Good morning, wonderful people, and happy THURSDAY. Gulf crude had a week of pipelines and tanks: new ways out of the Gulf, and new places to hold what comes out.
A second exit at Fujairah: Adnoc has told some Asian refiners that part of their crude supply is likely to arrive through its new West-East pipeline from early next year, Bloomberg reports, citing people familiar with the matter. Upper Zakum could be among the first grades to go through it, loaded for term customers at Fujairah instead of passing through Hormuz, while the existing Habshan-Fujairah pipeline currently delivers Murban. The new line is set to double the UAE’s Hormuz bypass export capacity. The state oil giant was already accelerating work on the West-East pipeline after the war started, with an original timeframe only indicating it’d be ready next year.
Saudi Arabia’s bypass, running again: Aramco has offered European buyers spot crude for October and November loading, Bloomberg reports, citing a person familiar with the matter. The cargoes load from either Yanbu on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast or Egypt’s Sidi Kerir terminal on the Mediterranean, and the offers suggest Aramco is making up for supplies lost while the East-West pipeline was shut.
IN CONTEXT- Aramco cut European refiners’ October term cargoes after a drone attack knocked the pipeline offline, and has since restored full November allocations. Yanbu had an estimated five to seven days of export-ready crude, and Aramco now wants to double its overseas crude storage to cushion future outages.
At the buyers’ end: The Philippines is in talks with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and several other countries about storing crude and refined fuels on its territory, Energy Secretary Sharon Garin told Reuters. It wants a buffer against future supply disruptions and plans its first government-owned strategic oil in Bataan in 2027, on top of 1 mn barrels held in private facilities, aiming for 60 days of demand. Nationwide inventories already cover around 55 days, against a 15-day minimum requirement, and no investment commitments, volumes, or emergency access arrangements have been announced.
Saudi Arabia now has money in most layers of Syria’s rebuild, from fiber and data centers to aviation, power, and water. A portfolio across sectors does not necessarily make an integrated system. John Calabrese, an assistant professor at American University in Washington, DC, sees a broader strategy in how the projects are bundled and sequenced. “The clearest evidence is the bundling of agreements across sectors and the focus on the grid and technical capacity,” he tells EnterpriseAM. He isn’t sure it becomes coordinated infrastructure: “It is possible that this is a one-off, the exception rather than the rule.”
Layer by layer
SilkLink is the one project that spans several layers of the same system. The SAR 3 bn project bundles more than 4.5k km of fiber with data centers and international submarine cable landing stations. STC owns 75% of the project vehicle, against 25% for the Syrian Sovereign Fund, and describes the investment as part of a wider cross-border connectivity strategy linking Arab, Asian, and European markets.
Aleppo’s airport and the new flynas Syria airline aren’t yet publicly linked. Elaf plans to develop a new Aleppo airport with a SAR 7.5 bn investment, upgrade and operate the existing facility during development, and finance an integrated navigation radar system. Work on the existing airport is expected to begin in early 2027, with the first phase targeting more than 2 mn passengers annually. Flynas is also taking a 49% stake in flynas Syria, with Syria’s civil aviation authority holding the other 51%, and operations are slated to begin in 4Q 2026. Neither company has said whether the airline will base aircraft at Aleppo, ensure traffic to the Saudi-backed airport, or coordinate cargo operations with Elaf.
A modern airport needs warehouses, customs, and links to industrial zones, Mustafa Ajlyakin, general manager at Jad United Services, tells us. It still needs bonded warehouses, cold storage, digital customs clearance, and links to industrial zones. At Jad’s 4k sqm distribution center in Aleppo, weak internet already slows shipment tracking, inventory visibility, and document exchanges with foreign partners. A reliable Saudi-backed fiber network could help ease those bottlenecks, he adds.
Saudi-backed airport, telecoms, power, and water projects are moving through separate ministries and contracts, Ajlyakin says. There is little evidence of coordination at the operational level, and he says Saudi investors, Syrian authorities, and private operators need to align construction schedules and infrastructure connections before individual projects come online.
The missing 400 km
Saudi Arabia and Turkey want a rail route through Jordan and Syria to Europe in three to four years. The route would carry goods, oil, gas, and passengers, but roughly 400 km of rail is missing between Syria and Jordan. Turkey is investing around USD 100 mn to rebuild the northern Syrian connection toward Aleppo and Damascus, and no broader financing plan has emerged.
