Bahrain has been warding off Iranian attacks over the past week for the first time since September as the kingdom reportedly negotiates a fresh round of financial support with its Gulf neighbors. The potential new rescue package comes as Bahrain’s foreign reserves are down by more than half since March, falling to a low of USD 1.8 bn in August, covering less than a month of imports, even after drawings on the USD 5.4 bn currency swap line the UAE extended in April.
The next package is likely to work like an IMF program in all but name, with disbursements tied to reform milestones and potentially to state asset stakes, our sources tell us. That style of conditional support would be a stark departure from the USD 10 bn rescue Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait extended in 2018, which eased Bahrain’s financing pressures without forcing the adjustment it was meant to deliver.
“We expect any future GCC package to resemble an IMF-style program more closely than the relatively lenient 2018 assistance,” Barclays MENA Economist James Swanston told EnterpriseAM. Swanston expects any new money to settle near-term concerns, with later tranches potentially “attached to contingencies such as budget deficit targets or implementation of certain fiscal policies.”
If anything, this round of Gulf support will set more stringent terms, Oxford Economics Senior Economist Karim Salhab tells us, saying he doesn’t think Gulf backers have given up on conditionality. He expects them to want conditions “that are harder to postpone,” with greater emphasis on measurable reforms and disbursements tied to implementation.
A bigger gap than before
The 2018 support was tied to a fiscal balance program meant to eliminate the deficit by 2022, a target Bahrain later pushed back by two years and then missed. Fast forward another two years past that extended deadline and Bahrain’s fiscal situation has deteriorated again. The IMF expects Bahrain’s economy to shrink 11.3% this year and puts government debt at 152.4% of GDP. BMI is more pessimistic, forecasting a 15.3% contraction, under a base case that assumes a US-Iran peace agreement in 1Q 2027. The agency also puts debt at 166.8% of GDP this year, with interest payments rising to 7.0% of GDP from 5.7% in 2025, according to research notes shared with EnterpriseAM.
Most of the revenue damage comes through oil, which, with refined products, accounts for about half of government revenue. BMI expects those receipts to fall 18% this year. Crude output was still 43% below February levels in September, largely because the offshore Abu Sa’fah field, which supplies around half of Bahrain’s oil and is operated jointly with Saudi Arabia, remains shut pending a joint decision to restart it, BMI said. Refining output was 60% below pre-war levels in August, and damage at the Sitra refinery will keep it 30% below 2025 levels at the end of 2027, the agency said.
The adjustment needed to stabilize the debt is now far larger than in 2018. Swanston estimates Bahrain needs consolidation worth about 16 percentage points of GDP. The package the government announced in December 2025, which included higher fuel prices and utility tariffs, a 20% cut to administrative spending, larger dividends from state companies and a 10% corporate income tax on large firms due to take effect in 2027, is worth around 5 percentage points, according to a Fitch estimate.
Even if Bahrain delivered the full adjustment by 2032, Swanston expects debt to climb to almost 180% of GDP in 2029 before declining. With only the December measures, debt would reach about 190% and plateau in the mid-2030s. With no further action, it would pass 250% by 2040.
Inspired by the IMF?
Bahrain has never had an IMF program, and all of our sources expect Gulf money to remain the first line of defense. “It’s very unlikely that Bahrain would be willing to go down the path of an IMF financing package,” Tuvey says. Salhab tells us a move to the Fund could also send the wrong message, since “bringing in the IMF could be interpreted as a sign that Bahrain’s relationship with its Gulf backers had materially deteriorated.” He sees the IMF becoming relevant only if bilateral support proves insufficient or talks over conditions break down.
A supporting role is more plausible. Tuvey can see Gulf states providing the money while the IMF is there “to mark Bahrain’s homework.” Under that setup, devaluing the BHD would be off the table. “The whole reason for the Gulf to provide funds to Bahrain is to avoid Bahrain devaluing, which would raise concerns about the sustainability of their own USD pegs,” he says. Capital Economics said last month that Bahrain would probably need more Gulf support to hold confidence in the BHD’s peg to the USD and refinance maturing external debt.
