Good morning, nice people. We’re going from the seabed to the server rack today, following the AI build-out from the cables under Hormuz to the chips Washington wants kept out of Chinese hands.
The Gulf’s AI campuses are still going up, while the cables meant to connect them sit unfinished. Work on four new subsea cable systems in the Gulf has stalled with the war, even as construction continues on more than USD 100 bn of the region’s big AI projects. Iran has since threatened the cables already running under Hormuz. None has been damaged so far. If several went down together, though, Gulf internet service would face severe disruption, Infoblox head of internet analysis Doug Madory says. We dig into what’s at stake in today’s Lede.
The UAE has joined a US-led pact to guard the AI supply chain: It’s one of nine US allies to sign the San Francisco Declaration, which covers the technology and infrastructure AI supply chains depend on, the State Department said. The others are Australia, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Qatar, Singapore, and the UK. Working groups will cover AI policy, adoption, supply chains, security hubs, and resilience. Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the European Commission are set to sign next week, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg told the Financial Times.
Chinese firms are about to lose their rent-a-chip loophole: They can’t buy top-end chips from makers like Nvidia, but they can legally rent them from data centers in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Under a new rule, chip sellers will need a license to supply overseas data centers that provide “significant volumes of computing power” to firms based in countries such as China, Russia, and Iran, The New York Times reports. Those data centers will also have to check whether their customers have ties to those countries. Advanced chip exports to firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil will need a license too, because of their higher smuggling risk. Anyone renting out GPUs, Gulf operators included, is about to get much better acquainted with their customers.
STC, meanwhile, is shopping for data centers; It’s among the bidders for a minority stake in British developer Pure Data Centers Group, which owner Oaktree Capital Management could value at c. USD 8 bn, Bloomberg reports, citing people familiar with the matter. GIC has teamed up with Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners for a rival offer. Pure DC has more than 1 GW of capacity live or under development across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, according to its website. That includes sites in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, so STC would be buying into a developer already building in its own backyard.
How did a stretch of desert coast become one of Egypt’s most sought-after places to live and invest? Destination Red Sea, our new four-part series, explores the businesses, infrastructure and policy shaping the coast. Issue one maps who is building there, how it is financed, and who is buying.
Work on four new subsea cable systems in the Gulf has stalled with the conflict, even as construction continues on the region’s big AI projects — and Iran has now threatened the cables already in service beneath Hormuz. Few Gulf countries have a substantial alternative to the strait, Doug Madory, head of internet analysis at Infoblox, tells EnterpriseAM. A cable doesn’t need to be cut to cause damage, either: users losing access to their services counts as a disruption, “even if every link is still technically up,” he says.
Paused mid-lay: None of the cables already in service have been damaged so far. Installation is on hold for 2Africa Pearls, the Gulf extension of SeaMeWe-6, Ooredoo’s Fibre in Gulf, and the WorldLink Transit Cable, Madory tells us. With those projects delayed indefinitely, growth in the region’s IT sector could be held back for years, he warns.
IN CONTEXT- Tehran has drawn up plans to target the cables if attacks resume, two senior Iranian officials told Reuters last month, and one said Iran would also try to block repairs. At least four Iranian-linked vessels made unusual movements around submarine cable routes in the Gulf of Oman last month, the Financial Times reported, citing Windward tracking data. The manoeuvers could be coincidental, but might also be intended to demonstrate Iran’s ability to damage undersea infrastructure, naval warfare expert at the Royal United Services Institute told the FT.
Seen from above, not below: Windward confirmed to EnterpriseAM that the activity could be described as consistent with possible cable reconnaissance, while stressing that its purpose remained unconfirmed. “Windward offers visibility into the vessel movements, but not what happens beneath the surface,” the company said.
Why this matters: The Gulf’s digital economy still needs a physical connection. Banking, cloud computing, and online commerce in the Gulf run on networks that cross borders and, in places, contested waters. For governments building their economies into technology hubs, that leaves investors with an uncomfortable question: how reliable is access to the computing capacity going up across the region?
Cloudy, with delays
Some cloud workloads have already moved out of the region: Iranian drone strikes in March knocked two of three availability zones in Amazon Web Service’s (AWS) UAE region, ME-CENTRAL-1, and one zone in Bahrain’s ME-SOUTH-1, Madory adds. Amazon said at the time that affected Bahrain customers were shifting applications elsewhere. Madory expects the affected facilities eventually to return to service, but only when operators consider it safe for staff to return.
Still pouring concrete: Construction on more than USD 100 bn of major Gulf AI projects has generally continued despite the conflict, analysts told us. That makes cable delays consequential: the region is adding computing capacity while some of the connections intended to support its growth remain unfinished.
Standing room only
A rounding error, globally: Less than 1% of global international bandwidth crosses Hormuz, according to the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), citing TeleGeography. The industry body has explicitly cautioned against confusing the strait with the much broader Middle Eastern cable network — serious regional exposure doesn’t translate into a worldwide internet shutdown.
