Terms and conditions

1

OPENING NOTE

No safe havens

Good morning, friends. Kuwait’s air defenses were firing overnight while Bahrain intercepted a third round of Iranian drones in five days. Also in the region: Iraq has reopened its pipeline to Turkey for the first time in more than a decade.

Kuwait’s army said overnight that its air defenses were countering hostile drone attacks and that the explosions residents could hear were interceptions, Gulf News reports, although no details were provided on where the drones came from or whether there was damage. Bahrain’s defense force said this morning that it had intercepted several Iranian strikes, calling them part of a continuing, systematic campaign. It was the third such attack in five days, after the IRGC said it sent drones at a US radar installation at Sheikh Isa air base in response to American drone flights over Iranian airspace, which CENTCOM said were intercepted without damage to US equipment or personnel.

GCC Secretary General Jasem Albudaiwi called on the Security Council to act, saying “any attack on the Kingdom constitutes an infringement on the security of all GCC states.” US fighter aircraft struck an IRGC missile launch site on Qeshm Island yesterday, which Hormozgan’s deputy governor said caused no damage to residential, commercial or infrastructure areas. Iran’s armed forces said three tankers hit mines crossing the strait the same day.

Next door, Iraq has started pumping crude to Turkey again through Kirkuk-Ceyhan, idle since 2014, with Oil Minister Bassem Khudair saying flows resumed on Tuesday at 120k bbl / d and will rise toward 500k bbl / d once testing finishes, The National reports. He called the 960 km northern outlet a strategic step that lets Baghdad market crude “without price discounts.” Iraqi exports fell from 3.36 mn bbl / d in February to 131k bbl / d in April after the war closed the southern route, and more than 90% of the federal budget is funded by oil revenue that normally leaves through Hormuz.

Gold and Treasuries, the two assets investors usually turn to when stocks sell off, aren’t offering much shelter this month, Reuters reports. Gold touched USD 3.83k an ounce on Monday, its lowest since October 2025, and traded near USD 3.87k on Tuesday, while Treasuries had their worst week since the April 2025 tariff shock even as tech stocks kept falling, Reuters reports separately.

Strategists put it down to inflation. Bonds and gold can still cushion a growth scare, and they offer far less protection when rising prices and the prospect of Fed tightening are behind the selloff. The S&P 500 closed Tuesday down 1.03% and the Nasdaq 0.74%, with semiconductors leading the week’s losses.

Nvidia reported into that and beat on every line, including revenue more than doubling. Data center revenue rose 110% to USD 107.6 bn, against analyst expectations of about USD 109 bn for the group, and the company guided to USD 130 bn for the current quarter, its results statement showed. That outlook assumes no data center compute revenue from China. Interim CEO Colette Kress, the CFO until the board accepted Huang’s resignation on 11 November, said demand is “far exceeding supply” and that Vera Rubin “is off to an explosive start.” The chairman said on the earnings call the board does not intend to reinstate Huang and that a search covering internal and external candidates is underway, CBS reported. –Salma


Would you like to have lunch with us on Thursday, 10 December? We’re setting a table in DIFC for a very small and exclusive group of readers and business leaders in the UAE. If you’d like to be there, just hit reply to this email, tell us who you are and what you do, and we’ll take it from there.

Wait, lunch? Yes, lunch. Two hours, one table, no panel, no slides, just an open conversation among peers. We want to hear how the people running businesses in the UAE see the next twelve months: what’s working, what’s getting harder, and where the money is actually going now that the region is open for business again. Expect good food, good company, and the kind of conversation nobody has on stage.

Seats will be strictly limited and the lunch is invitation-only, but we’re planning on doing this more often.

Everything that will be said at the table stays at the table under Chatham House rules. We’ll be in touch with the people we’re inviting over the next two weeks or so with the details.

2

THE LEDE

Gulf neighbors are expected to tie Bahrain’s next rescue to IMF-style reforms and asset stakes

Bahrain has been warding off Iranian attacks over the past week for the first time since September as the kingdom reportedly negotiates a fresh round of financial support with its Gulf neighbors. The potential new rescue package comes as Bahrain’s foreign reserves are down by more than half since March, falling to a low of USD 1.8 bn in August, covering less than a month of imports, even after drawings on the USD 5.4 bn currency swap line the UAE extended in April.

