Turkey’s Iranian gas ties collide with US sanctions push

1

WHAT WE’RE TRACKING TODAY

TODAY: US sanctions threat exposes gaps in Turkey’s gas mix + Lesha Bank buys into USD 1 bn aircraft portfolio

Good morning, wonderful people — the common thread this morning is risk management, in very different forms.

First up: Turkey’s Iranian gas habit is about to collide with Washington’s Iran sanctions push. The US has threatened economic penalties against countries still doing business with Tehran — putting Ankara’s roughly 7.7 bcm of Iranian gas imports, about 13% of the total, squarely at risk.

Meanwhile, Lesha Bank is taking a more structured route into aviation. The Qatar-listed bank has acquired stakes in a diversified aviation portfolio worth more than USD 1 bn through its Lesha Aviation Fund — though it didn’t say how much it put in or how big its stake actually is.

PLUS- There’s a second lens joining the rotation: Bottleneck Watch, a companion to last week’s newly introduced Chokepoint Watch. This lens focuses on supply squeezes that build gradually rather than at a single strait or crossing. We’ll track how disruptions compound over time — not one blocked passage, but a buildup of hits that can reshape grain, food, and commodity flows.

And while everyone else is managing risk, China is taking the long view on Egypt. China’s ZC Rubber signed a letter of intent with Egypt’s SCZone to study a USD 500 mn tire complex there. The move is one small piece of a much bigger week, with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi overseeing five agreements and more than 20 cooperation documents during China’s first state visit to Egypt in a decade.

LNG joins the offshore handoff

The UAE and Qatar are moving LNG in rare ship-to-ship (STS) transfers. Three cargoes loaded inside the Gulf were transferred to other tankers off Oman and the UAE’s east coast in recent weeks for delivery to India and Japan, Reuters reports, citing Kpler and Vortexa data.

Why this matters: LNG is rarely moved through STS transfers because the gas must remain chilled throughout the handoff, limiting the pool of compatible tankers and equipment that can handle it. Crude, by contrast, is routinely transferred between vessels — Iraq alone loaded nearly seven vessels in a single day last week.

REMEMBER- Gulf producers have been building exactly this kind of workaround for crude for weeks now. Saudi Arabia’s Aramco and QatarEnergy are both routing tankers through transfer points outside the strait as Gulf producers double down on the oil handoff. Meanwhile, Adnoc built a shuttle model around Fujairah that lets buyers collect crude without sending their own ships through the danger zone.

The caveat: The shuttle trade model can be viewed as a continuity mechanism rather than new export capacity, Natalia Katona, commodity analyst at Oil Price, tells EnterpriseAM. Scaling the model further means finding not only more available tankers and STS equipment, but a higher number of shipowners, trained crews, and ins’ers willing to accept the transit risk.

Trouble on the first leg

Attacks on tankers moving oil out of the Gulf are picking up again. Two tankers — the South Korea-linked Senegal Prosperity and Saudi-owned Sidr — were reportedly struck on Monday night, the Financial Times reports. UK Maritime Trade Operations said one of the tankers was hit by three projectiles while sailing the route closest to Oman — the same corridor Washington says it’s protecting.

The shuttle system is now a target: Iran has increasingly targeted vessels shuttling crude out of the Gulf for transfer to tankers in the Gulf of Oman. The strikes follow the Kuwaiti tanker Burgan being hit by a missile on Saturday, the second Kuwaiti vessel targeted within 48 hours.

The traffic picture remains far weaker than Washington suggests. US President Donald Trump said the military is guiding an average of 30 ships through the strait each night, but the data showed just 10 vessels moving in or out on 30 August and a daily high of 21. Ships are also switching off GPS signals to avoid detection, muddying the count further.

Market watch

Oil prices edged lower this morning as US-Iran strikes threatened Middle East supplies,

Reuters reports. Brent crude futures dipped 0.43 to USD 95.02 / bbl by 00.29 GMT, while West Texas Intermediate (WTI) slipped USD 0.24 to USD 90.77 / bbl.


The Baltic Index breaks surges overnight: The Baltic Exchange’s dry bulk index — which tracks rates for the capesize, panamax, and supramax vessel segments — increased by 5.5% to 3,331 points on Wednesday. The capesize index surged 8.1% to 5,642 points, while the panamax rose by 2.9% to 2,429 points. The smaller supramax inched up 0.7% to 1,657 points.

***

YOU’RE READING EnterpriseAM Logistics, the essential MENA publication for senior execs who care about the industry that connects producers and retailers to global markets. We’re out Monday through Thursday by 10:15 am in Cairo and Riyadh, and 11:15 am in the UAE.

EnterpriseAM Logistics is available without charge thanks to the generous support of our friends at Hassan Allam Utilities and Transmar.