Riyadh and Damascus have six months to find where their projects connect. They signed four MoUs in August covering roads, railways, civil aviation, and postal services, and the six months are for preparing an implementation plan. Separately, Saudi Arabia’s Al Rawaf and Syria’s Al Kawati secured a USD 300 mn contract to rehabilitate the Damascus-Palmyra-Deir Ezzor road, linking the capital with eastern Syria and routes toward Iraq, Sana reported.
The shared grid
Airports, data centers, industrial sites, and water systems all depend on the same grid. More generation won’t be enough without reliable transmission, infrastructure finance expert Ajay Pratap S. Hari tells EnterpriseAM. Syria’s electricity output has risen to 3.5 GW from 915 MW when the new authorities took over, while 8% of the transmission system has been rehabilitated. Energy Minister Mohamed Al Bashir has warned that new solar projects will also need additional substations and supporting infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia is building the software and control room for Syria’s grid, in a contract estimated at USD 60 mn. The announcement doesn’t name the company or say who will run it.
Gateways and handovers
Other companies already hold the gateways Saudi cargo has to use. CMA CGM holds a renewed 30-year concession to operate Latakia’s container terminal and has since moved into Syrian dry ports, while DP World holds a separate 30-year, USD 800 mn BOT concession at Tartus. Damascus International Airport is being redeveloped by a USD 4 bn Qatar-led consortium.
At the Tartus terminal, paperwork and handovers have caused more delays than infrastructure, Ajlyakin says. Drawing on Jad’s experience serving the Tartus International Container Terminal, he says “cargo moves smoothly when operators share data, documentation standards, and clear handover points. Problems arise at the seams: who holds the cargo, who is liable, and whose system records the transfer.”
Control by contract
Saudi investors hold control in several different forms: STC takes majority equity, flynas a minority JV, Riyadh Cables operating rights over a Syrian industrial asset, and Al Harfi contracted electricity sales for as long as 25 years.
Equity shares don’t show who runs what, Calabrese says. “Some are joint ventures, some are Saudi-funded development projects, and some remain at the study stage. Equity shares are indicators, but they alone do not tell us who will exercise operational control. The unpublished terms of the SilkLink agreement are particularly important.”
Who sets tariffs and approves capex can matter more than the ownership split. The same goes for who bears demand risk and controls revenue repatriation and termination protections. “A 49% shareholder with strong operating rights and contractual protections can sometimes have a better position than a 51% shareholder without them,” Calabrese adds.
Full ownership and long-term contracts signal a bid for long-term influence, Ben Todd, partner at Dispatch Risk advisory and a former US intelligence officer and diplomat tells us. “When I see Saudi investors pursuing full ownership or locking in long-term contracts, that is a signal that they are looking for long-term influence,” he adds. Smaller stakes and partnerships may offer goodwill and a foothold rather than control, Todd notes. The clearest way to assess who benefits is to look at who sets prices and who bears the losses when something goes wrong.
Syria’s investors can receive tax reductions of up to 80%, 100%foreignownership, and up to 40% foreign labor. “These mega-projects will bring [USD] into the country in the short term, but the terms will see Syria forgo much of the public revenue that reconstruction could generate,” Haddon Barth, director at the Network for Syrian Legislative Studies, tells EnterpriseAM. Syria gets the most visible value first, including infrastructure, jobs, technical capacity, and in some cases direct equity. “Saudi Arabia’s return appears more strategic in the near term, with the financial benefits likely to come later,” Calabrese argues.
Syrian firms have mostly landed supply and building roles, Ajlyakin says. Local-content commitments, JVs offering Syrian companies equity and operating rights, and access to financing could help domestic operators expand alongside foreign investors. Jad is already pursuing partnerships with Saudi and Gulf logistics firms, and he says securing lasting operating roles will be key to keeping more of the infrastructure’s economic value in Syria.
The seams
Smaller roads, utility connections, and access infrastructure often lack a named financier, Ajlyakin says. Major Saudi projects have identifiable financial backers, but the links between them often depend on public budgets or have no clear financing arrangements. Operators are absorbing the costs: one Jad client has paid for reserved warehouse capacity for more than two months while its shipment is held up by customs and coordination problems, and another has been unable to release goods from storage for a month because of licensing delays. Neither delay resulted from insufficient warehouse capacity.
