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From Cairo to Riyadh, boards are buying their own shares back as the regional selloff deepens

But the buyback instrument isn’t doing the same thing across markets

MENA boards are reaching for buybacks across markets at the same time as the war-era selloff drags into month eight. From Riyadh to Cairo, listed companies are buying their own shares — often in sizes and at a pace that would have looked out of character two years ago. The buyback pipeline — whether active or just recently approved — includes programs at Aramco, QNB, IHC, Alpha Dhabi, Talabat, Space42, eXtra, Madinet Masr, and five EGX-listed mid-caps that bought a combined 20.1 mn of their own shares earlier this month alone. Industries Qatar — running a program since February 2025 — pulled the rip cord on 12 October, days before posting a QAR 809 mn (USD 221.3 mn) 9M loss.

Years of healthy liquidity build-up have brought us here: “There is clearly an increase in buyback programs as companies have adequate cash on their balance sheets,” Kamco Invest’s Director of Investment Strategy and Research Junaid Ansari tells EnterpriseAM. The cash-and-equivalents-to-total-assets ratio for GCC-listed companies is now close to 8%, “relatively higher when compared to most other leading global exchanges.” With shares trading cheap after eight months of war-era risk-off, it is the raw material for a wave.

But the rationale behind the moves is not the same everywhere: Gulf large-caps are using accumulated liquidity to optimize capital structures and send ownership signals. Egyptian mid-caps are responding to a currency-pressured screen with owner-management conviction that their companies are being traded below fair value.

Gulf large-caps: Capital on the side, begging for deployment. The programs at Aramco (USD 3 bn), IHC (AED 5 bn or USD 1.36 bn), Alpha Dhabi (AED 1 bn or USD 270 mn), and Talabat (5% of capital) share a profile. The programs are backed by strong balance sheets, carrying headline amounts that look dramatic but represent a fraction of market capitalization. Aramco’s program is under 0.2% of its market cap; IHC’s second consecutive program of the same size is less than 1% of a company now worth more than AED 840 bn (USD 228.7 bn). Ansari reads this grouping in plain terms: “Large-caps in the GCC use cash for capital optimization and returning excess liquidity.”

The surge in buybacks could also be read as a sign of maturing stock markets. The region is moving into “more mature equity markets and a move to simply sprawling, conglomerate corporate structures,” Hasnain Malik, Tellimer’s emerging markets equity strategist, tells EnterpriseAM. In these complex structures, majority shareholders, often backed by strategic and patient sovereign-linked capital, use buybacks to accrue more of the future value creation rather than share it through standing dividend commitments, Malik adds.

IHC’s buyback is one part of a larger push to reshape the conglomerate’s portfolio. Abu Dhabi’s largest listed company launched the program on 12 June, front-loading AED 1.8 bn in the first tranche. At the same time, IHC is running a USD 20-25 bn sell-down of minority stakes and a USD 20-24 bn acquisition drive. Proceeds from the exits are being rolled into new controlling stakes — Sammaan Capital in India, Alpha Wave Global in the US — not paid back to shareholders. The buyback is the gesture that runs alongside: A signal to the remaining minority holders that they still count while the portfolio is being rewritten around them. “It seems like a strategy to regain control and reward shareholders,” Ansari says. “These are also aimed at investing in new businesses.”

Talabat is more of a post-IPO stabilization play. A company less than two years into its listing is telling the market its shares are both underpriced and under-traded. The Dubai-listed food-delivery platform launched a 5% buyback on 18 May and hired a liquidity provider — a third-party market-maker paid to quote both sides of the stock through the trading day, tightening spreads and reducing volatility — in the same resolution. “The program aims to support a fair share price” in a post-IPO context, Ansari says, while the liquidity provider “helps to improve the order book and reduce intraday volatility.”

The character of the Egyptian cycle is different — cheaper stocks, smaller companies, owners buying their own names. Five EGX-listed mid-caps — Ibnsina Pharma, Edita, Taaleem, PRE Group, and Bonyan — bought a combined 20.1 mn shares a few weeks ago, three of them approving programs during the October selloff that triggered the first market-wide trading halt since October 2021. “Mid-caps in Egypt often buy back shares to support depressed valuations, and since these businesses are mostly owner-run firms, they buy cheap stocks when there is a move in the currency,” Ansari says.