The next package is likely to work like an IMF program in all but name, with disbursements tied to reform milestones and potentially to state asset stakes, our sources tell us. That style of conditional support would be a stark departure from the USD 10 bn rescue Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait extended in 2018, which eased Bahrain’s financing pressures without forcing the adjustment it was meant to deliver.

“We expect any future GCC package to resemble an IMF-style program more closely than the relatively lenient 2018 assistance,” Barclays MENA Economist James Swanston told EnterpriseAM. Swanston expects any new money to settle near-term concerns, with later tranches potentially “attached to contingencies such as budget deficit targets or implementation of certain fiscal policies.”

If anything, this round of Gulf support will set more stringent terms, Oxford Economics Senior Economist Karim Salhab tells us, saying he doesn’t think Gulf backers have given up on conditionality. He expects them to want conditions “that are harder to postpone,” with greater emphasis on measurable reforms and disbursements tied to implementation.

A bigger gap than before

The 2018 support was tied to a fiscal balance program meant to eliminate the deficit by 2022, a target Bahrain later pushed back by two years and then missed. Fast forward another two years past that extended deadline and Bahrain’s fiscal situation has deteriorated again. The IMF expects Bahrain’s economy to shrink 11.3% this year and puts government debt at 152.4% of GDP. BMI is more pessimistic, forecasting a 15.3% contraction, under a base case that assumes a US-Iran peace agreement in 1Q 2027. The agency also puts debt at 166.8% of GDP this year, with interest payments rising to 7.0% of GDP from 5.7% in 2025, according to research notes shared with EnterpriseAM.

Most of the revenue damage comes through oil, which, with refined products, accounts for about half of government revenue. BMI expects those receipts to fall 18% this year. Crude output was still 43% below February levels in September, largely because the offshore Abu Sa’fah field, which supplies around half of Bahrain’s oil and is operated jointly with Saudi Arabia, remains shut pending a joint decision to restart it, BMI said. Refining output was 60% below pre-war levels in August, and damage at the Sitra refinery will keep it 30% below 2025 levels at the end of 2027, the agency said.

The adjustment needed to stabilize the debt is now far larger than in 2018. Swanston estimates Bahrain needs consolidation worth about 16 percentage points of GDP. The package the government announced in December 2025, which included higher fuel prices and utility tariffs, a 20% cut to administrative spending, larger dividends from state companies and a 10% corporate income tax on large firms due to take effect in 2027, is worth around 5 percentage points, according to a Fitch estimate.

Even if Bahrain delivered the full adjustment by 2032, Swanston expects debt to climb to almost 180% of GDP in 2029 before declining. With only the December measures, debt would reach about 190% and plateau in the mid-2030s. With no further action, it would pass 250% by 2040.

Inspired by the IMF?

Bahrain has never had an IMF program, and all of our sources expect Gulf money to remain the first line of defense. “It’s very unlikely that Bahrain would be willing to go down the path of an IMF financing package,” Tuvey says. Salhab tells us a move to the Fund could also send the wrong message, since “bringing in the IMF could be interpreted as a sign that Bahrain’s relationship with its Gulf backers had materially deteriorated.” He sees the IMF becoming relevant only if bilateral support proves insufficient or talks over conditions break down.

A supporting role is more plausible. Tuvey can see Gulf states providing the money while the IMF is there “to mark Bahrain’s homework.” Under that setup, devaluing the BHD would be off the table. “The whole reason for the Gulf to provide funds to Bahrain is to avoid Bahrain devaluing, which would raise concerns about the sustainability of their own USD pegs,” he says. Capital Economics said last month that Bahrain would probably need more Gulf support to hold confidence in the BHD’s peg to the USD and refinance maturing external debt.

Full IMF lending would raise harder questions. The Fund has to judge a country’s debt sustainable before it lends, which in Bahrain’s case would probably require harsh tax rises and spending cuts, Tuvey notes. Some form of restructuring would likely come first, though not necessarily haircuts, Salhab suggests. Because Gulf governments and institutions hold a large share of the debt, that could mean “extending maturities, lowering financing costs or otherwise terming out obligations.” In a severe enough scenario, Salhab adds, the peg itself could come into the discussion.