Roll call: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi referred to seven major internet cables beneath Hormuz in his warning. Windward’s regional inventory — spanning existing infrastructure and new projects — names AAE-1, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International, Tata TGN-Gulf, and OMRAN/EPEG, alongside the 2Africa Gulf extension and the planned Fibre in Gulf and SeaMeWe-6 systems. Iran also has connections at stake, including Falcon and Gulf Bridge International, Windward notes. Damage to shared sections could therefore disrupt Iranian connectivity too, depending on where it occurred and how traffic could be rerouted.
Location, location, landing station: Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait depend on Hormuz for their direct submarine routes, though not for all their connectivity: Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait have terrestrial links through Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait also connects through Iraq. The UAE has cable landings at Fujairah, and most Saudi international bandwidth arrives through the Red Sea coast, according to a TeleGeography regional assessment. Those routes reduce dependence on the strait, but overland capacity may not be able to absorb all the displaced traffic.
Iraq is building its case as a data detour: Baghdad recently signed agreements with UAE’s e& and Bahrain’s Alliance to carry internet capacity across Iraqi territory toward Europe. The agreement follows a similar one with Qatar’s Ooredoo in September, adding to Iraq’s push to connect Gulf networks to Europe overland.
The catch is capacity: Networks can divert traffic through other submarine cables or overland links, the ICPC says. The business question is how much capacity remains available when several connections fail together — and whether that is enough to keep services running normally. It is hard to measure directly how international traffic divides between Hormuz and alternatives, including overland routes through Iraq and Turkey, through Iran to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and satellite connections, Madory says.
Extra cables only count as backup if they avoid the same corridor. “Redundancy strengthens autonomy when the alternatives can survive the same crisis,” Scientific Project Manager at the ICI Institute Daniel Sidiqie tells us. Several cables running through one vulnerable corridor can add capacity without providing a dependable way around disruption. Connection through Oman or terrestrial routes across Saudi Arabia can diversify exposure, while the developing Iraq-Turkiye corridor offers another potential alternative, he says. Their value depends on sufficient spare capacity and tested rerouting.
Satellites can cover selected needs: Satellite links can support emergency communication, Sidiqie says, but can’t replace submarine capacity at scale. Madory similarly cautions that satellites, including Starlink, could replace only a small fraction of the capacity lost if the strait’s cables were damaged.
Buffering…
“Still connected” doesn’t necessarily mean usable: Applications tolerate different levels of latency — the time data takes to travel — and packet loss, when some of the data fails to arrive. Beyond a certain point, either can make an application unusable, Madory says, with user complaints often providing the first indication.
For banks, that can mean delayed transfers: If damaged connections prevent a bank from reaching overseas payment networks or outsourced technology providers, customers could face delayed transfers or unavailable services. Financial-sector resilience body FS-ISAC urges banks to map these dependencies, including international data transfers and outsourced operations. The impact would depend on each bank’s connections and backup arrangements.
The domino problem: Banks use incoming payments to fund outgoing ones, so an institution unable to send money can leave others waiting for funds they expected to receive. The Bank of England identifies this as a channel through which operational disruption can create liquidity pressure elsewhere in the system. Applied to a prolonged connectivity outage, the concern is a growing queue of unsettled obligations — with businesses further down the chain still needing to pay suppliers and staff.
For AI facilities, the workload matters: International customers offer Gulf computing facilities a commercial opportunity, but serving them requires reliable external connections, Sidiqie says. That does not mean every task stops when connectivity deteriorates. “The consequences of disruption vary by workload: an intact cluster with locally stored data may continue training even as overseas customers lose access to its services,” he says.
Backups need bandwidth too: If international connections deteriorate, the exposure extends to overseas users, external services, and the links that keep remote backup copies up to date. AWS’s disaster-recovery guidance says replication needs enough bandwidth to keep pace with changes in the original data. A prolonged bandwidth squeeze could leave a backup further behind, even while the primary servers remain operational.
Moving a workload takes preparation: AWS’s recovery options range from restoring backups to maintaining a second, running version of an application in another region — with different costs and recovery times. Some workloads also face data-residency requirements that constrain where they move. Critical services may need recovery capacity outside the immediate conflict zone, supported by data rules permitting replication in approved jurisdiction, Sidiqie says.
Your servers, whose control?
Sovereign, with an asterisk: Domestic data centers support local AI development and strengthen governments’ jurisdiction over data, but their operation can still rely on foreign cloud providers, and access to advanced GPUs remains subject to external supply chains and US export rules, Sidiqie says. “The strongest test of Gulf digital sovereignty is whether essential services can keep running when access to foreign technology or international connectivity is disrupted,” he adds.
Keeping the hardware local also keeps it within range. Domestic investment places valuable assets inside a regional conflict, and Gulf cloud infrastructure has already been hit, Sidiqie argues. “Sovereignty therefore depends on how effectively states can sustain these capabilities under pressure.”
Iran could dent the Gulf’s pitch without destroying its infrastructure. “Creating uncertainty over how quickly damaged systems could be restored could already undermine confidence in the region as a reliable computing hub,” Sidiqie says. Threats against the cables mean the networks linking those facilities to their markets are exposed too.