REMEMBER- October’s circuit-breaker accelerated the cycle rather than start it. EnterpriseAM Egypt flagged the Egyptian buyback trend as early as 18 January 2026, when the wave was concentrated in real-estate mid-caps, and the tax dynamic was the main driver. Madinet Masr, a major real estate developer, was the latest example, executing a 2% buyback approved back in June, putting it ahead of the current wave.

Owner conviction is doing the heavy lifting in Egypt as elsewhere. “Some of the stocks were extremely undervalued,” Al Ahly Pharos Head of Research Hany Genena tells EnterpriseAM. His desk has been fielding inquiries from companies weighing whether the October selloff was a good moment to launch a buyback program. EGX30 heavyweights had been caught in the crossfire of two bouts of selling pressure last month, leaving many trading at or well below fair valuations. “It’s a good signal for the market that the companies have bigger conviction in their valuation than what the market is seeing it as,” Menthum co-founder and CEO Himanshu Shrimali tells us.

But part of why the Egyptian cycle is different is about the country’s tax code. Egyptian dividends attract a 10% withholding tax; selling into a buyback attracts only a proportional stamp duty of 0.05% per side. For owner-managed mid-caps looking at a dislocated price, the buyback is the cleaner instrument — and it sets no expectation of a repeat payout the following year, as Genena told us back in January.

And that tax arithmetic doesn’t apply in the Gulf. Saudi dividend withholding is 5% and only applies to foreigners and non-GCC investors. And the UAE’s and Qatar’s sit at 0% for everyone. When an IHC or a Talabat board chooses a buyback over a dividend, the after-tax outcome for the shareholder is identical. In that sense, the Gulf cycle is doing pure capital-structure and confidence signalling work, while the Egyptian cycle is doing that plus a tax trade.

Buybacks can also do defensive governance work — and that cuts across markets. For some Egyptian companies, a thinner float is the point. Genena points to the cement sector: Misr Beni Suef Cement has bought back shares and then reduced capital, limiting how much stock rival shareholders can accumulate toward a board seat in an industry where companies are reluctant to give rivals visibility into profits and margins. “It’s becoming more and more closed, more and more heading towards private than public,” Genena says.

Which brings us to who isn’t buying. Gulf banks are conspicuously absent from this cycle, QNB aside. Ansari’s explanation is regulatory: “Central banks want banks to have minimum capital and liquidity as buffers. In addition, buybacks would need central bank approval in some cases. As a result, banks prefer to give dividends.” The point is sharper in Kuwait and Oman, where banks “do not want to lower freefloats as it would affect their inclusion in global indices.” That is the structural answer for why the regional cycle has concentrated in conglomerates, insurers, and oil majors — not in the sector that typically returns the most capital to shareholders in Western markets.

A buyback only makes sense when the stock is underpriced, and the balance sheet can support it — and Industries Qatar's buyback cancellation is an example of when it doesn’t. The petrochemicals and steel firm had been executing its 25 February 2025 buyback steadily through 2026 before canceling on 12 October, days before posting a QAR 809 mn 9M loss as the war hit both its business segments.

Even when the earnings hold, the lift doesn’t last past the program’s end. “A buyback supports a price only while it runs,” Hamed says. What happens next depends on what the company does with the paper it bought. “The real question is whether those shares are canceled or come back to the market within the regulatory window.” Canceled shares shrink the share count for good; shares parked in treasury are supply waiting to return.

SOUND SMART- Egyptian law caps treasury holdings at 10% of a company’s shares and requires them to be re-issued or canceled within a year. Saudi, UAE, and Qatari frameworks carry similar ceilings. Reissuances “are normally spread over a period of time in order to prevent sudden market oversupply,” Ansari notes.

What’s next: Genena expects companies that bought at distressed valuations to sell their treasury shares back into a recovering market. With 1H 2027 expected to run considerably stronger than 2H 2026, companies have room to wait for a better exit before the one-year deadline.

Our take: this is capital being redeployed, not de-equitization. The US and European markets ran a two-decade wave of buybacks that materially shrank public float. MENA isn’t there. “For a region that should be growing, it is a little early to assume sustained de-equitisation through a wave of share buybacks in the manner seen in the US and Europe for the two decades prior to the AI capex boom,” Malik says.

THE CONTRARIAN VIEW- A sustained preference for buybacks over dividend growth, Malik argues, is also “a sign that some companies do not see the cost of a public listing, in terms of reporting, disclosure, and compliance, as worth it.” If the cycle extends into 2027 without a parallel pipeline of new listings, the question of whether being public still pays in MENA becomes harder to dismiss.