Posted inEnergy

Why our gas sector is leaning heavily on LNG imports

Natural gas imports jumped 36% y-o-y in 1Q 2026 as the country pivots to LNG to cover domestic demand and preserve its export hub ambitions

Egypt’s energy challenge is characterized by a widening gap between declining production and rising demand, but the government is working to stabilize the sector. The Oil Ministry is making good on its debts to international oil companies, announcing last week that it will fully settle these arrears by 10 June, ahead of its original end-of-June target. The dues had already been slashed to USD 440 mn in May from USD 714 mn at the end of April, down from a peak of USD 6.1 bn on 30 June 2024.

By the numbers: Egypt imported nearly 6 bcm (c. 2.35 bcf / d) of natural gas in 1Q 2026, a 36% y-o-y increase, according to the latest figures from the Joint Organizations Data Initiative (Jodi) (pdf). Combined with 9.85 bcm (c. 3.87 bcf / d) of domestic production, these imports accounted for 38% of Egypt’s total available gas supply — a sign the country is increasingly relying on shipments to balance the local market.

The data also shows a sharp shift in our import mix, which tilted heavily toward LNG during the quarter. LNG inflows more than doubled, jumping 131% y-o-y to 4.3 bcm (c. 1.7 bcf / d), while pipeline gas imports dropped 34% y-o-y to 1.7 bcm (c. 670 mmcf / d).

The macro picture

The country’s gas balance has deteriorated markedly, with domestic production falling nearly 30% from 2023 to 2025. Domestic gas production fell from 15.55 bcm in 1Q 2023 to 13.43 bcm in 1Q 2024, 10.68 bcm in 1Q 2025, and 9.85 bcm in 1Q 2026. Across these four consecutive first-quarter periods, output declined by nearly 37%, equivalent to a compound annual decline rate of about 14%.

Annual gas production fell from nearly 59 bcm (c. 5.7 bcf / d) in 2023 to 50 bcm (c. 4.8 bcf / d) in 2024 and 42 bcm (c. 4.1 bcf / d) in 2025 — a loss of nearly 17 bcm (c. 1.6 bcf / d) of annual output in just two years. Overall, production declined by 29% over the period, averaging a 15.4% annual drop.

What’s driving the decline? The gas sector faced a combination of challenges, including natural field depletion, delayed investments, and slower development activity following years of mounting arrears. Zohr — Egypt’s largest gas field which accounts for roughly 30% of the country’s total natural gas output — has seen its production slide to around 1.2 bcf / d from a 2019 peak of 3.2 bcf / d.

Imports are a pricey solution

Gas imports rose as domestic supply weakened. On a quarterly basis, imports increased for four consecutive first quarters — from 2.2 bcm in 1Q 2023 and 2.6 bcm in 1Q 2024 to 4.4 bcm in 1Q 2025 and 6 bcm in 1Q 2026. That represents a cumulative increase of nearly 172% between 1Q 2023 and 1Q 2026, with a compound annual growth rate of 39%.

Imports climbed from nearly 8.5 bcm (c. 300 bcf) in 2023 to 14.6 bcm (c. 516 bcf) in 2024 and 22.2 bcm (c. 786 bcf) in 2025. The country added roughly 13.7 bcm (c. 483 bcf) of annual imports over the period — a cumulative 159% increase to keep the lights running, growing at a compound annual rate of 61%.

Filling the gap comes at a growing financial cost. Natural gas made up 45% of our fuel import bill in 1Q, totaling USD 2.5 bn between January and March. Our natural gas import bill is set to jump 26% y-o-y to USD 10.7 bn in the next fiscal year to cover both LNG cargoes and pipeline gas.

Depending on pipelines proved risky

Pipeline gas imports initially helped Egypt cushion production decline, rising from roughly 8.6 bcm (c. 304 bcf) in 2023 to a 10.2 bcm (c. 360 bcf) spike in 2024. However, the trend reversed in 2025, with annual pipeline imports falling back to 9.2 bcm (c. 325 bcf).

While Israeli gas remains a critical source of supply, repeated regional disruptions have exposed the risks of relying too heavily on a single pipeline corridor. Pipeline imports fell from nearly 2.6 bcm in 1Q 2025 to 1.7 bcm in 1Q 2026. The decline accelerated in March, when pipeline inflows plunged 78% m-o-m as regional tensions escalated. To compensate, the country increased LNG imports by 29% m-o-m in March to 1.67 bcm.

LNG has become the balancing source

To reduce supply risks, Egypt turned to the LNG market, leveraging its floating storage regasification units (FSRUs). The country imported virtually no LNG in 2023, before bringing in roughly 4.4 bcm in 2024 and around 13.1 bcm in 2025. The trend has continued this year, with LNG imports reaching 4.3 bcm during 1Q 2026 — accounting for 72% of all gas imports during the quarter.

By the share: Pipeline gas represented virtually all of Egypt’s imports in 2023, but by 2025, LNG had grown to account for nearly 60% of the country's total gas imports, highlighting the shift toward diversification.

Egypt has quite the roster of suppliers: Over the past two years, the Oil Ministry expanded its supplier base to over 70 companies, including big names like Saudi Aramco, Trafigura Group, Vitol Group, Hartree Partners, BGN, Shell, and Azerbaijan’s Socar.

The export surplus disappeared

Before Egypt became a major LNG importer, it first stopped being a major gas exporter. Annual gas exports fell from around 5.6 bcm in 2023 to 1.4 bcm in 2024 and 1.1 bcm in 2025 as declining domestic production forced more gas into the local market.

There’s a catch: Exports dropped from 906 mcm in 1Q 2024 to 90 mcm in 1Q 2025, before recovering to 377 mcm in 1Q 2026 — a fourfold rebound.

The rebound does not necessarily signal a recovery in domestic production. Instead, it reflects the government’s strategy of importing LNG from its four deployed FSRUs to satisfy domestic demand while preserving export activity and keeping the liquefaction infrastructure at Idku running. This supports long-term regional hub ambitions even during periods of stress.

The strategy is intentional: “Importing and exporting — this would be the end game for Egypt,” VP and Country Chair of Shell Egypt Dalia El Gabry said at an AmCham gathering back in April.

Why? The government is honoring existing contracts with international energy players even when it comes at a financial loss. This is a long-term play to ensure that energy companies live up to their investment pledges to ramp up production. It’s about giving them confidence — not only that their arrears won’t be withheld again, but that they will still be able to tap into the more lucrative export market even when times get tough in Egypt.

On a more positive note

The government wants to revive upstream activity and stabilize declining domestic output. To secure its target of USD 6.2 bn in FDI for the oil sector in the next fiscal year, the government is clearing arrears, rolling out risk-adjusted upstream terms, and securing significant FDI commitments — like a USD 19 bn pledge from global energy majors over the next three years.

Cautious optimism: There are signs that the decline may begin to ease, with Chevron currently appraising its 2.8 tcf Nargis discovery, Eni preparing to drill a new appraisal well at Nour, and Shell drilling the Velox prospect in the underexplored West Mediterranean.

The bottom line: The government’s upstream recovery plan hinges on whether international oil companies believe the economics have improved. With oil output currently at 560k bbl / d versus a target of roughly 626k bbl / d by the end of the next fiscal year, and gas output under 4 bcf / d with a push to add 1 bcf / d by year-end — part of a larger target to reach 6.2 bcf / d by 2027 — the strategy could largely depend on attracting enough investment to reverse the decline.