Gulf operators are building African port redundancy

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WHAT WE’RE TRACKING TODAY

TODAY: DP World expands African port capacity + Fujairah is getting a Mediterranean oil terminal

Good morning, nice people. We’re back — and evidently, so is Washington’s pressure campaign against Iran.

The US has rolled out its next play: “Operation Economic Outcast.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent rolled out sanctions on roughly 60 entities, individuals, and vessels worldwide, and put the world on notice that secondary sanctions now cover anyone doing business with Iran across five sectors — digital assets, technology, gold, aviation, and shipping.

Iran was already threatening countermoves before Bessent took the podium — floating military retaliation and deeper cuts to Gulf oil exports. Economy Minister Ali Madanizadeh later kept it simpler: Iran is “fully prepared.” An IRGC spokesperson went further, warning that any US strike on Iranian infrastructure would draw “heavy” retaliation against American energy chokepoints and interests.

The Red Sea front is also heating back up: A vessel belonging to the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia (Bahri) was involved in a “security incident” in the Red Sea on Monday, according to a statement. Bahri said that all crew members aboard the Amzan were unharmed. The statement follows claims by Yemen’s Houthis that they targeted a vessel off Yanbu’s coast, matching a report from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations of a strike 63 nautical miles west of the port city.

Which brings us to something new: We’re introducing Chokepoint Watch — a new lens on the stories shaping trade and infrastructure. We’ll be watching what happens to the infrastructure underneath: the routes that can be blocked, the alternatives being built, and the assets that suddenly become more valuable when a chokepoint tightens.

The EnterpriseAM Egypt Forum is back — and we’re devoting the full day to the singular set of questions on everyone’s mind: What does AI actually mean for your company, your people, your economy, your own job — and your kids’ future?

Every session on stage answers one question: “So, what do I actually do about it?”

Join us on 5 October in Cairo. Seats are limited and attendance is by invitation only.

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Saudi mulls state-backed ins. cover for ships

Saudi Arabia is exploring a state-backed war and political risk ins. pool to cover ships in the region, with early talks underway with London brokers, the Financial Times reports, citing sources it says are familiar with the matter. The plan responds to a market where ins. players have raised prices, restricted coverage, and in some cases refused to sell war cover for vessels transiting chokepoints including the Red Sea. Underwriters have also grown warier of Saudi-linked ships as Houthi attacks escalate, treating them more like high-risk Israeli and US assets.

How it would work: The Finance Ministry is considering a scheme offering up to SAR 700 mn in commercial cover per insured event, such as a ship seizure or missile strike. Ins. and reins. companies would provide the initial cover, supported by hundreds of mns of USD in additional backstop capacity per insured entity from the Saudi Export-Import Bank. One version of the proposal would see Saudi Re and Riyadh Re leading a consortium of reinsurers that could include international firms. The terms and the government’s exact share of the risk are still being negotiated and could change or collapse.

The pool would cover an increasingly blurred risk, giving shipowners access to broader cover for war, political violence, and terrorism — risks that are typically insured separately. That matters more as Houthi attacks blur the line between war and terrorism, leaving shipowners unsure what their policies actually cover, said Maximilian Hess of Enmetena Advisory.

The bigger issue is keeping trade moving. As Saudi shifts more exports toward Yanbu while both of its main maritime routes face disruption, a state-backed pool could give shipowners enough certainty to keep using those routes without ins. costs becoming a deterrent. Hess doesn’t see a market in crisis but said a pool could keep cover available at rates that don’t dent project economics or investment decisions.

Adnoc’s local partner in South Africa

A local face for Adnoc’s Shell agreement: Adnoc Distribution signed a definitive agreement with Reatile Group that will see the South African investment holding company take a minority stake in Shell Downstream South Africa (SDSA) once Adnoc Distribution’s own acquisition of the business closes, according to an ADX disclosure (pdf).

What we know: The tie-up satisfies South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment rules, which require local ownership in the country’s fuel retail sector. While the statement does not disclose the size of the stake, Adnoc had said that it plans to sell around 28% of SDSA to a local empowerment partner and an employee ownership scheme.