Were you forwarded this email? Tap or click here to get your own copy of EnterpriseAM Logistics.

Want to send us a story idea, request coverage, ask for a correction, or otherwise get in touch? Reach out to us on [email protected].

DID YOU KNOW that we also cover Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE? ***

2

The Big Story Today

Washington’s push to isolate Iran could cost Turkey one of its biggest gas suppliers

Turkey’s Iranian gas habit is about to collide with Washington’s Iran sanctions push. The US has threatened economic penalties against countries that continue doing business with Tehran — putting Ankara’s Iranian gas imports at risk, Bloomberg reports. Turkey sourced nearly 7.7 bcm from Iran last year— around 13% of its gas imports — and the flows have continued even after the two countries’ 25-year supply contract expired at the end of July.

The business lens: diversification is paying off for Washington

Turkey has been steadily reducing its reliance on Iranian gas, widening both the number of suppliers and the range of contracts. State-owned Botas has built a wide LNG portfolio, including around 15 bcm of supply under 2025-2028 agreements with eight global suppliers — the likes of Germany’s Sefe, Japan’s Jera, Norway’s Equinor, and Italy’s Eni — while a new 15-year agreement is set to bring another 2.2 bcm a year of Azerbaijani pipeline gas from the Absheron field starting in 2029.

The shift has brought US suppliers deeper into Turkey’s gas mix. The country signed its second long-term US LNG offtake agreement last December — a nine-year Woodside agreement covering 5.8 bcm over nine years from 2030. It also secured a 20-year Mercuria agreement for around 4 bcm a year from 2026, as well as LNG supply contracts with ExxonMobil for 2.5 mtpa and Shell for 4 bcm a year.

That gives Washington an economic lever as well as a sanctions tool. Ankara has committed to take nearly 1.5k US LNG cargoes over 15 years as it targets USD 100 bn in bilateral trade — making Turkey a major buyer of American energy just as the US pushes it away from Iranian supply.

But replacing Iranian gas will still come at a cost: “Initially, much of the shock would probably sit with Botas. But ultimately there are only several places for that cost to go: the Botas balance sheet, the government budget, industry, or consumers,” CEO of Global Resources Partnership Mehmet Ogutcu tells EnterpriseAM.

Higher imported-gas costs would feed through electricity prices, industrial costs, and inflation, Ogutcu says. Turkey still subsidizes around 45% of residential natural gas bills, and its Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in April that the government’s 2026 electricity and gas support program could rise from TRY 305 bn to roughly TRY 925 bn if elevated energy prices persist through year-end. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has signaled that Ankara will not jeopardize ties with Washington over Iranian gas — even if that means securing more expensive replacement supply before winter.

The systems lens: new suppliers don’t ensure a new route

Turkey has diversified its gas supply, but its transport network remains more concentrated. Ankara started importing Turkmen gas in March 2025, with 1.3 bcm delivered via an Iranian swap. Turkey was still considering higher volumes through the same route last year, before the swap was suspended after just a month or two, Iranian energy analyst Dalga Khatinoglu tells us.

Why this matters: It indicates why adding suppliers doesn’t necessarily remove the risks attached to them. Washington last year refused to approve Iraq’s plan to import Turkmen gas through Iran, despite Baghdad arguing that the gas itself was Turkmen, because the swap arrangement would still economically benefit Tehran.

The bigger question for Turkey is whether each new source comes with an independent route. “Having five suppliers instead of two doesn’t necessarily give you five independent supply corridors,” Ogutcu argues. True diversification means reducing exposure not just to individual suppliers, but also to the routes, contracts, infrastructure, financing arrangements, and political risks that underpin those supplies. “Turkey has made impressive progress on the first. It still has work to do on the others,” he adds.

The resilience lens: Turkey has the backup — but not all of it is ready

Turkey has built a buffer against losing Iranian gas, but some of the capacity is still catching up with the country’s plans. Turkey has around 161 mcm / d of LNG regasification capacity, while its roughly 6.3-6.5 bcm of gas storage is full. Domestic production is helping as well, though the Sakarya region was still producing around 9.5 mcm / d, against earlier targets of roughly 20 mcm / d by 4Q 2026.

Turkey’s LNG capacity and rising domestic production leave it with enough supply options to withstand the loss of Iranian gas, Khatinoglu says. But the real stress test “is not whether Turkey can buy another LNG cargo. It is whether Turkey can land it, regasify it, inject or withdraw it when necessary and move those molecules to the right part of the country on the coldest day of January,” according to Ogutcu.

The bottom line: Turkey has spent two years building genuine optionality — LNG contracts, Azerbaijani pipeline gas, domestic production — but the Turkmen gas-via-Iran swap shows that optionality on the molecule doesn’t fully insulate Ankara from Washington’s transit-route logic.