Who absorbs the loss when the system fails depends on the contract, Hari says. A PPA, minimum-revenue guarantee, or take-or-pay arrangement can shift part of demand risk onto the state, while termination payments and change-in-law clauses can protect investors if conditions deteriorate. “But these protections are ultimately only as strong as the counterparty standing behind them. That is why, in Syria, I would probably pay as much attention to payment security and risk allocation as to the projected IRR,” he adds.
More foreign investors haven’t yet added redundancy. More operators only create redundancy if their assets can substitute for one another when something fails. “Having Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, Turkish, and European players each building separate pieces of Syria’s economy looks more like a patchwork than a safety net, since every country is chasing its own goals rather than working from a shared plan,” Todd says.
The next Saudi investments may target the links between existing assets. “If the current sequencing continues, I would expect Saudi capital to look next at logistics and dry ports, industrial projects linked to its power investments, and maybe even banking and payments,” Calabrese says.
THE BOTTOM LINE- Five or six foreign investors now share Syria’s rebuild, which lowers the risk of any one of them controlling the system and leaves the handoffs between assets without an owner. For now, no single investor appears to control enough of those handoffs to make Syria’s infrastructure work as one.
Mubadala and Trafigura have shelved the sale of Porto Sudeste after bids came in about 30% below what they wanted. Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Capital and Trafigura Group, which own the Brazilian iron ore terminal, plan to keep it until they get a better price, Bloomberg reports, citing people familiar with the matter. Weaker iron ore prices pulled the offers down, one of the people said, and the owners are in no rush to sell, another said. Trafigura declined to comment, and Mubadala didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
Contracted cargo gives bidders more revenue visibility: Porto Sudeste extended its agreements with Itaminas and AVG last year, raising their potential annual handling volumes to 8 mn and 4 mn tons and extending both contracts to around 20 years. The agreements also raised minimum-volume commitments, though the operator didn’t disclose the minimum tonnages. Vale was separately considering a long-term take-or-pay agreement to support the GIP-led bid, which would have given investors more revenue visibility without Vale taking an equity stake.
The risk doesn’t end with a signed contract: The valuation gap suggests investors are unwilling to pay for growth until the additional volumes translate into actual earnings, Wolfgang Lehmacher, former head of supply chain and transport industries at the World Economic Forum, tells EnterpriseAM. Long-term cargo commitments provide some protection but their value ultimately depends on the financial strength of the miners behind them, Lehmacher argues. When multiple customers face the same downturn, even take-or-pay contracts offer limited protection. “Long-term commitments protect only as far as customers can keep paying,” he adds.
And what about Mudadala’s plans for Brazil? The sovereign investor was reportedly considering using the proceeds to expand investments in Bahia, where its subsidiary Acelen Renováveis secured USD 1.5 bn in financing for a biofuels refinery in May. The broader development is expected to require more than USD 3 bn in investment, with operations scheduled for 2029. Trafigura also signed an agreement in June to supply feedstocks and market some of the refinery’s future production.
Mine to ship
One of the port’s own customers is cutting production due to higher freight costs. Itaminas, which holds a long-term handling agreement with Porto Sudeste, announced in September that it would temporarily halt one of its four processing plants in October and place around 300 workers on collective leave. CEO Thiago Toscano said freight had risen to around USD 42 a ton from USD 19 a year earlier. Elsewhere, in Minas Gerais, CSN Mineração lowered its 2026 production and third-party ore purchasing guidance to 39-41 mn tons from 45-47 mn tons in September, citing freight-related margin pressure, according to a filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, according to US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Ore reaches the port by truck and rail from Minas Gerais: At the jointly owned Morro do Ipê mining operations, ore travels roughly 30 km by truck along Brazil’s BR-381 federal highway to rail terminals in Sarzedo and Brumadinho, then around 515 km by rail to Porto Sudeste, according to Morro do Ipê’s 2024 sustainability report (pdf). The port unloads, stores, and blends the ore and moves it through a 1.8-km conveyor tunnel to the shiploaders, according to Trafigura’s 2024 annual report (pdf).