Reports that the UAE is taking the lead in the new package largely reflects Abu Dhabi’s stronger financial position, Tuvey says, although this shifting balance could add to friction with Riyadh, he noted. Asharq Bloomberg reported last month that Riyadh was aware of Abu Dhabi’s move and viewed additional Gulf support for Bahrain positively. The report came a few weeks after UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh in what was the first high-level bilateral meeting since the two countries’ relations were strained over Yemen from last December.

Bond investors have long priced in a rescue. Bahrain became the first Gulf sovereign to sell bonds publicly after the war began, raising USD 1 bn in 10-year notes in June at a 7.125% yield on orders above USD 3.2 bn, Zawya reported.

“Bahrain’s risk premia are very low given the state of its public finances,” Tuvey says, warning that “any sense that the Gulf countries are wavering on that support would quickly test this assumption and probably cause risk premia to spike.” For Salhab, a prolonged delay, visible disagreement among backers, or financing that “materially weakens the position of existing bondholders” would do the most damage. Much of the demand for Bahrain’s debt also comes from Gulf institutional investors, so “headline market access probably understates how dependent financing conditions remain on regional support,” he added.

What’s in it for the rest

For Bahrain’s neighbors, the cost of support is small next to the cost of a default, which “could threaten Bahrain’s USD peg and generate wider speculation over Gulf exchange-rate regimes,” putting pressure even on far stronger Gulf economies, Swanston tells us. Tuvey describes the sums Bahrain needs as “a drop in the ocean” next to the savings held in Gulf sovereign wealth funds.

Egypt offers a template for what Gulf backers may ask for in exchange — potentially getting “something tangible in return” for intervening with FX liquidity in a severe crunch Tuvey says, pointing to Egypt’s megadeal with the UAE on Ras El Hekma. In February 2024, an ADQ-led consortium agreed to pay USD 24 bn for the site’s development rights and to convert USD 11 bn of UAE deposits at Egypt’s central bank into investments, as part of a USD 35 bn agreement. “I wouldn’t be surprised if financing for Bahrain starts to follow a similar script,” he says.

Bahrain has assets it could put on the table. Sovereign wealth fund Mumtalakat holds around USD 18.3 bn, BMI estimates, and Salhab says Manama could offer land or minority stakes. He sees limits to how far that can go: “The most attractive assets are finite, and their valuations would themselves come under pressure in a severe fiscal or financial crisis.”

It’s all about stamina

How much will Bahrain adjust? Any conditions will run up against how much austerity the government is prepared to absorb. BMI expects it to prioritize social stability and favor gradual, revenue-led adjustment over sharp wage or subsidy cuts. The 20% administrative spending cut and a new household electricity and water subsidy system are likely to be delayed or only partly implemented, BMI said in September, and it forecast current spending to rise 1.5% this year against the 1.0% cut it expected before the war. Swanston expects the adjustment to be spread over several years, in line with comparable Gulf adjustments that have taken around six.

The pace also hinges on Hormuz. BMI’s September forecast had the deficit narrowing to 6.0% of GDP in 2027 from 10.5% this year, on the assumption that shipping would begin to normalize in the fourth quarter of 2026. In October it pushed its expected US–Iran deal back to the first quarter of 2027 and gave a 30% chance to a return to high-intensity conflict, under which the economy would shrink 18.6% this year.

Bahrain “is not a completely lost cause,” Tuvey says, pointing to Oman, which Fitch has lifted back to investment grade. “Oman has shown that it can be done, but it will be painful,” he said.

If Gulf support does become permanent, Salhab expects a deliberate backstop to look “less like repeated bailouts and more like a multi-year financing framework: predictable concessional funding in exchange for fiscal targets, reform milestones and regular monitoring.” Tuvey would go further. To draw a line under the uncertainty, he says, the Gulf might need to offer “some type of unlimited financing (both in terms of time and amount),” such as an unlimited currency swap.

3

ECONOMY

Iraq’s draft 2027 budget would be its biggest ever — and its first full federal budget in four years

Iraq is on track to pass its first annual federal budget in four years, and the draft is the biggest Baghdad has ever written. The 31-article draft sets total spending at IQD 217.2 tn (c. USD 143.6 bn) and revenue at IQD 175 tn (c. USD 115.1 bn), with a deficit of IQD 43 tn, Susan Abdullah, head of the General Commission for Monitoring Federal Revenue Allocations, told Shafaq News. Parliament has not passed a working annual budget since the 2023 law, and the Finance Ministry has run on a monthly temporary spending mechanism for salaries and essentials since.