REMEMBER- Adnoc Distribution agreed to buy SDSA from Shell in July for around USD 1 bn before debt and working-capital adjustments — making South Africa its fourth retail market after the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The agreement, expected to close in 2027, hands Adnoc 580 fuel stations plus SDSA’s wholesale fuels, aviation, and lubricants businesses.

Why it matters: Reatile has 23 years of investing and partnering experience across the energy sector in Africa — including South Africa — which makes it more than a name on a cap table brought in to check a compliance box.

What’s next? The underlying acquisition still needs regulatory sign-off in South Africa, and the completion of the Reatile stake sale is conditioned on that acquisition closing first.

The Hormuz workaround’s newest investor?

TotalEnergies is putting its own capital behind the UAE’s Hormuz bypass. The French energy giant is set to invest in expanding Abu Dhabi’s export pipeline capacity through Fujairah, as the UAE works to roughly double the amount of crude it can move to the Gulf of Oman without crossing Hormuz, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne told Reuters. The existing Habshan-Fujairah pipeline can carry up to 1.8 mn bbl / d, with expanded export capacity targeted for next year.

This is as much a trading hedge as infrastructure play: TotalEnergies — which is a major trader of Iraqi and Qatari crude — needs alternative export routes it can rely on rather than betting on Hormuz staying open. That turns bypass capacity from something TotalEnergies simply uses into infrastructure it’s willing to help finance, part of a broader push that also includes plans to partner on an Iraq-Syria pipeline.

REMEMBER- The UAE had already started building the redundancy. Adnoc is accelerating a second pipeline to Fujairah that it says was already 50% complete in May and is targeted for delivery in 2027, supplementing the existing Adcop route. The additional line would add around 1.5 mn bbl / d, lifting the UAE’s bypass capacity to roughly 3.3 mn bbl / d.

Two hedges, one supplier?

Japan is starting to reroute Saudi crude around the Red Sea — a sign that Asian buyers are adapting to a new reality for Gulf oil flows. Idemitsu, Japan’s second-largest refiner, has begun sourcing Saudi crude from Yanbu via Suez and the Cape of Good Hope after Houthi attacks made Bab Al Mandab largely impassable, Reuters reports. The detour stretches a typical 20-day voyage to 50-60 days.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking to expand crude storage in Japan and South Korea — with both asking Tokyo to increase their current 8 mn bbl stockpiles tenfold, the New York Times reports. Saudi has already expanded storage in South Korea and partnered with KNOC to hold 5.3 mn bbl there.

Japan has little room to move away from Gulf crude itself. The country sourced 94% of its crude imports from the Middle East in 2025, with 93% of those barrels normally passing through Hormuz. Its refineries are also configured around Middle Eastern grades, making a wholesale switch to alternative suppliers difficult.

Market watch

Oil prices fell 2% this morning as Iran and Oman resumed talks on reopening Hormuz, Reuters reports. Brent crude futures fell around 1.78 to USD 86.80 / bbl by 02.27 GMT, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) declined USD 1.49 to USD 80.87/ bbl.

The Baltic Index edges up: The Baltic Exchange’s dry bulk index — which tracks rates for the capesize, panamax, and supramax vessel segments — was up 1.5% to 2,926 points on Tuesday. The capesize index gained 2% to 4,735 points, while the panamax increased by 2% to 2,166 points. The smaller supramax inched up 0.1% to 1,643 points.

Destination Sahel Issue IV, the final issue in the series, drops this week, and we’re exploring how Egypt’s North Coast could become more than a summer story.

Living in Sahel year-round is moving from a seasonal idea to a serious question; an industrial push is reshaping the Coast’s economic base, and Egyptian homebuyers are weighing Sahel against Dubai, London, and other Mediterranean markets for where to put their money.

In this issue, we get into what it would take for Sahel to work beyond the summer, how industry fits into the Coast’s next chapter, and the numbers behind the Sahel-vs-everywhere debate.