Beyond the iron ore
Volumes have held up, at about half the port’s capacity. The terminal shipped a record 27.8 mn tons of iron ore in 2025, up from 21.9 mn tons in 2024, and 13.6 mn tons in 1H 2026, according to its earnings (pdf). Its existing capacity is 50 mn tons a year, with an expansion license covering up to 100 mn tons.
And record volumes don’t necessarily mean a resilient network: “Record tonnage shows last year’s demand, not resilience. I would test whether committed volumes come from customers who can honor them in a downturn, and examine customer concentration, overdue receivables, debt-service headroom, ship waiting times, and who controls access to the railway, on what terms. Then I would ask which link limits the chain: berth, railway, or mine. Resilience is capacity customers can still afford to use,” Lehmacher tells us.
Oil is the port’s next cargo, though its revenue is unproven: Porto Sudeste is spending BRL 177 mn on dedicated mooring and berthing structures for oil and petroleum products, separating liquid-bulk transfers from the shared pier. The operator expects the facilities to be completed in 1H 2027 and to support up to 144 liquid-bulk operations a year, against 19 in 2025. The expansion adds 50 mn tons of annual liquid-bulk transfer capacity to the terminal’s existing 50 mn tons, bringing it toward the licensed 100 mn tons.
Oil could make Porto Sudeste less dependent on iron ore, but only with contracted revenue from producers outside the ore cycle, Lehmacher says. The investment needs to attract creditworthy producers whose business doesn’t move with iron ore demand, he argues. Dedicated oil facilities could also ease pressure on ore-handling schedules and potentially provide overflow capacity for the nearby port of Açu, provided operations can be safely separated.
Shuttle tankers and anchor contracts could limit what the new oil berths earn, Lehmacher says. If shuttle tankers are scarce, they could be another bottleneck. However, with many new moorings the terminal builds and without firm commitments from oil customers, the planned rise in liquid-bulk operations carries no assured revenue. “Without anchor contracts, up to 144 operations a year is an option, not a hedge,” he adds.
The Gulf’s tanker shortage is pulling former dark-fleet carriers into mainstream oil trade: Vessels that once hauled sanctioned Venezuelan crude are now moving Iraqi barrels, drawn by lucrative Middle Eastern routes and a shortage of tankers willing to cross Hormuz, Bloomberg reports. The shift comes as the US Navy issued a fresh advisory urging ships without essential business in the Gulf of Oman and the strait to steer clear.
Why it matters: The extra ships won't change the economics of moving oil out of the Gulf, but they can help ease a very stressed market, Bloomberg says.
Venezuela’s ex-tankers
The Centuries is the latest to arrive: The more than 25-year-old supertanker, boarded by the US Coast Guard in the Caribbean last December while carrying crude from Venezuela’s state oil company, loaded Iraqi oil earlier this month after being chartered by Iraq’s state oil marketer Somo, according to Kpler and Vortexa data cited by Bloomberg. It then transferred the cargo to another tanker in the Gulf of Oman. The vessel was never formally sanctioned, although its age and involvement in sanctioned oil trades landed it on unofficial dark-fleet watch lists.
Others are already there or on the way: The Axe, a supertanker sanctioned over its Venezuelan trades and later removed from the US blacklist, entered the Gulf of Oman on Sunday. Two VLCCs that once carried Venezuelan crude, Kelly and Marbella, are sailing from South America toward Oman’s Sohar, and the Kiara M, another delisted tanker, has been moving Iraqi crude since April. Centcom told Bloomberg it was aware of the Centuries, Axe, Kelly, and Marbella, and that none was currently of concern.
Rates drawing ships in
The money makes the risk worth taking: Daily earnings for supertankers on Middle East-East Asia routes have risen more than 4.4k% this year, according to Baltic Exchange assessments. Some voyages loading Gulf crude for ports outside the Gulf have been booked at up to USD 40 mn, or as much as USD 4 mn a day, shipbrokers told Bloomberg.
Shuttle tankers are what keep Gulf crude moving: Tankers willing to cross Hormuz load Gulf crude, transfer it to vessels waiting in the Gulf of Oman, then return for another cargo. Some 60 VLCCs were shuttling in and out of the strait as of late September, up from around 30 in June-July and seven in April, according to Vortexa. The trade has helped lift Gulf oil flows to near prewar levels, while the US blockade of Iranian shipping, in place since mid-July, has pushed Iran’s crude exports close to zero.