Full IMF lending would raise harder questions. The Fund has to judge a country’s debt sustainable before it lends, which in Bahrain’s case would probably require harsh tax rises and spending cuts, Tuvey notes. Some form of restructuring would likely come first, though not necessarily haircuts, Salhab suggests. Because Gulf governments and institutions hold a large share of the debt, that could mean “extending maturities, lowering financing costs or otherwise terming out obligations.” In a severe enough scenario, Salhab adds, the peg itself could come into the discussion.
Reports that the UAE is taking the lead in the new package largely reflects Abu Dhabi’s stronger financial position, Tuvey says, although this shifting balance could add to friction with Riyadh, he noted. Asharq Bloomberg reported last month that Riyadh was aware of Abu Dhabi’s move and viewed additional Gulf support for Bahrain positively. The report came a few weeks after UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh in what was the first high-level bilateral meeting since the two countries’ relations were strained over Yemen from last December.
Bond investors have long priced in a rescue. Bahrain became the first Gulf sovereign to sell bonds publicly after the war began, raising USD 1 bn in 10-year notes in June at a 7.125% yield on orders above USD 3.2 bn, Zawya reported.
“Bahrain’s risk premia are very low given the state of its public finances,” Tuvey says, warning that “any sense that the Gulf countries are wavering on that support would quickly test this assumption and probably cause risk premia to spike.” For Salhab, a prolonged delay, visible disagreement among backers, or financing that “materially weakens the position of existing bondholders” would do the most damage. Much of the demand for Bahrain’s debt also comes from Gulf institutional investors, so “headline market access probably understates how dependent financing conditions remain on regional support,” he added.
What’s in it for the rest
For Bahrain’s neighbors, the cost of support is small next to the cost of a default, which “could threaten Bahrain’s USD peg and generate wider speculation over Gulf exchange-rate regimes,” putting pressure even on far stronger Gulf economies, Swanston tells us. Tuvey describes the sums Bahrain needs as “a drop in the ocean” next to the savings held in Gulf sovereign wealth funds.
Egypt offers a template for what Gulf backers may ask for in exchange — potentially getting “something tangible in return” for intervening with FX liquidity in a severe crunch Tuvey says, pointing to Egypt’s megadeal with the UAE on Ras El Hekma. In February 2024, an ADQ-led consortium agreed to pay USD 24 bn for the site’s development rights and to convert USD 11 bn of UAE deposits at Egypt’s central bank into investments, as part of a USD 35 bn agreement. “I wouldn’t be surprised if financing for Bahrain starts to follow a similar script,” he says.
Bahrain has assets it could put on the table. Sovereign wealth fund Mumtalakat holds around USD 18.3 bn, BMI estimates, and Salhab says Manama could offer land or minority stakes. He sees limits to how far that can go: “The most attractive assets are finite, and their valuations would themselves come under pressure in a severe fiscal or financial crisis.”
It’s all about stamina
How much will Bahrain adjust? Any conditions will run up against how much austerity the government is prepared to absorb. BMI expects it to prioritize social stability and favor gradual, revenue-led adjustment over sharp wage or subsidy cuts. The 20% administrative spending cut and a new household electricity and water subsidy system are likely to be delayed or only partly implemented, BMI said in September, and it forecast current spending to rise 1.5% this year against the 1.0% cut it expected before the war. Swanston expects the adjustment to be spread over several years, in line with comparable Gulf adjustments that have taken around six.
The pace also hinges on Hormuz. BMI’s September forecast had the deficit narrowing to 6.0% of GDP in 2027 from 10.5% this year, on the assumption that shipping would begin to normalize in the fourth quarter of 2026. In October it pushed its expected US–Iran deal back to the first quarter of 2027 and gave a 30% chance to a return to high-intensity conflict, under which the economy would shrink 18.6% this year.
Bahrain “is not a completely lost cause,” Tuvey says, pointing to Oman, which Fitch has lifted back to investment grade. “Oman has shown that it can be done, but it will be painful,” he said.
If Gulf support does become permanent, Salhab expects a deliberate backstop to look “less like repeated bailouts and more like a multi-year financing framework: predictable concessional funding in exchange for fiscal targets, reform milestones and regular monitoring.” Tuvey would go further. To draw a line under the uncertainty, he says, the Gulf might need to offer “some type of unlimited financing (both in terms of time and amount),” such as an unlimited currency swap.