Good morning, wonderful people. Goldman Sachs makes the case in today’s news well that regional risks mean we should sign up for a new IMF program when our extended fund facility expires next month. We need the external financing, the bulge bracket stalwart suggests, and we probably need the seal of approval — outside reassurance that, yes, the Cabinet and the central bank know what they’re doing.
Respectfully, I’m not sure I agree. I’d like to think we can do the right thing without the IMF holding a gun to our collective head. The numbers bear it out, and policymakers have spent the nearly three years since the March 2024 float consistently doing the right thing. (And yeah, I get it, past performance is not a guarantee of future results.)
Let’s start with the math on the balance of payments. You go to the IMF for cash when you can’t clear your FX market, and Goldman sees no external financing gap through FY 2029/30 as long as the war in the Gulf doesn’t take a turn for the worse. Net international reserves sit at USD 57.5 bn right now, remittances hit a record USD 38.2 bn in the first nine months of this year (a miracle, given all that’s happening in the GCC), and Suez Canal revenues are improving (admittedly from a very, very low base). The USD 2.3 bn or so we’ll get when we clear the final review of the current program doesn’t really move the needle.
What investors really want isn’t the IMF’s money — it’s a chaperone. Foreign bondholders always want an external babysitter because it saves them from having to trust local institutions. Given our history, I get the reflex. (And, yes, I get it: The time to raise money is … when you don’t need money.)
BUT- The Madbouly government and the Central Bank of Egypt have consistently done the right thing since the war began. When hot money bolted in October — offshore holdings of local debt dropped by roughly a third, to c. USD 20 bn from around USD 30 bn — the CBE didn’t freeze the exchange rate or ration greenbacks. It let the EGP take the hit and hiked rates 100 bps.
And that’s not all: Previous cabinets would not have had the guts to let Banque du Caire continue to market — let alone to allow Misr Life to follow.
Our training wheels have to come off at some point. Wrapping up a four-year program is supposed to mean graduating, not signing up for permanent tutelage. If the only reason investors think we’re capable of doing the right thing is a quarterly review, then we’re not the poster child for IMF orthodoxy, we’re a ward of the Fund.
Should we want technical assistance from the Fund? Yes. Another funded program? No. And if policymakers think differently? It should be a hell of a lot smaller — a token amount that phases down to no new money the next time ‘round.
None of this means investors and the business community here at home shouldn’t keep the pressure on policymakers. IMF mission chief Amine Mati didn’t use his final statement last week to lecture the central bank on rates or the EGP — he pointed straight at the fiscal soft spots, including EGPC’s balance sheet, avoiding a buildup of ruinous energy subsidies, and bringing Mostaqbal Misr under the state-ownership policy.
Buyers and sellers of FX and government paper issue a ruling on the credibility of our economic policy every weekday morning when markets open. They’re the ultimate “mission chief” assessing whether we’re on track — or going over the cliff. –Patrick
(Editor’s note: An earlier version of this story misstated the year Egypt floated the pound. It was March 2024, not March 2025.)