Could the Mediterranean become Europe’s next natural gas battleground?

As tensions around the world’s most critical energy corridor — Hormuz — ripple through global markets, Europe is being reminded of a hard truth: its gas strategy is still volatile. And, increasingly, the question is whether the Mediterranean can act as a buffer in a system defined by disruption.

In a global LNG system shaped by chokepoints, freight routes, and whoever is bidding high that week, stability is scarce. Since 2022, Europe has leaned heavily on LNG to backfill Russian pipeline flows — turning the Dutch TTF into the world’s most watched gas benchmark.

That exposure was clear when risks around Qatari supply emerged. Europe sources roughly 10% of its LNG from Qatar, and even limited disruption fears pushed TTF prices up to EUR 62/MWh, from EUR 29/MWh at the start of the year. Still far below the EUR 343/MWh peak of 2022 — but a reminder of how quickly volatility feeds through.

The timing: EU gas storage sat around 31% this month — its lowest since 2022 — raising concerns that the bloc may miss its 90% winter storage target, especially with disruptions around Hormuz. Filling storage to the target would require a 13% increase in LNG imports compared to last year.

The dilemma: While the bloc has reduced dependence on Russian gas, the alternatives are not inherently stable. US LNG is increasingly tied to political and trade dynamics, while the global spot market swings with every geopolitical shock.

That’s where the Mediterranean starts to matter — not as a full replacement, but as a stabilizer. Unlike long-haul LNG, North African supply offers proximity, pipeline access, and processing hubs that can bypass parts of the global bottleneck. With Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Morocco advancing competing models, the region is becoming a strategic arena over who supplies Europe’s gas.

For the non-energy crowd, the race is split along two models: pipelines and supercooled cargoes, both of which come with limitations. Pipeline trade is the simplest and cheapest, but only works between connected neighbors with fixed infrastructure, while cargoes move gas in its liquefied form — a process that depends on liquefaction plants on the export side and regasification import terminals on the receiving end (which can be connected to pipelines).

Algeria is ahead on deliverability

If Europe wants extra molecules in the near term, Algeria is first in line. State producer Sonatrach says it already has two operating gas pipelines into Europe — one to Italy and one to Spain — with a combined transport capacity of 43 bcm per year. Algeria supplied about 20 bcm to Italy last year — or 30% of Italian consumption — while Spain is looking to squeeze another 10% out of the Medgaz pipeline due to the regional disruptions in the energy market.

The advantage is simple: The pipes are already there, the customers are already there, and the relationships — especially between Eni and Sonatrach — are already in place.

A clear W from the disruptions: “In North Africa, Algeria is geographically distanced from the conflict, whilst also holding connections to the European market,” VP and head of MENA Research at Welligence Energy Analytics Lauren Mayhew tells EnterpriseAM.

The long-term upside is obvious too: The revived USD 13 bn Trans-Saharan gas pipeline would move some 20-30 bcm annually from Nigeria through Niger into Algeria and then onward to the European market.

But that’s still future optionality, not present-day supply. In a scramble, the country that matters most is usually the one with spare route access and commercial credibility today — and on that score, Algeria is ahead.

Egypt is ahead on flexibility

Egypt’s case is different, not because its domestic gas balance is comfortable (it’s not) — but because it holds one advantage no other player in this race can match at scale: infrastructure. Egypt is one of the few players in the region that has both regasification and liquefaction facilities, which allows it the flexibility to import and export — even while simultaneously becoming supply-constrained.

That makes it more of a processing and routing hub — a country capable of converting eastern Mediterranean gas into export-ready LNG and pushing it into cargoes, provided sufficient feedgas is available.

The feedgas is being secured: Egypt and Cyprus have been working for some time now to send Cypriot offshore gas to Egypt for liquefaction and re-export to Europe. Gas from the 3.7 tcf Aphrodite field and 3 tcf Cronos field will feed Egyptian facilities by 2027-2031.