Click here to subscribe to the Egypt edition, coming straight to your inbox today.

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DP World pushes ahead with Dar es Salaam terminal expansion

Are the Gulf’s port operators buying themselves more geographic optionality? Egyptian EPC contractor Edecs Group is redeveloping seven operational cargo and material-handling yards spanning a combined 90k sqm at DP World’s Terminal 1 in Dar es Salaam, alongside new gates, utilities, and infrastructure for digital yard management, according to a press release published last week. Works are already underway, extending a modernization program that has been running since DP World took over operations in 2023.

The systems lens: the only way out is through

The terminal matters because it sits at the end of a trade corridor linking Tanzania’s coast to the Copperbelt’s mines. The firm’s 30-year concession covers a gateway serving Tanzania and landlocked East and Central African markets, with connections to road, rail, and freight corridors, as well as the Southern-Central African copper belt. The UAE-based port operator has committed more than USD 500 mn to modernize the terminal and its technology.

The infrastructure behind the port is also being rebuilt at the same time. China’s CCECC is now moving ahead with a USD 1.4 bn rehabilitation of the 1.8k-km Tazara railway connecting Dar es Salaam with Zambia, while a USD 270 mn World Bank program is upgrading roads, border infrastructure, and trade systems along the same corridor, according to the project’s appraisal document (pdf).

A successful Tazara rehabilitation could spread the benefits across the corridor. Exporters may face lower costs and fewer delays, the railway may carry more freight, Dar es Salaam could handle more cargo and competing gateways may respond with lower prices or better services, former head of supply chain and transport industries at the World Economic Forum Wolfgang Lehmacher tells EnterpriseAM.

The business lens: control without owning the berth

Another asset inside East Africa shows DP World isn’t running one playbook. In Kenya, where years of attempts to secure berth control at Mombasa stalled, the operator took a different route — developing a 222-hectare industrial park less than 20 km from the port, starting with 40 hectares. The project gives DP World access to the same cargo ecosystem — warehouses, distribution, customs, cold storage, inland logistics — without controlling the terminal itself, giving it two different positions across two competing East African gateways.

But, owning a berth is not the only way to influence the cargo. “A berth controls how cargo comes off a ship,” Lehmacher says. An operator can still gain influence without owning it if it has a strong role in storage, customs, rail, trucking, and distribution, he adds.

That asset diversification has a commercial value of its own — but it shouldn’t be confused with redundancy. Having positions across several markets can spread exposure across port contracts and cargo type, but it doesn’t automatically mean customers can shift disrupted cargo between them, Lehmacher notes.

The resilience lens: redundancy that predates the reason

The new capacity is landing exactly where the port’s next constraint was already flagged. The terminal handled a record 27.7 mn tons in FY 2024/25, up from 23.7 mn tons a year earlier, and DP World says discharge times for comparable cargo have already fallen by more than 90% since it took over. That efficiency gain is real — but the World Bank’s prior diagnosis (pdf) named insufficient container storage space and weak road and rail access as the port’s actual constraints, not berth speed. Faster discharge pushes more cargo onto a landside system that wasn’t sized for the volume — which is exactly the pressure point the Edecs project’s 90k sqm of new operational space is built to absorb before it becomes the next chokepoint, not after.

This isn’t only a DP World strategy — the UAE’s other big port operator is building a similar map. AD Ports already has exposure to the other side of Dar es Salaam port through a 30% stake in the JV — led by AD Ports and Adani Ports — that acquired 95% of the operator of berths 8-11. It also secured or developed long-term port positions in Luanda Port terminal (Angola), Pointe-Noire terminal (Republic of the Congo), and Douala terminal (Cameroon).

The UAE is not alone in turning African ports into long-duration infrastructure positions. Saudi Arabia’s PIF-backed Red Sea Gateway Terminal secured a 30-year concession in 2025 to operate and develop Djibouti’s Tadjourah port, with plans to lift it to an initial capacity of 5 mtpa and add a dedicated freezone serving East African trade and Ethiopian mineral exports. That sits alongside a 92-year agreement for a 120k sqm Saudi Logistics City in Djibouti’s port freezone, and RSGT is now evaluating a separate 25-year concession at Cape Town’s Duncan Dock.