The headline numbers only work because Baghdad spent the last few months laying the groundwork. In August, the cabinet approved a cut to fuel subsidies for industry, commerce, and private power generation, with the four citizen fuels (petrol, gas oil, kerosene, and LPG) left subsidized. In October, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) devalued the IQD by 15% to IQD 1,520 to the USD. Both are explicitly tied to the budget math: the subsidy reform targets around IQD 17.8 tn a year in additional revenue and savings, while the devaluation hands the government about 15% more IQD for every USD of oil revenue it earns — a decision, as we reported at the time, is necessary for Baghdad to balance the budget, with Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi framing the alternatives to parliament as austerity, paying salaries every 45 days, or more borrowing against a debt stock already past IQD 208 tn.

The budget has big ambitions despite a year of lost oil revenues. The IQD 217.2 tn (USD 143 bn) spending plan runs 44% above the highest actual spending Iraq has executed in the past three years and 54% above the 2025 outturn, according to analysis by Rudaw Research Center (RRC), a Kurdistan Region-backed think tank that claims to have seen the budget bill. Planned non-oil revenues are also high — the budget is forecasting IQD 30.2 tn (USD 20 bn) of non-oil revenue, almost double the 2025 figure.

Salary spending steps up despite the squeeze: Public employee compensation has been rising every year — IQD 47.2 tn in 2023, IQD 60.1 tn in 2024, IQD 60.4 tn in 2025 — and the 2027 draft adds another IQD 4.3 tn (USD 280 mn) to reach IQD 64.7 tn (USD 43 bn).

Investment spending is also going up, but there’s a caveat. The budget allocates IQD 34.4 tn (USD 23 bn) for investments, which reads as health on paper. But almost half of this figure actually is tied up in prior commitments: IQD 10 tn (USD 6.6 bn) for oil companies, IQD 4 tn (USD 2.6 bn) for Chinese contracting agreements, and IQD 2.7 tn (USD 1.8 bn) for external loans.

But Iraq’s latest budget planning shows it has typically overshot and been rescued by underexecution. Against the 2023 budget law’s IQD 198.9 tn spending plan, the Finance Ministry’s year-end report shows actual spending of IQD 142.4 tn, or 71.6% of the plan, with the actual deficit landing at IQD 6.8 tn, representing about 4.7% of spending, according to RCC calculations.

The draft rests on an oil price and an FX rate that both sit below current market levels, a move that Iraqi economists previously told us would give breathing room for the government. The crude assumption is USD 58 per barrel at 4 mn bbl / d in exports — way below where crude is trading now. The FX assumption of IQD 1,500 to the USD — the rate at which the Finance Ministry sells oil receipts to the central bank — sits below the IQD 1,520 official rate the public pays.

REMEMBER- Iraq used to export an average of 3.5 mn bb / d prior to the war, and adding 500k bb / d would require significant investments on a slightly longer-term horizon. Current Iraqi exports are running at around 600k bbl / d with Hormuz still closed,

The draft also carves itself out of the 2019 fiscal management law in several places. Article 6/4 of the Fiscal Management Law of 2019 caps the federal deficit at 3% of GDP; Article 30 of the 2027 draft exempts itself from that cap, and the proposed deficit runs roughly six times the limit. The draft is a one-year plan, not the medium-term framework the 2019 law envisages. Article 25/1 widens the finance minister’s authority to move money, letting them reallocate between “programs” rather than only within a single “section” — a meaningful expansion of executive discretion.

This fits a messy policy pattern our sources have described. The August fuel subsidy decision was still unpublished in the Official Gazette and under cabinet review more than five weeks after Baghdad announced it, Mohammed Khalaf, principal legal adviser at Iraq Gate Legal Consulting, told us in October; and half of the new crude pricing formula pointed to a price guided by a budget that did not yet exist then. On the oil side, Lehigh University economist Frank Gunter told EnterpriseAM in an earlier conversation that Iraqi budgets have run on a 20-year institutional offset: “The Ministry of Oil has always exaggerated how much oil they were able to export; the Ministry of Finance has always underestimated the price of oil.” The outcome, in Gunter’s words: “less oil but at a higher price.” The 2027 draft inverts that pattern, with a conservative headline oil price and an ambitious volume target that few outside the Finance Ministry’s own working assumptions treat as reachable.