3

Investment Watch

Lesha Bank broadens aviation exposure with new 18-aircraft portfolio

Lesha is taking a more structured route into aviation: Qatar-listed Lesha Bank has acquired equity interests in a diversified aviation portfolio with an aggregate market value of more than USD 1 bn through its Lesha Aviation Fund, according to a Qatar Stock Exchange disclosure (pdf). The bank didn’t specify how much it invested or the size of the equity interest it acquired.

What’s in the bag: The portfolio comprises 18 aircraft leased to nine airlines across eight countries and was acquired through an aviation asset-backed securities transaction. Lesha Aviation Capital, the bank’s Dublin-based aircraft leasing platform, will manage the portfolio.

The growth play: Lesha added five Boeing 777-300ERs to its portfolio in late 2024, followed with an indirect investment in Edinburgh Airport in April 2025, lost out to DAE on Macquarie AirFinance earlier this year, and acquired Amedeo Air Four Plus in a GBP 190 mn acquisition days later.

There’s more in the pipeline: Lesha Aviation Capital says it now has more than 70 aircraft across signed investments, compared with 28 aircraft in its closed portfolio — meaning most of what it’s committed to hasn’t closed yet. The platform manages around USD 2.7 bn in aviation assets, with operations spread across Doha, Dublin, and London, though it’s not clear from public disclosures whether today’s agreement is already counted in that total.

4

BOTTLENECK WATCH

Could Black Sea attacks reopen the world’s grain wound?

Black Sea attacks are squeezing grain exports: Nearly two months of sustained Russian and Ukrainian attacks on each other’s commercial vessels, ports, and grain terminals have disrupted exports from both countries — pushing wheat futures to their highest level in three years, Bloomberg reports.

Ukraine’s grain exports reportedly fell to just a fifth of their potential volume in August, as repeated Russian strikes hit major Black Sea ports including Odesa, while attacks and capacity constraints also disrupted alternative routes via the Danube. The country may ship around 29.6 mn tonnes of agricultural products in the 2026/27 marketing year, down 54% from an earlier estimate of 64.4 mn tonnes, while wheat exports alone could fall 53% to 8.3 mn tonnes.

Russian wheat exports in September are expected to fall to their lowest level since 2010, according to research firm SovEcon, which expects shipments of 1.8-2.3 mn tonnes this month, compared with 4.8 mn tonnes a year earlier. Strikes have also damaged facilities at Novorossiysk — Russia’s main grain-export hub — and disrupted navigation through the Don-Azov Channel.

The bottleneck is the route to market

The grain is there, the routes are not: Both countries still have grain to sell, but damaged terminals, vessel risk, and constrained alternative routes are preventing it from reaching buyers. That has created a split market: wheat prices are falling inside Russia and Ukraine as grain accumulates, even as international futures rise and importers pay more to secure replacement cargoes.

Why this matters: Russia and Ukraine together supply more than a quarter of globally traded wheat, while also exporting major volumes of corn, barley, and sunflower oil. Russia alone accounts for roughly one in every six tons of wheat traded globally. Black Sea grain is typically among the cheapest available, making it important for price-sensitive importers across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

Who could benefit: Exporters in the EU, Australia, Argentina, and the US could capture displaced demand, with Romania and Bulgaria offering the closest alternatives. But replacement is not one-for-one; other origins may cost more, travel farther, or supply wheat with different milling qualities.

Can the backup carry the load?

Diversion options remain limited: Russia is redirecting grain toward its Baltic ports, but their estimated 7 mtpa capacity is a fraction of the 46.3 mn tonnes handled through the Black Sea and Sea of Azov last season — equivalent to some 90% of the country’s grain exports. Ukraine’s Danube fallback is also congested, with around 80 vessels waiting to enter its river ports at the end of August.

The risks are mounting, but the market is not yet in crisis. Global grain stocks remain relatively comfortable following strong harvests in previous years, while food commodity prices remain well below the records reached after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict started. Those buffers mean the immediate impact is more likely to appear through higher landed costs, freight rates, and government subsidy bills than widespread physical shortages.

The impact will vary by importer: Egypt and Jordan face the most immediate procurement and subsidy pressure, while Gulf states have greater purchasing power to pay for alternative supplies and a wide supplier options, allowing them to compete for alternative cargoes — potentially pushing more vulnerable importers further down the queue.

Two chokepoints, one shock

The Middle East is being squeezed between two disrupted trade corridors. Black Sea attacks are making the region’s cheapest grain harder and more expensive to secure, while the Hormuz disruptions are raising the cost of fertilizer, fuel, and freight. The impact is primarily a fiscal shock for now, not an immediate shortage.