OUR TAKE- A company scrambling to build redundancy mid-crisis is absorbing cost under pressure. A company that already had this portfolio in place is just running its existing playbook at a larger scale — which is the entire argument for building optionality before you need it, not after.

Egypt clears Fujairah’s Mediterranean oil zone

Fujairah is building a Mediterranean oil foothold: The Egyptian government has approved the establishment of a private freezone for Fujairah Alamein Oil and Gas Company next to Al Hamra oil terminal in New Alamein, according to a cabinet decree (here, pdf and here, pdf). The 738k sqm zone will store and handle crude oil and petroleum products.

Terms and conditions: The decree requires the company to export the equivalent of 100% of its annual output and maintain a local-content ratio of at least 50%.

The zone is the commercial base for a wider Egypt-Fujairah buildout. The UAE’s Fujairah started working on its USD 3 bn oil logistics zone at Al Hamra port last October, following three agreements signed by the Egypt’s Oil Ministry and the Emirate of Fujairah, including establishing a joint-stock company for a logistics zone in El Alamein, storing crude at Al Alamein’s Hamra port, and supplying petroleum products to the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC).

Al Hamra is already open to third-party barrels: The terminal began storing and handling crude for external customers earlier this year, with Fujairah and state-owned operator Wepco targeting a USD 457 mn expansion to increase crude storage to 5.3 mn barrels by December — with a target of 20 mn barrels by 2030. Al Hamra handled 74 mn barrels in FY 2024/25.

Think of Al Hamra as the infrastructure backbone, and the freezone as the new commercial layer attached to it. The Egyptian-operated port provides the marine facilities, tanks, and pipeline connections, while the adjacent Fujairah-backed zone provides a dedicated space and regulatory incentives for storage, handling, and export operations.

The business lens: The UAE buying into Egypt’s gateways

UAE port operators are steadily building positions across Egyptian energy infrastructure. Fujairah International Oil and Gas Corporation was in talks with EGPC in June to lease crude and petroleum-product storage on Egypt’s Red Sea coast. This is the second time in the past few months that an Emirati entity has made a move like this — AD Ports made a similar pitch for Red Sea storage in April. In March, Egypt put up 10 storage facilities for lease at Ain Sokhna and Ras Badran to monetize spare capacity. The country has around 29 mn barrels of spare storage across its main ports.

The resilience lens: A Mediterranean hedge

The location is the real asset: Fujairah became a major oil hub because it sits outside Hormuz. Al Hamra gives Fujairah-linked operators another foothold on the Mediterranean, beyond both Hormuz and Bab Al Mandab. As the agreement predates the current disruptions — so this should not be presented as a direct wartime response — the buildout creates precisely the kind of geographical redundancy: barrels can be stored, blended, traded, or delivered from a coast that does not require passage through either chokepoint.

The systems lens: The port becomes the network

Al Hamra is becoming more than a storage terminal: An existing pipeline carries crude from the port to the Midor refinery in Alexandria, while Egypt is preparing another line that will move refined products in the opposite direction for storage and export. Connecting the freezone, terminal, refinery, and the pipeline network would give the Mediterranean site a full operating system: crude comes in, storage absorbs it, Midor processes it, and products can return to Al Hamra for export.

China’s state tankers sidestep from chokepoints, shifting to offshore transfers

China’s biggest tanker operators are abandoning the Middle East’s two main chokepoints — despite having more room than most to navigate. Cosco Shipping Energy Transportation and CMES have stopped sending tankers through both Hormuz and Bab Al Mandab, instead collecting Gulf crude from transfer points outside the danger zone.

This isn’t a marginal retreat: State-owned Cosco and CMES operate more than 100 VLCCs between them and handled roughly half of China’s Middle Eastern crude imports before the regional disruptions. Their decision to avoid chokepoints reportedly followed communications with China’s central authorities, sources told Reuters last week, while CMES publicly told investors last month that its vessels would stay out of Hormuz for the time being.