Not without risk: This flexibility may prove temporary, however. If domestic production continues to decline, Egypt is likely to need even the gas it currently exports, forcing a shift toward prioritizing local demand.

Confident, even when its own gas balance is tight: Energy majors like Shell, BP, and Eni are all doubling down on Egypt’s hub positioning — expanding gas production and accelerating exploration activities in the Mediterranean.

In a market defined by flexibility, Egypt is hard to ignore. While pipelines lock gas into geography, Egypt’s LNG model keeps it mobile — and in a volatile system, that optionality is what Europe is paying for.

Libya is the wildcard

Libya looks strong geographically: Unlike the complex, capital-intensive deepwater fields in the region — like in Egypt — Libya’s shallow onshore fields can be brought online quickly and developed at significantly lower production costs. The country already has a direct line into Italy through Greenstream, with Libya’s national oil company aiming to lift gas production to some 1 bscf/d by 2030 — allowing more supply to be directed to European markets.

… but the numbers show why it’s still a wildcard, not a front-runner. While Greenstream has an 8 bcm annual capacity, Libyan gas exports to Italy fell to 105 mmcf/d in 2025 — a 22-year low.

The country is showing renewed potential, with its latest post-war bid round drawing interest from international oil majors such as Chevron and QatarEnergy, while Eni has announced more than 1 tcf of new gas discoveries offshore. Although the specific reserve volumes are modest compared to the East Mediterranean’s massive fields, their shallow nature allows for faster development and lower operating costs.

It carries the highest risk in the group, however, because the infrastructure ambitions are repeatedly disrupted by local political dynamics, a stop-start investment cycle, and a fragile production base. Libya can move from the sidebar to center stage — but only once it proves sustained operational consistency.

Morocco is the long wager

Morocco is the boldest play in the pack — and the weakest near-term supply. The long-stalled USD 25 bn Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline — also named the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline — is set to see an intergovernmental agreement inked this year, targeting up to 30 bcm annually moving through a 6.9k-km hybrid offshore-onshore line. First gas from these initial segments is scheduled for 2031.

The logic is obvious: Morocco wants to be a transit state, an import platform, and eventually a re-export node tied into West African gas and European demand.

The problem is that Morocco is still mostly marketing infrastructure ambitions rather than bankable gas. The country froze the tender process for its USD 1 bn LNG import terminal and pipeline corridor at Nador West Med Port, after revised demand and cost assumptions complicated project economics. It also still imports most of its gas — spot market LNG is regasified at Spanish terminals and pumped through the Gaz Maghreb pipeline — with current demand at about 1 bcm and projections of 8 bcm by 2027.

The finish line

So, who is best positioned? For immediate incremental supply into Europe, our take is that Algeria is ahead — because it already has operational pipeline capacity and commercial relationships. Egypt is ahead, given its operational liquefaction plants, with Cypriot gas increasingly being structured around them. Libya represents the upside case if production stabilizes, while Morocco is the longer-term strategic transit play, with a commercial case that materializes later.

The broader point is that the Mediterranean can be Europe’s next gas hedge — but not its sole solution. US LNG supply is still capturing all the upside from the disruptions — and is too large to displace — while the bloc’s decarbonization policy still puts a clock on long-lived gas answers, with a dual strategy that cuts gas demand structurally, while securing flexible supplies that reduce exposure to spot volatility.

That’s exactly why the Med matters now: It offers Europe a portfolio rather than a single replacement. Algerian pipes, Egyptian liquefaction, Libyan optionality, and a Moroccan corridor. The race, in the end, is not about who has the best map; it is about who can deliver credible, financeable molecules into Europe before 2030 turns from a target into a deadline.

For now, some frame the situation as a missed window: “Sadly, while some African countries have excess capacity in both LNG and pipeline gas, the majority of them, if not all, are not producing at full capacity,” Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum Philip Mshelbila said. “If you look at the export pipelines ⁠to Europe, from Algeria or from Libya, not one of them is full,” he added.