The Gulf has the capital, energy, and political willingness to grant permits that will let it build AI data centers fast. The financing worries, concerns about electricity pricing and availability, and the broad “not in my back yard” movement that together threaten to slow the buildout of data centers in the West are simply not factors in our part of the world.
Instead, MENA+ data center investors face two big constraints — and will need to design around a single big threat, we’ve reported this week.
Constraint #1: Water, as our AI + Innovation desk notes. Every GCC state sits below the WHO-defined water scarcity line, and most get 70% or more of their drinking water from desalination plants. Iran has already hit several of those in Bahrain and Kuwait. And it’s critical: AI chips need far more cooling water than the chips in traditional data centers.
BY THE NUMBERS: UAE data centers will go from needing c. 24 bn liters of water in 2025 to c. 61 bn by 2030, Indian market research firm Mordor Intelligence estimates. The firm also is penciling in even steeper demand growth in Saudi Arabia — from about 20 bn liters a year to c. 88 bn.
“If it’s not addressed in a different way, then we’ll be facing a wall,” Stefan Umiastowski, SVP and CEO for IMEA at Ecolab, told us. His fix is recycling water in a closed loop (Ecolab sells those systems), which he says is far easier to build into a new data center than to retrofit. Neither the UAE nor Saudi Arabia has released a formal plan to manage AI data centers’ water use.
Constraint #2: Washington, DC. The UAE’s deal for license-free access to cutting-edge Nvidia chips expires in April 2027, and it will be the biggest test of how far Washington goes after the midterms and Jensen Huang’s ouster, our AI + Innovation desk reported on Tuesday. National AI champion G42 and its cloud arm, Core42, must become US companies by early April or seek fresh authorization. Saudi Arabia’s deal is narrower: approval for up to 35k of those chips for Humain. A refusal to renew, or onerous new conditions, would be a massive blow to the Gulf’s AI ambitions.
And the Democrats, who will control both the House and the Senate in the new year, could make trouble. Authorization for chip sales ultimately rests with the Commerce Department, not Congress, but incoming Senate Banking Committee chair Elizabeth Warren has slammed the UAE chip agreement as corrupt.
The odds: “I don’t think anything over the last week guarantees that the Gulf is going to face significantly more US pressure,” Sam Winter-Levy, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a vocal critic of the UAE deal, told us. “But I do think there’s going to be more scrutiny in general of chip sales … and more scrutiny on the Gulf deals.” Forecast International analyst Vincent Carchidi expects the UAE’s export status “is likely to be less certain next year.”
The early signs aren’t bad. A new rule imposed on Monday puts case-by-case licensing on data centers in five countries the Trump administration thinks are high-risk, and no MENA+ state is on that list.
THE BIG, EXISTENTIAL RISK: Physical security. There’s been a lot of chatter about the need to disperse and harden data centers in the wake of Iranian attacks that took out facilities in the UAE and Bahrain. Less talked about: Risk to the cables that link the Gulf to the rest of the world, as our Infrastructure desk reports.
Work on four new subsea systems in the Gulf has stalled with the war. These include 2Africa Pearls, the Gulf extension of SeaMeWe-6, Ooredoo’s Fibre in Gulf, and the WorldLink Transit Cable, according to Infoblox head of internet analysis Doug Madory. Tehran has plans to target the cables already running under Hormuz if attacks resume, two senior Iranian officials told Reuters last month. None has been damaged so far.
Keep it in proportion: Less than 1% of global international bandwidth crosses Hormuz, the International Cable Protection Committee says, citing TeleGeography. But Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait depend on the strait for their direct submarine routes.
Iran doesn’t have to cut anything to do damage: “Creating uncertainty over how quickly damaged systems could be restored could already undermine confidence in the region as a reliable computing hub,” Daniel Sidiqie, scientific project manager at the ICI Institute, told us. Three Red Sea cables damaged in 2024 took six months to repair, according to TeleGeography.
Why it matters: Construction on more than USD 100 bn of Gulf AI projects has generally continued through the war, analysts told us last month.