The retreat is already visible at Hormuz: Three Hong Kong-flagged, China-linked supertankers abruptly reversed course around the strait last week, Bloomberg reported. The Hestia entered the Gulf along Oman’s coast before turning back out, while the Iraq-bound Erecter also abandoned its passage. The Sea V — carrying Iraqi crude — reversed course while approaching Hormuz from inside the Gulf and is now idling near its exit. It is unclear what prompted the U-turns.

The same caution extends to Bab Al Mandab: The Coslucky Lake — among the last Cosco tankers to enter the Red Sea to collect Saudi crude from Yanbu — changed course in early August and sailed empty through the Suez Canal to instead load at Egypt’s Sidi Kerir.

Why this matters: China-linked vessels have been among the few able to navigate the region’s contested waterways under Iran’s selective-access policy — but they are not one uniform fleet. Much of the chokepoint traffic involved Iran-linked, smaller, or already sanctioned operators with less additional compliance exposure. Cosco and CMES sit at the opposite end of the market: the state-controlled giants avoid Iranian oil and depend on mainstream ins’ers and international counterparties, fearing ins. restriction and sanctions exposure. That leaves China’s biggest carriers collecting crude outside the conflict zone while more sanctions-tolerant vessels handle the risky first leg.

Their solution is to collect barrels outside the danger zone. Four Cosco-operated VLCCs and one CMES vessel loaded through transfers at Fujairah in July, with around two dozen more vessels controlled by the two companies scheduled to load outside the Gulf between August and mid-September. Ship-to-ship transfers involving China- and Hong Kong-owned vessels outside the Gulf surged above 600k bbl / d in both June and July, from virtually nothing in April and May, Reuters reports, citing Kpler data.

Adnoc built the supply chain making that possible: Sustained shuttle shipments from inside the Gulf to transfer points beyond Hormuz have allowed the Emirati producer to sell more than 100 mn barrels through tenders. The arrangement separates the riskiest leg from the main voyage, with buyers collecting outside the strait without exposing their own tankers.

Chinese buyers were already active on the other side of this trade. They participated in recent tenders for spot Middle Eastern crude “clandestinely” shipped through Hormuz by Adnoc and other regional producers, according to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES). The resulting increase in prompt barrels created a “mini-glut” in July, with market sources telling MEES that Chinese buyers have since begun reselling some of the cargoes they picked up during that period.

Saudi Aramco is now following suit — and Chinese buyers are returning. In a rare move, the state oil giant is privately offering some Asian refiners Arab Medium and Arab Heavy through ship-to-ship transfers off Fujairah, including cargoes for September loading, Reuters separately reports, citing two unnamed sources. It remains unclear how Aramco is moving cargoes to Fujairah. PetroChina, Sinochem, Unipec, and Rongsheng Petrochemical purchased a combined 10 mn barrels of prompt-loading Arab Medium and Arab Heavy through the tender, traders told Bloomberg.

Term supplies are also recovering. Aramco separately allocated at least 14 mn barrels of September-loading crude to Chinese refiners under annual contracts.That is a meaningful pickup, but still well below the 40-50 mn barrels China typically imported from Saudi crude each month before the war.

The significance is in how the trade is returning: Chinese demand for Saudi crude is recovering without China’s largest carriers returning to Hormuz. Producers are increasingly taking responsibility for moving the barrels across the strait before handing them over to buyers and their preferred fleets outside the Gulf.

A squeeze on Iranian crude could drive more Chinese buyers toward those arrangements. Around 40 mn barrels of Iranian crude are sitting on vessels near Singapore, but only 10% remained unsold, Bloomberg reports, citing Kpler. Another 41 mn barrels and 22 empty tanks are trapped inside the Gulf following the renewal of the US blockade in July.