The chokepoint problem is rippling across the whole system: The disruptions in Black Sea and Hormuz, alongside heat waves damaging European crops, are leaving the food system exposed at the input, production, and export stages. Grain trapped inside Russia is pushing down domestic prices and squeezing farm margins, which could prompt farmers to reduce winter planting. That would turn today’s export-logistics problem into an actual global supply constraint next season.

What to watch: Turkey is in talks with Russia and Ukraine about restoring safe passage for grain shipments through the Black Sea, potentially reviving a UN-brokered agreement — the Black Sea Grain Initiative — that got 33 mn tonnes of grain out of Ukraine during the early days of the conflict

5

Also on Our Radar

ZC Rubber becomes the fourth Chinese tiremaker to target Sokhna + Refad adds dry storage at King Abdulaziz Port

Egypt's tire export hub takes shape

China’s largest tiremaker is circling Sokhna. Zhongce Rubber Group (ZC Rubber) — founded in 1958 and maker of the Westlake and Chao Yang brands — signed a letter of intent with Egypt’s SCZone to study a USD 500 mn tire manufacturing complex in the Sokhna Industrial Zone, according to an Investment Ministry statement. The proposed three-phase complex would span c. 600k sqm, with the company targeting 95% of output for export to African, Middle Eastern, and European markets.

IN CONTEXT- The move came during Chinese president Xi Jinping’s first state visit to Egypt in a decade this week. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Xi oversaw the signing of five agreements and MoUs, plus more than 20 cooperation documents, according to a statement from the Egyptian Presidency spokesperson. The five agreements run from an MoU aligning Egypt’s Vision 2030 with China’s Belt and Road, through economic and technical cooperation, industrial and supply chain, and information technology MoUs, to one between the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone) authority and China’s Commerce Ministry.

And there’s a cluster forming behind it. ZC Rubber is at least the fourth Chinese tire-sector investor to target Sokhna in the past year — after Sailun’s USD 1 bn plant, which broke ground in September 2025, Chaoyang Longmarch’s USD 190 mn factory, and Zenith’s USD 300 mn tire-components plant. Egypt is being assembled — project by project — into a Chinese-built tire-export base on the Red Sea, close to Suez and inside the trade agreements that open Africa, the Gulf, and the EU.

Refad adds dry storage at King Abdulaziz Port

Refad is expanding at King Abdulaziz Port: The Saudi real estate developer is building a Grade A dry warehouse on an 18.5k sqm plot — with more than 12k sqm of warehouse space — and is targeting completion in 2027, Sabq reports. The facility will hit 18.8 meters at its peak, with seven loading and unloading gates, dock levellers, industrial flooring, and circular truck routes, all built for higher-throughput operations.

Refad is doubling down at the port: Refad previously partnered with Maersk on a refrigerated storage facility at King Abdulaziz Port, spanning 13.3k sqm and designed to handle 168k pallet positions a year, according to a press release.


SEPTEMBER

16-17 September (Wednesday-Thursday): Saudi Maritime & Logistics Congress, Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

22-23 September (Tuesday-Wednesday): Breakbulk Americas, Houston, US.

22-24 September (Tuesday-Thursday): Seamless Middle East, Dubai, UAE.

28-30 September (Monday-Wednesday): Transport Logistics Middle East, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

OCTOBER

12-14 October (Monday-Wednesday): The Airport Show, Dubai, UAE.

20-22 October (Tuesday-Thursday): TOC Americas, Cartagena, Colombia.

21-22 October (Wednesday-Thursday): Global Ports Forum, Singapore.

26-29 (Monday-Thursday): Air Cargo Forum, Miami, US.

27-29 October (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes World, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

NOVEMBER

2-5 November (Monday-Thursday): ADIPEC Maritime and Logistics Exhibition and Conference, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

10-11 November (Tuesday-Wednesday): TOC Asia, Singapore.

10-12 November (Tuesday-Thursday): Intermodal Europe, Rotterdam, Netherlands.

11-13 November (Wednesday-Friday): Logitrans, Istanbul, Turkey.

18-19 November (Wednesday-Thursday): Breakbulk Asia, Singapore.

FEBRUARY 2027

10-12 February (Wednesday-Friday): Routes Americas, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

MARCH 2027

16-18 March (Tuesday-Thursday): CMA Shipping, Houston, US.

16-18 March (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes Asia, New Delhi, India.

APRIL 2027

20-22 April (Tuesday-Thursday): Routes Europe, Antalya, Turkey.

26-29 April (Monday-Thursday): Transport Logistic and air cargo Europe, Munich, Germany.

26-29 April (Monday-Thursday): Saudi Smart Logistics, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Now Playing
Now Playing
00:00
00:00