syria’s electricity output has risen to 3.5 GW from 915 MW when the new authorities took over, while 8% of the transmission system has been rehabilitated. Energy Minister Mohamed Al Bashir has warned that new solar projects will also need additional substations and supporting infrastructure. Saudi Arabia is building the software and control room for Syria’s grid, in a contract estimated at USD 60 mn, though the announcement doesn’t name the company or say who will run it.

The gateways Saudi cargo has to use belong to others. CMA CGM holds a renewed 30-year concession to operate Latakia’s container terminal and has since moved into Syrian dry ports, while DP World holds a separate 30-year, USD 800 mn BOT concession at Tartus. Damascus International Airport is being redeveloped by a USD 4 bn Qatar-led consortium. Delays at Tartus come from paperwork rather than capacity, Ajlyakin says: “Cargo moves smoothly when operators share data, documentation standards, and clear handover points. Problems arise at the seams: who holds the cargo, who is liable, and whose system records the transfer.”

Control by contract

Saudi investors hold control in several different forms: STC takes majority equity, flynas a minority JV, Riyadh Cables operating rights over a Syrian industrial asset, and Al Harfi contracted electricity sales for as long as 25 years. Equity shares don’t show who runs what, Calabrese says. “Some are joint ventures, some are Saudi-funded development projects, and some remain at the study stage. Equity shares are indicators, but they alone do not tell us who will exercise operational control. The unpublished terms of the SilkLink agreement are particularly important.”

Who sets tariffs and approves capex can matter more than the ownership split. The same goes for who bears demand risk and controls revenue repatriation and termination protections. “A 49% shareholder with strong operating rights and contractual protections can sometimes have a better position than a 51% shareholder without them,” Calabrese adds.

Full ownership and long-term contracts signal a bid for long-term influence, Ben Todd, partner at Dispatch Risk Advisory and a former US intelligence officer and diplomat, tells us. “When I see Saudi investors pursuing full ownership or locking in long-term contracts, that is a signal that they are looking for long-term influence,” he adds. Smaller stakes and partnerships may offer goodwill and a foothold rather than control, Todd notes.

Calabrese expects the near-term return to be strategic rather than financial, with Syria taking the visible value first in infrastructure, jobs, technical capacity, and — in some cases — equity. He sees the next Saudi money going to the links between what already exists: “If the current sequencing continues, I would expect Saudi capital to look next at logistics and dry ports, industrial projects linked to its power investments, and maybe even banking and payments.”

THE BOTTOM LINE- Five or six foreign investors now share Syria’s rebuild, which lowers the risk of any one of them controlling the system and leaves the handoffs between assets without an owner. For now, no single investor appears to control enough of those handoffs to make Syria’s infrastructure work as one.