China’s independent refiners could therefore be next: Kpler expects virtually no new Iranian supplies to be available for delivery from late September. Chinese teapots — that normally absorb those discounted barrels — could respond by buying alternative grades or cutting refinery runs from October.

But not every producer is offering delivery outside the danger zone: Iraq’ Somo and QatarEnergy have launched rare tenders requiring buyers to collect crude from terminals inside Hormuz, Reuters reports. However, compared to Aramco and Adnoc, Iraq and Qatar are asking buyers to send their own vessels inside.

This is where the market splits: Producers able and willing to shuttle barrels through Hormuz can reach China’s risk-averse mainstream carriers and potentially command better terms. Producers that leave the crossing to buyers may have to offer deeper discounts or rely on the smaller pool of vessels still willing to enter.

The economics reward the workaround: Daily freight on the Oman-China route reached USD 140k last week, generating an estimated USD 110k daily margin per tanker. Comparable voyages earned some USD 30-40k a day before the war, a Chinese shipping executive told Reuters.

But the workaround is now becoming a target itself: Iran has accused dozens of vessels of violating its transit protocols and threatened them with fines, detention, or confiscation, the Financial Times reports. The list includes vessels operated by Adnoc and South Korea’s Sinokor — two of the fleets involved in shuttle movements through Hormuz — while Iran has warned that ships conducting transfers with blacklisted vessels could also face restrictions.

That threatens the entire operating model: Gulf producers can separate the risky crossing from the buyer’s main voyage, but they cannot eliminate it. If Iran begins penalizing both the shuttle vessels and the tankers receiving their cargo, the risk extends beyond the first leg and into the transfer network China’s biggest carriers are using to stay outside the strait.

Jeddah's new container terminal + DP World's Southeast Asia build-out

RSGT, CMA CGM back Jeddah’s next terminal

A new container terminal is coming to Jeddah Islamic Port: Saudi’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) and CMA CGM have inked definitive agreements to jointly develop and operate the new container terminal for around SAR 1.6 bn (USD 434 mn), according to a post on X. The terminal will add up to 2.6 mn TEUs of annual capacity, with new deep-water berths capable of handling the largest containerships and 10 new ship-to-shore cranes.

REFRESHER- RSGT and CMA CGM first laid out the potential JV in October 2025, when they inked in SAR 1.7 bn of investment and said Terminal 4 would operate as a separate terminal adjacent to RSGT’s existing complex. The project already sits under RSGT’s long-term Mawani concession and would take its Jeddah handling capacity to around 8.8 mn TEUs annually.

The business lens: The expansion agreement comes just months after Maersk’s APM Terminal agreed to take a 37.5% stake in DP World’s competing South Container Terminal at the same port. That leaves Jeddah’s two major container operators increasingly paired with two of the world’s largest shipping groups — giving terminal owners not just additional capital, but potentially stronger access to the vessel networks and cargo volumes needed to fill all that new capacity.

The resilience lens: the port is no longer relying on Saudi import growth alone. Jeddah spent the last period adding liner connections across India, China, Southeast Asia, Europe, Turkey, Egypt, and East Africa — while the Hormuz disruption gave that network an unexpected stress test. By late March, Maersk said Jeddah volumes were already up 40% since the conflict began as its land-bridge network through Red Sea and Gulf bypass ports handled around 35k containers a week.

DP World expands footprint in Southeast Asia

Logistics giant DP World opened a new warehouse in Malaysia as it expands its contract logistics operations across Southeast Asia, according to a press release. The 11.5k-sqm facility in Johor is the first of two, with a warehouse slated to open in Kuala Lumpur later this year. The operator is looking to launch similar projects in Thailand and the Philippines this year. Its current footprint in the Asia-Pacific region includes 16 ports and terminals.

Gulf energy earnings split along one line: who built a way around Hormuz before the war started

The regional war’s biggest beneficiaries aren’t the companies with the most oil — they’re the ones with a way around Hormuz. ExxonMobil’s net income doubled y-o-y to USD 14.5 bn, Chevron’s rose close to 400%, and Valero Energy’s earnings increased more than fivefold, CNBC reports. But strip out the global majors and the real split shows up closer to home: Gulf and regional players that had already built pipeline capacity, spare vessel capacity, or rerouting options before the war are capturing the windfall; the ones that hadn’t are absorbing the disruption.