More ships won’t bring freight rates down while attacks continue: Iran’s attacks on ships have reached almost 30 this month, a wartime high. Venezuela-linked carriers are seen as the easiest dark-fleet ships to rehabilitate, but shipowners cite several hurdles before mainstream traders and producers will use them more widely. Additional shuttle tankers are unlikely to bring rates down materially “as long as Iran maintains the threat of attacks on vessels in the region,” Kpler senior crude analyst Muyu Xu told Bloomberg.
Clearing and warning
The administration wants more tankers in the mainstream trade: Washington has signaled it wants more carriers in the trade to ease costs, even if that means rehabilitating dark and sanctioned ships. “Vessels that were blocked are being delisted or are being licensed for certain forms of financial transactions,” Benjamin Robinson, a maritime attorney at Chalos & Co. and former US Coast Guard counsel, told Bloomberg.
The Navy is telling ships without business there to keep away: Wednesday’s advisory told vessels making necessary transits to allow extra time for traffic and blockade enforcement, and said neutral ships may still face questioning, visit, and search. The US last issued a similar notice in mid-July, when the blockade began.
The rate benchmark in court
Mercuria wants TD3C’s wartime rates thrown out: The commodity trader is suing the Baltic Exchange in the English High Court, in a case heard from Monday, over its decision to keep publishing TD3C, its Middle East Gulf-China tanker benchmark, after the war began, the Financial Times reports. Mercuria argues the collapse in Hormuz traffic warranted suspending the index and wants a court declaration that its publications since early March are invalid. The trader isn’t seeking damages. The Baltic says some ships kept transiting the route and experienced brokers kept providing assessments, and its lawyers warn that a Mercuria victory would have “chaotic marketwide consequences.”
Some traders already treat the benchmark as unreliable: Platts suspended its own assessments for oil shipped through Hormuz two days after the war began. The Baltic launched TD34 this month, a Fujairah-China benchmark covering voyages that start outside the strait.
REMEMBER-We explained in March how TD3C feeds into freight pricing and derivatives used to hedge against shipping costs — and how thin trading makes those assessments more uncertain. By August, the benchmark still reflected a theoretical Gulf-China round trip, while cargoes carried two separate freight bills: one for crossing Hormuz and another for the onward voyage.
Higher VLCC freight rates and more chartered-in tankers drove Bahri’s 3Q earnings up nearly tenfold. Net income at Saudi Arabia’s National Shipping Company (Bahri) rose 891% y-o-y to SAR 5.1 bn in 3Q, while revenue jumped 504% to SAR 14.8 bn, according to its earnings release pdf.
Bahri Oil drove most of the increase: The tanker unit’s revenue rose 913% y-o-y to SAR 13.3 bn, and the company credited higher realized freight rates for very large crude carriers (VLCCs), driven by regional disruptions and heightened maritime security risks, alongside a significant increase in charter-in activity. Integrated logistics revenue roughly doubled to SAR 497 mn, chemicals and products rose 5% to SAR 793 mn, and dry bulk climbed 38% to SAR 149 mn.
3Q accounted for about half of Bahri’s 9M net income, by our math: Net income for 9M rose 587% y-o-y to SAR 9.98 bn, and revenue climbed 268% to SAR 26.1 bn. Bahri Oil accounted for SAR 18 bn of the revenue increase, followed by integrated logistics at SAR 429 mn, chemicals at SAR 270 mn, and dry bulk at SAR 139 mn, according to a Tadawul disclosure.
Conflict-related incidents affected four of Bahri’s vessels during 9M, and two crew members were killed. Two of the vessels have returned to service after repairs and two remain under repair. Bahri operated 109 vessels at end-September, 107 owned and two on long-term lease, against 117 a year earlier, after selling a VLCC and a chemical tanker for net proceeds of SAR 270 mn.
Bahri has ordered three VLCCs from Saudi shipbuilder International Maritime Industries (IMI) for SAR 1.69 bn, due in 2029-2030. It added three second-hand medium gas carriers for LPG and ammonia. The first was delivered in September, and the other two are due in 4Q 2026 and 1Q 2027. It ordered two RoCon (roll-on/roll-off and container) vessels for SAR 776 mn in 3Q for delivery in 2030. After the quarter closed, it signed a SAR 1.69 bn agreement with Saudi shipbuilder International Maritime Industries (IMI) for three VLCCs, due in 2029-2030.