What’s next: We still don’t have a signoff, but earlier reports suggested that the Cabinet might green light the draft as soon as this week.

GO DEEPER- We flagged in July that Baghdad had given up on a 2026 budget and was redrafting 2027 from scratch on a program-and-performance model developed with the World Bank. In September, we covered the fuel subsidy lift as the first of the pre-budget moves, and in October we covered the 15% devaluation as the second.

4

DIPLOMACY

EU and Syria revive 2008 partnership agreement

EU foreign ministers agreed on Monday to revive a dormant 2008 partnership agreement with Syria, paving the way for a freetrade framework, political dialogue, and broader economic cooperation with Damascus, Reuters reports. “The EU seeks a major upgrade in its ties with Syria, and today ministers supported moving ahead with the EU-Syria Association Agreement,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told reporters after a monthly foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels.

The push continued in Damascus a day later, at the first meeting of the Syria Partnership Coordination Forum (SPCF) held on Syrian soil attended by representatives from EU member states, the G7, Arab governments, and international financial institutions — the forum had its inaugural session in Brussels on May 11.

The meeting’s concrete deliverables so far: The EU and Syria launched a Technical Assistance Hub to support institutional and economic reform, and Damascus signed an undertaking to implement the EU’s Registered Exporter (REX) system, the technical system that lets Syrian exporters claim preferential tariff treatment into the European market. The EU Commission also said it expects to sign contracts for a EUR 175 mn socioeconomic support package by the end of 2026, covering SME support, business-climate reform and rule-of-law programs, with a full EU-Syria investment conference penciled in for 2027.

Why does this all matter? European commercial capital has lagged other early movers in Syria — and these moves add to a spate of signals that non-EU governments and investors in the US and the GCC have been sending about the viability of investing in Syria. We flagged in April that European players were late to Syria’s reopening, and the pattern has held through the year, while more risk-friendly Turkish, Qatari, Emirati, and Saudi money made moves on big-ticket projects.

REMEMBER- European capital is a different animal. It’s mostly private-sector led, commercially driven, and accountable to shareholders that are risk-averse and anal about compliance, as we explained in July. The operative constraints for European capital were not just sanctions headlines but also the remaining grey areas, such as FATF gray-listing, murky correspondent-banking compliance, US secondary-sanctions exposure, insurable security risk, and contract enforceability in a country whose property and commercial law are still being rewritten.

5

MARKETS + DEALS

Jordan’s Bank Al Etihad wins Syria’s first new banking license in 16 years

The region’s buyers are going abroad with partners this week. Mubadala is taking Canaccord’s UK wealth arm through a joint venture with Centerbridge. STC is bidding for a minority of a British data center developer whose owner wants a co-investor to fund expansion. And Jordan has laid claim to Syria’s first banking license since 2010.

Jordan’s Bank Al Etihad received the green light to set up an Islamic bank in Syria, the first new banking license Damascus has issued in some 16 years. The Central Bank of Syria approved Bank al Etihad Islamic, capitalized at USD 150 mn. It is the first approval since Governor Safwat Raslan said in September that he expects more than USD 1 bn in foreign capital to go into new banks. The Amman-listed Bank al Etihad will hold a controlling 51% stake, while an unnamed local partner will hold the remaining 49% stake, Bank Al Etihad Group said in a bourse disclosure.

The license opens a much needed route to recapitalizing a banking sector whose capital base has become too thin due to war. The USD 150 mn in earmarked capital for the new bank is nearly a fifth of the c. USD 795 mn in combined equity that Syria’s private banks held at the end of 2025, according to Karam Shaar Advisory estimates we cited in May. Until now, foreign money has come in through one acquisition: Qatar’s Estithmar Holding took 49% of Shahba Bank in April.


Egypt’s state-owned Misr Ins. Holding Company is floating 15% of Misr Life Ins. on the EGX next month. The state insurer is selling 750 mn existing shares in a purely secondary offering, so the proceeds go to MIHC rather than to Misr Life, according to its intention to float (pdf). That is below the up to 20% the Sovereign Fund of Egypt put on the table in May. A private placement for qualified investors in Egypt and abroad runs alongside a retail offering, both priced through a book-build, with subscription and trading expected in December.