The first payout came directly through the price of the barrel. US crude futures averaged above USD 92 / bbl between April and June, up 27% from the previous quarter, before easing to around USD 79 / bbl from the start of July through 8 August — leaving prices elevated enough for producers to continue capture stronger realizations even as the initial war premium faded.

The boom was driven by a shortage of assets, not just crude. Wars in Iran and Ukraine have created a global refining deficit of around 6.5 mn bbl / d, including damaged plants and product stranded behind disrupted export routes, Goldman Sachs estimates. More than 1.2 mn bbl / d of Middle Eastern refining capacity remains offline because of physical damage, JPMorgan estimates.

That scarcity tightened gasoline and diesel markets even as crude flows began to recover — which is why Valero, whose refineries stayed operational, and ExxonMobil, which sold higher-priced crude while running its own refineries at high utilization, both benefited on the processing side, not just the wellhead.

A higher price still needed an exit: “The market is no longer pricing who sells oil. It is pricing

who can still deliver it. A pipeline you built 10 years ago is worth more in a crisis than a price spike you get this quarter,” former head of supply chain and transport industries at the World Economic Forum Wolfgang Lehmacher tells EnterpriseAM.

Aramco captured the price bump without absorbing the full export loss because it had another coast. Its net income rose 44% y-o-y to USD 32.7 bn in 2Q as higher crude, refined product, and chemicals prices outweighed lower production. The price uplift was monetizable because the company had already ramped the East-West Pipeline to its 7 mn bbl / d maximum, allowing crude to reach Yanbu without crossing Hormuz, while domestic and overseas storage kept customers supplied.

Adnoc Gas didn’t have that option — and 2Q made it worse. Export and traded-liquids volumes had already fallen 20% y-o-y to 202 TBTU in 1Q as Hormuz disrupted shipments of LNG, LPG, and naphtha. By 2Q, lower sales had halved net income to USD 664.6 mn and revenue down 33% to USD 3.1 bn.

Restoring gas production only solved half the problem. Adnoc Gas had restored gas supply at its Habshan complex to 85% by quarter-end, ahead of its previous recovery target, but restoring production didn’t remove the chokepoint sitting between it and overseas buyers.

Once barrels reached an export terminal, the next premium moved to the vessels carrying them. Bahri’s 2Q net income surged 574% y-o-y to nearly SAR 2.8 bn as revenue climbed 156% to SAR 6.3 bn, extending the freight-driven earnings jump that began in 1Q. “Capacity is the raw material. Speed is what turns it into margin,” Lehmacher says. Bahri captured the rate increase because it could lease additional tankers as soon as demand moved, adding working capacity to the market rather than just earning more on ships it already owned.

Adnoc L&S shows the capacity had to sit in the right business line. Net income surged 303% y-o-y to USD 951 mn in 2Q as shipping captured the tanker boom — tankers alone delivered USD 797 mn as revenue climbed to USD 1.7 bn from USD 460 mn a year earlier. Integrated logistics moved the other way: revenue fell 16% to USD 559 mn, and net income dropped 64% to USD 59 mn on lower material-handling volumes, higher fleet costs, and weaker jack-up-barge utilization, according to its financial presentation (pdf).

The same divide showed up at Emirati ports, but with business models determining how much of the disruption reached the bottom line. AD Ports’ net income rose 88% y-o-y to AED 836 mn in 2Q, even as UAE container throughput fell 65%, while bulk and general cargo volumes fell 67% y-o-y to 3.1 mn tons. Higher rates and warehouse sales helped, but the group had routes through Fujairah and Khor Fakkan outside Hormuz, while its landlord model left part of its income less dependent on cargo volumes.

