Kuwait’s push to move more citizens into private-sector jobs is squeezing operating margins across the economy. For businesses running on margins between 12-25%, the fixed labor overhead of replacing experienced expatriates with local successors can strip 5-10% of operating margin, Trefor Murphy, CEO of GCC-based recruitment agency Cooper Fitch, tells EnterpriseAM.

The context for these surging localization costs is a shortage of local talent and a public sector that hires the vast majority of Kuwaitis at a 41% premium. Non-Kuwaitis currently account for roughly 96% of private-sector employment, Murphy says. Only about 4% of private sector employees are Kuwaitis — around 67.2k out of 1.8 mn workers — against 80.1% of government workers. And the public sector carries a 41% wage premium over comparable private-sector salaries, according to the IMF. The mandate: Kuwait is targeting a 69% increase in Kuwaiti private-sector employment and USD 32 bn in foreign direct investment as part of its 2035 vision that outlines Kuwaitization and diversification targets. Kuwaitization quotas now require a Kuwaiti headcount of 70% in banking, 22% in insurance, 65% in telecoms, 30% in petrochemicals, and 20% in real estate.

Why this matters: Vision 2035 asks the private sector to carry diversification, while Kuwaitization asks it to do so with a workforce the labor market does not currently provide — and the public sector’s wage premium ensures the Kuwaitis who do work keep migrating toward the government rather than away from it.

Background

Kuwaitization itself is twenty-three years old and has barely moved the private-sector share. Sector-based quotas were set by the Council of Ministers in September 2002 and implemented in October 2003 under the National Labour Support Law, with the latest sectoral quotas passed in 2019. Four prime ministers, three parliaments, and multiple revisions later, the Kuwaiti share of the private sector has moved from roughly 2% to 3.6%.

Kuwait is also behind on diversification: Kuwait has “certainly lagged behind its neighbors in terms of diversifying,” Courtney Freer, a Gulf-focused assistant professor at Emory University, tells us. Hydrocarbon receipts account for over 90% of exports and government revenue, well behind regional peers like the UAE and Saudi Arabia in non-oil revenue generation and structural reform execution. The regional backdrop has worsened the position: Following conflict and disruptions near the Strait of Hormuz, the IMF scaled back its regional projections and now forecasts that Kuwait’s real GDP could contract by as much as 16.7%.

The pain points

Kuwaitization troubles in the private sector are concentrated at the management level. The pool of experienced local executives is constrained, particularly for upper-management functions, and companies competing for the same limited group of Kuwaiti finance, technology, and operational leaders risk driving up compensation costs without expanding the underlying supply of qualified professionals. “Just because you work in finance in the Finance Ministry, the Economy Ministry, or the Tourism Ministry in the government doesn’t mean you can go into a [private] company and tell them, ‘I’m now the CFO.’ There is a skill set mismatch,” Murphy says.

And handovers are expensive: Replacing a foreign chief financial officer or chief technology officer with local talent often requires extended handovers, Murphy tells us. When an outgoing executive must remain in place to train a successor, a company bears the cost of double-headcount salaries for a prolonged period. “That’s where the cost comes in,” Murphy says, noting the dual expense of retaining expatriates during transition periods while funding the recruitment and training of local successors. In cases where visas are not renewed immediately, firms face tight windows to transfer institutional knowledge before foreign talent departs.

Murphy’s take is that the policy now borrows too much from GCC peers and doesn’t contain the incentives that Kuwait needs. “It just seems like a policy that worked somewhere else put into a country where that policy can’t work… they don’t have the economic stimulus to actually drive a significant change like that,” Murphy says. Localization frameworks deployed in Saudi Arabia under Nitaqat or in the UAE under Emiratization have run alongside substantially larger structural reforms — tax base shifts, wage interventions, dedicated talent-attraction regimes. Kuwait has carried its quotas without the surrounding architecture.

Kuwait has also led a citizenship revocation campaign that is adding pressure to its localized labor base. The campaign tightens an already binding supply constraint on Kuwaitisation compliance. Kuwaitisation ratios are enforced at the employer level — the share of Kuwaitis in a given company’s headcount, against the quota set for the sector. The supply side is the pool of qualified Kuwaiti nationals employers can draw from, and the campaign shrinks that supply pool further, and sharpens the compensation bidding war Murphy described.

But beyond shrinking the supply pool of qualified Kuwaitis, the campaign has not triggered a broader outflow of foreign workers. Kuwait’s population expanded by roughly 72k people, or 1.4%, in 1H 2026, driven almost entirely by foreign residents. Expatriate employment grew by 50k workers, or 1.9%, over the same period.

Compensation and employment opportunities remain the main factors shaping decisions for skilled expats. The same applies to Kuwaiti citizens weighing public versus private sector work: pay and career path drive the choice. The campaign changes the citizen supply pool, and signals exit risk to a professional-class segment of the population. It does not change the private-sector pay structure, the skill mismatch, or the public-sector wage premium pulling Kuwaiti talent away from the diversification the plan depends on.

The state has not published disaggregated data on who has been affected — whether the revoked were in the workforce, which sectors they worked in, or whether they held roles that counted toward Kuwaitization targets. “I don’t know how many people in the business community are aware of what’s been happening and have been affected by it.” What is observable is that the campaign reduces the citizen supply the quota draws against, in a labor market where supply was already the binding constraint.

IN CONTEXT- The campaign has stripped 71k citizenships since March 2024, with some putting the full estimate at 250k-300k once dependents are counted. The campaign, which has drawn criticism, is also an indirect intervention into the labor market.

The bottom line

For Kuwaitization to pick up, Kuwait needs to fix its talent localization to go beyond quotas. The country needs to address the structural incentives that are punishing for the private sector — and on top of these incentives is the wage premium gap between the private and public sectors. This should be paired with initiatives that do two things: Closing the gap between skills and education and the private sector’s needs, while giving breathing room for private businesses to cover extra costs that quotas are driving.

The public sector bloat is both a diversification and Kuwaitization story: Kuwait’s public-sector wage bill reached 15.4% of GDP in FY 2024-25, up from 12.8% in FY 2019-20, and absorbs 41% of total government expenditure. That eats away at the financing available for the country to spend on diversification investments, and the IMF called directly for intervention: “A public sector wage setting mechanism should be introduced to gradually reduce the 41 percent premium over the private sector, while a hiring cap should be used to steadily lower the public sector employment share, both towards high-income country levels,” the Fund’s directors said in February 2026. Public employment remains a core component of Kuwait’s social contract and one of its largest fiscal obligations. The structural reform the IMF has asked for has not moved.