Dubai’s dnata and DP World are building the inland end of the supply chain abroad: a cargo terminal at Australia’s new Western Sydney International Airport and a temperature-controlled food hub near Bologna. Dnata has started ground handling at the airport, and DP World has opened its first fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) contract logistics hub in Italy.
Dnata is investing about AUD 32 mn in a cargo terminal at Western Sydney International Airport. The company handled the airport’s first international flight on 26 October. The 5k sqm terminal sits in the airport’s 24-hour cargo precinct, according to a press release, and will handle up to 60k tons a year at maturity, including temperature-sensitive shipments. That is about a fifth of the 300k tons dnata handles across Australia each year, by our math. Operations are due to start in December.
DP World has opened a 22k sqm temperature-controlled hub near Bologna, with Alce Nero as its anchor customer. The site in Castel San Pietro Terme has around 30k pallet positions and offers warehousing, transport, and e-commerce fulfillment, according to a press release. DP World runs warehousing and distribution for Alce Nero, an Italian organic food company, and the hub has space for other food, beverage, and consumer goods businesses. It adds to DP World’s existing presence in Italy.
#1- Qatar’s hedge on US LNG: QatarEnergy is in advanced talks with US-based Venture Global and Australia’s Woodside for at least 3 mn tons annually each, although the timeline and contract duration remain unclear.
#2- Adnoc’s stake in Libya’s upstream: XRG, Adnoc’s international investment arm, is in early talks to buy a stake in Eni’s Libyan oil and gas business. Negotiations are at an early stage with no certainty of an agreement.
#3- Aramco’s Singapore storage: Aramco plans to begin storing crude at Jurong Rock Caverns in 2H 2027 under an MoU with Singapore’s Energy Market Authority and JTC Corporation. The parties aim to finalize within months. Storage volumes and the agreement’s duration remain undisclosed.
#4- DP World’s Canadian Arctic gateway: DP World has negotiated an MoU with two Canadian entities, including Arctic Gateway Group. The agreement covers operations at the Port of Churchill and a potential corridor connecting it with inland facilities by CentrePort Canada. No investment figure or terms have been disclosed.
OPEN + PENDING
Jeddah’s Al Khumrah logistics zone: The Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) has opened expressions of interest from private developers, logistics operators, and shipping companies to develop and operate the 2.4 mn sqm site. Submissions close on 20 November. The site is meant to support storage, cargo distribution, and re-export, and Mawani has not disclosed an investment value, a concession structure, or a development timeline.
DEALS + LAUNCHES
#1- Qatar’s purchase of US LNG: QatarEnergy signed two long-term sale and purchase agreements with US-based Cheniere to buy up to 4 mn tons a year from the Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi terminals on the US Gulf Coast, with deliveries beginning in 2031.
#2- Syria’s road overhaul: Syria signed a USD 147 mn contract with Qatar’s Almohannadi for Roads, Trading, and Contracting (MRTC) to rehabilitate and expand the highway to Iraq’s Al Tanf border crossing, state news agency. The contract adds a second carriageway across 215 km, covering the 170-km stretch from the Al Busayri junction to Al Tanf and a 45-km section from Al Sabaa Biyar to Al Busayri, and MRTC will also rehabilitate the existing road and install safety features over 900 days.
#3- Abu Dhabi’s LNG fund: The Private Department of Sheikh Mohammed bi Khalid Al Nahyan and its affiliate KSH Investments launched an LNG investment fund targeting USD 1.2 bn at its initial close. Reem Partners will manage the vehicle under the Department’s partnership with EIG and MidOcean Energy.
#4- Sharjah’s Hedebah gas field, phase one: Sharjah National Oil Corporation (Snoc) has completed the first phase of its Hedebah gas-condensate field, more than doubling its gas production. Snoc is accelerating the next stage to raise production in 2027, with plateau output expected by 2028, and it didn’t disclose current production volumes or the field’s expected peak output.
The Pipeline is our running tracker of the region’s megaprojects, from announced to funded, awarded, and under construction, and tells you what moved this week.
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