DP World had less protection where the shock landed — net income dropped 39.1% y-o-y to USD 585 mn in 1H as disruptions at Jebel Ali drove the port’s 2Q throughput down 90.1%, even as group revenue rose 13.1% y-o-y and volumes outside Jebel Ali grew 6.5%. DP World’s planned Fujairah terminals show the redundancy it is now trying to build — adding capacity outside Hormuz after the disruption exposed Jebel Ali’s dependence on vessel access through the strait.

Milaha shows why a stronger freight market was not enough on its own. Net income fell 19% y-o-y to QAR 542 mn in 1H even as revenue rose 6% to almost QAR 1.7 bn, as the conflict cut container volumes and pushed costs up across its network. Offshore was the largest drag, down QAR 85 mn, with smaller declines across its other segments.

Fertiglobe shows an exporter could buy its way into the price shock without a permanent bypass. It trucked fertilizer from its UAE plants to ports outside Hormuz, accepting double handling and higher transport costs to keep production running, while expanding storage and exploring rail shipments with Etihad Rail alongside other alternatives. That kept 2Q exports at 56% of UAE production, avoiding any conflict-related shutdowns beyond scheduled maintenance. Geography helped too — Fertiglobe’s Egyptian production ships through the Mediterranean, avoiding both Hormuz and the Red Sea, while Algerian exports were untouched. Revenue jumped 92% y-o-y to USD 1.1 bn in 2Q, with higher prices partly offsetting lower volumes and the cost of the workarounds.

The bottom line: Proximity to Hormuz didn’t decide who gained this quarter — pre-crisis investment did. Aramco, Bahri, and Fertiglobe all had a workaround in place before the war started. Adnoc Gas, Milaha, and DP World are still building theirs.

What’s next: Refining margins already show the pattern the rest of the sector should expect — they spiked on reopening and are fading as crude resets. But the sunk cost of new routes, storage, and standby vessels doesn’t disappear along with the price spike. “Prices normalize on the news. Networks normalize on the balance sheet — and balance sheets do not read headlines,” Lehmacher says. The edge should shift back toward the companies still catching up on volume, but only if they keep the crisis-era workarounds running once Hormuz reopens fully, instead of dismantling them the moment the news improves.

Calendar

30 August-1 September (Sunday-Tuesday): Air Cargo Middle East, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

30 August-1 September (Sunday-Tuesday): Saudi Warehouse and Logistics Expo, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

SEPTEMBER

16-17 September (Wednesday-Thursday): Saudi Maritime & Logistics Congress, Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

22-23 September (Tuesday-Wednesday): Breakbulk Americas, Houston, US.

22-24 September (Tuesday-Thursday): Seamless Middle East, Dubai, UAE.

28-30 September (Monday-Wednesday): Transport Logistics Middle East, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

OCTOBER

12-14 October (Monday-Wednesday): The Airport Show, Dubai, UAE.

20-22 October (Tuesday-Thursday): TOC Americas, Cartagena, Colombia.

21-22 October (Wednesday-Thursday): Global Ports Forum, Singapore.

26-29 (Monday-Thursday): Air Cargo Forum, Miami, US.

27-29 October (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes World, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

NOVEMBER

2-5 November (Monday-Thursday): ADIPEC Maritime and Logistics Exhibition and Conference, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

10-11 November (Tuesday-Wednesday): TOC Asia, Singapore.

10-12 November (Tuesday-Thursday): Intermodal Europe, Rotterdam, Netherlands.

11-13 November (Wednesday-Friday): Logitrans, Istanbul, Turkey.

18-19 November (Wednesday-Thursday): Breakbulk Asia, Singapore.

FEBRUARY 2027

10-12 February (Wednesday-Friday): Routes Americas, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

MARCH 2027

16-18 March (Tuesday-Thursday): CMA Shipping, Houston, US.

16-18 March (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes Asia, New Delhi, India.

APRIL 2027

20-22 April (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes Europe, Antalya, Turkey.

26-29 April (Monday-Thursday): Transport logistic and air cargo Europe, Munich, Germany.

26-29 April (Monday-Thursday): Saudi Smart Logistics, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

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