The groundwork was laid in the fall. Misr Life and Banque du Caire were both on the road in mid-October, a government source told us then, as the state pressed the National Social Ins. Authority, Egypt Post, and the Awqaf Authority to lift their equity exposure. The EBRD was negotiating in August to take up to 5% ahead of the IPO, with five global, Arab, and African institutions competing for a 10% private placement tranche.

It would be the third major EGX offering since October, after MNT-Halan sold 20% of its Egyptian business and Banque Misr sold 45% of BdC, with Gourmet and Korra Energi debuting earlier in the year. The float has been on the table since 2018, when the state aimed at a 1Q 2019 listing before slipping to end-2020, 2022, and 2H 2023. Misr Life was temporarily listed in March and the board approved a 10-for-1 share split in September, taking the register to 5 bn shares with paid-in capital unchanged at EGP 5 bn.


Mubadala and Centerbridge Partners are buying Canaccord Genuity’s UK wealth business at an enterprise value of about GBP 1.17 bn (USD 1.55 bn). The two will form a JV to acquire all the shares in CGWM UK, which manages GBP 43.4 bn for private clients in the UK and in Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man, according to a press release. Canaccord expects about GBP 564 mn (USD 746 mn) from the sale, and the business keeps the Canaccord Wealth brand for two years.

It is the first half of a two-part deal. Chairman and CEO Dan Daviau has agreed to take the Toronto-listed parent private, and that transaction cannot close unless the UK sale does, with part of the proceeds going to Canaccord shareholders as part of the buyout price. A 45-day go-shop period leaves room for a competing offer, after earlier talks with Warburg Pincus and Clayton Dubilier & Rice fell through. Holders of about 35% of common shares have indicated support, and both are expected to close in 1H 2027.


Saudi’s stc is among the bidders for a minority stake in British data center developer Pure Data Centers Group, which Oaktree Capital Management may seek to value at around USD 8 bn. The owner wants a new minority investor to help fund expansion, with GIC teaming up with Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners for its own offer ahead of a deadline for binding bids later this month, Bloomberg reports, citing sources familiar with the matter. FAB joined the lenders behind Pure DC’s USD 1.9 bn financing framework this month.


L’imad has raised its indirect stake in ADX-listed Abu Dhabi Aviation to 71.61% from 59.45%, buying the extra 12.17% from Mubadala. The Abu Dhabi sovereign investor’s wholly owned ADQ Aviation and Aerospace Services, which became the carrier’s controlling shareholder in 2024, acquired 133.4 mn shares from Mamoura Diversified Global Holding, a wholly owned Mubadala subsidiary, according to an ADX disclosure (pdf). Terms were not disclosed, and the 133.4 mn shares imply a register of about 1.1 bn, by our math.

Market Snapshot

Tadawul -0.1% • ADX 0.9% • DFM 0.6% • EGX30 -1.0%

Brent USD 93.14 / bbl • Gold USD 3,852 / oz • USD / SAR 3.75 • USD / EGP 53.80

6

DIPLOMACY

Oman and Uzbekistan sign USD 5 bn MoUs focused on logistics and mining

Oman widens its Central Asia pipeline with a USD 5 bn Uzbekistan package: Oman and Uzbekistan signed about USD 5 bn in agreements on Monday during a joint business forum in Muscat, the latest in a Central Asia-focused run. The agreements cover energy, manufacturing, mining, logistics, agriculture, construction, and digital technologies, as well as visa exemption, customs cooperation, free zones, communications, and finance, Oman’s Foreign Ministry said.

Logistics and mining were the priority on the Uzbek side: Landlocked Tashkent is seeking access to Omani ports and international shipping routes, with Uzbek Industry and Trade Laziz Kudratov describing Oman as a “natural gateway” into the GCC, Africa, India, and Southeast Asia. Uzbek firms are also eyeing copper and gold exploration in Oman, he said, with Tashkent offering discounts against London Metal Exchange prices for companies processing Uzbek copper.

ICYMI- The physical logistics corridor is already taking shape alongside the capital corridor: Asyad Group acquired a controlling stake in Uzbekistan’s main dry-port platforms — Universal Logistics Services and Highway Logistics Center — in June, linking inland terminals in Tashkent to Omani ports.

