Venezuela is weighing an exit from Opec, Bloomberg reported late last month, citing people familiar with talks between Caracas and Washington — potentially putting it on a path already taken by the UAE and one Iraq has considered: prioritizing production growth and deeper US ties over Opec’s supply discipline. A Venezuelan exit would shield any US-backed revival of its oil sector from the group’s output quotas. No final decision has been made, and neither Venezuela nor Opec has confirmed a formal withdrawal is on the table.

The regional stakes are bigger than Venezuela alone: If Venezuela follows Abu Dhabi, and Iraq eventually does the same, Saudi Arabia could be left carrying Opec’s supply management almost alone.

The talks come as Caracas makes a sharp pivot toward Washington. Venezuela granted private producer North American Blue Energy Partners (Nabep) 100-year concessions covering 17 oilfields with an estimated 65 bn barrels of proven reserves, according to a White House fact sheet published last week. In return, Nabep granted the US government a 35% stake in its parent company, the right to buy 20% of the oil from its current and future fields at production cost, and first refusal on the remaining 80% before Nabep sells it elsewhere.

Three founding members, three pivots to Washington

REMEMBER- The UAE already walked away: Abu Dhabi’s exit from Opec followed years of disagreements over production limits and its ability to monetize the capacity it had spent bns building. But the move also came as the country embedded itself more deeply in the US-led energy, financial, and technology system — suggesting its departure was part of a wider strategic repositioning rather than only a dispute over barrels.

Iraq showed signs of a similar — if narrower — pivot: In late June, it was reported that Baghdad is considering leaving Opec if it was denied a substantially higher production quota, although the government later ruled out an exit and said it would instead seek a “fair” share. Iraq wants to raise capacity from some 4.5 mn bbl / d to 8-10 mn bbl / d within six years, and is increasingly turning to the US to support that expansion, signing dozens of oil, gas, power, and pipeline agreements in July valued at some USD 200 bn. “Iraq certainly has the reserves base, but it is highly doubtful that the target will be achieved,” Atkinson said, adding that “If capacity does grow, the temptation for Iraq (another founding member) to follow the UAE’s example will be strong.”

That puts all three countries on parallel — though not identical — tracks: The UAE is using oil revenues to secure a position inside the US-led technology and investment system, Venezuela is granting Washington direct influence over the development and sale of its crude, and Iraq is turning to US companies to expand production and build export routes. In each case, deeper US ties reinforce the commercial incentive to maximize output — an objective that could become increasingly difficult to reconcile with Opec quotas.

Exit protects future barrels, not current ones

Venezuela is currently exempt from Opec’s production limits, meaning membership does not constrain its output today — but leaving the group would make that exemption permanent. It would protect any future US-backed production growth from Opec quotas, giving companies greater certainty that new capacity wouldn’t later be shut in to support prices. It would also cement the country’s realignment away from China and Russia and toward the US. “Assuming that the US’ influence remains decisive, it is hard to imagine a situation where investors would accept restrictions on output decided by Opec,” former head of the International Energy Agency’s oil division Neil Atkinson tells EnterpriseAM.

The immediate market impact would be limited: Venezuela currently produces around 1.2 mn bbl / d, less than half its late-1990s peak, with growth constrained by degraded fields, insufficient diluent, and damaged processing and export infrastructure. Leaving Opec wouldn’t solve those physical constraints or add barrels to the market overnight. “In any event, production will not rise significantly in the next year or so,” Atkinson says.

The long-term threat is bigger: “Venezuela’s long-term outlook depends on how quickly foreign investment can be mobilized,” Atkinson adds. If US capital succeeds in restoring output above 2 mn bbl / d, those barrels could sit outside the producer group’s supply-management system, increasing competition for market share and forcing remaining members — such as Saudi Arabia — to shoulder more of the cuts needed to support prices.

There’s symbolism here too: Venezuela was one of Opec’s five founding members in 1960, alongside Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait — and was arguably the main force behind the organization’s creation, according to Atkinson. “For most of Opec’s existence, Venezuela played a key role in brokering supply and price agreements at times of market stress, but its influence waned as the country’s oil sector collapsed during the presidencies of Chávez and Maduro,” he says. Its departure after the UAE’s exit earlier this year — and amid Iraqi frustration with production constraints — would deepen questions over whether the group can retain members whose expansion plans increasingly conflict with collective supply discipline.

Could Saudi be holding the barrel?

If both Venezuela and Iraq follow the UAE, the Kingdom’s share of Opec production would approach 50% (this is what it was in February, the last “normal” month before the war), according to Atkinson. After such departures, “Saudi would control around 75% of the group’s spare capacity, with Kuwait the only other member holding a meaningful supply cushion,” Atkinson tells us, noting that “we may soon see a situation whereby Saudi Arabia is the only remaining member of the organization with the ability to move markets by adjusting production up or down.”

The risk is that it eventually stops defending prices: If supply outside Opec continues growing as demand slows, the Kingdom could decide that coordinated cuts are merely handing market share to its competitors. “Saudi Arabia might recognize that organized production cuts are futile and simply fight for market share and rely on its huge production volumes to offset lower prices,” Atkinson says, adding that “such a policy choice could force the shut in of some higher cost production in non-Opec countries.”

The price of staying in Opec

Venezuela’s possible exit matters less for the barrels it could liberate than for what it says about Opec’s changing bargain: membership becomes harder to justify when producers are spending heavily to expand capacity, and then being asked to restrict the output those investments create.

The US has an obvious interest in accelerating that fragmentation: Washington competes with Opec for market share and has long opposed the group’s ability to constrain supply and support prices. Every exit reinforces US influence over global oil flows and weakens the producer group’s leverage.

Still, Venezuela has little reason to rush. Opec is unlikely to impose a binding quota while Venezuela’s production remains depressed, giving the country time to test whether the US can turn investment promises into physical capacity before giving up its seat. Kpler sees an eventual departure as structurally plausible but unlikely in the immediate term. “I suspect that the Trump administration will decide before the end of its term what it will require the country to do,” Atkinson says.

ALSO- Opec+ held the line yesterday: The seven members agreed to keep October production quotas unchanged, extending the pause after months of symbolic increases.. Attention now turns to an audit of each member’s actual production capacity, due by the end of September, which will shape 2027 quotas — and test whether the group can accommodate countries such as Iraq that want more room to grow.