And the Uzbek-Omani private sector cooperation is also maturing: The Uzbek corporate footprint in Oman has widened from six companies in 2020 to 57 at the end of 2025, Omani Commerce Minister Anwar bin Hilal al Jabri told the forum. A 15-year-old joint Uzbek-Omani sovereign investment platform was worth some USD 266.7 mn as of 2025.

IN CONTEXT- These agreements are the latest in a larger Central Asia push that we’ve been tracking this year. The OIA announced earlier this month it would launch a USD 500 mn fund targeting Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, pooling capital from other sovereign funds under an Omani manager. Back in April, the OIA signed a preliminary agreement to launch a joint fund with Kazakhstan’s SWF Samruk-Kazyna, with capital divided 50-50 between the sovereigns in a structure that is almost identical to all of OIA’s foreign investment ventures in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Spain.

7

WHAT WE’RE TRACKING

Abu Dhabi wants new businesses up and running in half the time

Abu Dhabi wants to halve the time it takes to get a business running once it’s licensed. The Department of Economic Development (ADDED) is targeting an average 53% cut in the time between getting an economic license and starting to operate, across five sectors: education (77%), healthcare (63%), F&B (54%), beauty and wellness (39%), and industrial (34%), according to an Abu Dhabi media office statement.

BACKGROUND- In 2025, 51.6% of new licences were issued immediately, with no extra approvals needed from other government entities. ADDED says the changes would have lifted that to 67% if applied to 2025 licenses.

Jeddah calling

Dar Global plans to establish a new mixed-use development in Jeddah with a gross development value of USD 267 mn, according to a press release. The project will sit on land acquired for around USD 56 mn. The purchase is part of Dar Global’s plan to expand its Saudi portfolio by up to SAR 4 bn, with further land acquisitions to be announced shortly.

Sign of the times

The UAE has joined a US-led pact to guard the AI supply chain: It’s one of nine US allies to sign the San Francisco Declaration, which covers the technology and infrastructure AI supply chains depend on, the State Department said. The others are Australia, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, Singapore, and the UK. Working groups will cover AI policy, adoption, supply chains, security hubs, and resilience. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission are set to sign next week, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg told the Financial Times.


November 2026

19 Nov — Jordan-EU Investment Conference. Jordan

24-26 Nov — Libya International Energy Conference and Exhibition (LIBYES 2026). Libya

December 2026

4-6 December (Friday-Sunday): Formula 1 Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. UAE

5-6 December (Saturday-Sunday): Doha Forum 2026. Doha

7-10 December (Monday-Thursday): Abu Dhabi Finance Week. UAE

8-9 December (Tuesday-Wednesday): Capital Market Summit. UAE

8-9 December (Tuesday-Wednesday): Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting.

8-10 December (Tuesday-Thursday): UN Water Conference 2026. UAE

10 December (Thursday): Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey MPC meeting. Turkey

16-17 December (Wednesday-Thursday): Bahrain National Day (public holiday). Bahrain

17 Dec — Central Bank of Egypt monetary policy decision. Egypt

18 December (Friday): Qatar National Day (public holiday). Qatar

January 2027

7 January (Thursday): Coptic Christmas (public holiday, market closed). Egypt

12-14 January (Tuesday-Thursday): World Future Energy Summit, Adnec Centre. UAE

21 January (Thursday): Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey MPC meeting. Turkey

25 January (Monday): Police Day / Revolution anniversary (public holiday). Egypt

26-27 January (Tuesday-Wednesday): FOMC meeting. US

February 2027

1-3 February (Monday-Wednesday): World Governments Summit, Dubai. UAE

22 February (Monday): Founding Day (public holiday). Saudi Arabia

25-26 February (Thursday-Friday): National and Liberation Days (public holidays). Kuwait

March 2027

12-14 March (Friday-Sunday): Bahrain Grand Prix, season opener, Sakhir. Bahrain

16-17 March (Tuesday-Wednesday): FOMC meeting.

18 March (Thursday): Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey MPC meeting. Turkey

19-21 March (Friday-Sunday): Saudi Arabian Grand Prix, Jeddah Corniche Circuit. Saudi Arabia

30 March-1 April (Tuesday-Thursday): Egypt Energy Show. Egypt

April 2027

22 April (Thursday): Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey MPC meeting. Turkey

25 April (Sunday): Sinai Liberation Day (public holiday). Egypt

27-28 April (Tuesday-Wednesday): FOMC meeting. US

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