The recovery test
A cable doesn’t have to be the target to become a casualty: Around 200 submarine cable faults occur worldwide each year, mostly because of routine accidents involving anchors or fishing, according to ICPC data cited by TeleGeography. Conflict adds another route to damage: in 2024, a vessel hit by the Houthis dragged its anchor before sinking, damaging three Red Sea cables.
A repair ship has to get there and stay put: Specialist vessels need permission to enter the relevant waters and must stay stationary while fixing a fault, leaving crews exposed in a conflict zone. UAE-based e-Marine handles Gulf repairs as the region’s maintenance authority, according to TeleGeography, so safe access for its vessels is a practical limit on how fast service comes back.
The Red Sea benchmark: Three cables damaged there in 2024 took six months to repair, according to TeleGeography. After another incident damaged four cables in 2025, repairing three took five months.
Prep before the break: “Resilience also means restoring service quickly when prevention fails, which makes advance repair permissions and access to suitable vessels essential,” Sidiqie says.
Paying for Plan B
Money is already moving into connections: Microsoft says it plans to invest more than USD 400 mn in submarine and terrestrial connectivity across the Middle East by 2030, building on investments including the SeaMeWe-6 cable system. But SeaMeWe-6’s planned route through the Gulf to Bahrain then overland across Saudi has also faced delays amid Gulf hostilities, according to TeleGeography. Finding a different path is only part of the job, and they also need to be able to build and maintain it.
Connectivity is part of the commercial proposition: Security concerns are already influencing plans, with G42 considering spreading its planned data center footprint across the UAE to reduce the risk of concentrating infrastructure in one location. Our reading is that developers may need to spend more on independent connections and reserve capacity elsewhere, while customers weigh those safeguards against price and performance. Cheap power and available chips remain advantages, but the commercial proposition also depends on customers being able to reach them.
The signal
The measure of resilience is how much service survives a disruption, and how quickly full capacity can return. If several cables remained down for an extended period, Madory expects severe disruption to Gulf internet service. Look first for traffic volumes falling below expected levels, alongside longer delays as remaining routes become congested or traffic travels farther. Depending on the connectivity lost, monitoring could also show withdrawals of BGP routes — the routing announcements that tell other networks how to reach a destination — for networks that become unreachable.
Sounds familiar? We’ve been following the same problem in other industries. A route becomes unavailable, flows shift elsewhere, and alternatives have to absorb the load. Tankers and data move differently, but the resilience question is familiar: how much can the alternative or the remaining route carry, and for how long? Hormuz concentrates several kinds of dependencies in the same geography, that is why a chokepoint is called a chokepoint.
L’imad Holding now owns more than 70% of Abu Dhabi Aviation (ADA), the latest step in its consolidation of Abu Dhabi’s infrastructure assets. The sovereign investor bought an additional 12.17% of the ADX-listed group from Mamoura Diversified Global Holding through its wholly owned subsidiary, ADQ Aviation and Aerospace Services, according to a disclosure (pdf). The deal covers 133.4 mn ordinary shares and lifts L’imad’s indirect stake to 71.61% from 59.45%.
Same shares, new owner: No fresh capital goes into ADA. The deal moves Mamoura’s entire stake to ADQ Aviation, and no price was disclosed. ADA’s annual report (pdf) listed Mamoura at 12.17% and other investors at 29.39%.
More control, not necessarily more value: L’imad already held majority control of ADA before the acquisition, meaning the additional stake “is more about strengthening its position and increasing its share of future earnings,” infrastructure finance expert Ajay Pratap S. Hari tells EnterpriseAM. “Under UAE company law, special resolutions generally require approval from 75% of shares represented at a meeting, so the higher ownership makes it more difficult for minority shareholders to block such decisions. However, I wouldn't expect the increased stake alone to have a significant impact on ADA's operating performance,” he adds.
Majority by swap: ADQ Aviation took its original majority stake through an AED 4 bn share swap completed in May 2024. ADA acquired 100% of Etihad Airways Engineering, 100% of Advanced Military Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Centre (Ammroc), and 50% of Global Aerospace Logistics (GAL), in exchange for convertible instruments representing 652 mn new shares. With the swap, ADA became a broader aviation services and maintenance platform.
Why it matters: L’imad has been consolidating ownership of major Abu Dhabi assets since it absorbed ADQ in January, including Taqa and AD Ports Group, where it lifted its stake above 98.5% in September. At ADA, a single state shareholder now controls more than two-thirds of the company, up from just under 60%. Meanwhile, “Greater ownership provides L’imad with stronger economic exposure and potentially greater flexibility to align capital allocation, industrial capabilities, and long-term investment priorities,” Linus Benjamin Bauer, founder and global managing partner at BAA & Partners, tells EnterpriseAM.
More hangar than helipad: ADA has grown from a helicopter operator into a group spanning civilian and military maintenance, aircraft engineering, technical support, and air cargo. Maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) now makes up 88.3% of its revenue. GAL and Ammroc account for much of that segment’s growth, and Maximus Air handles the cargo business.
Where the synergies could emerge: “The strongest opportunities lie in integrating maintenance capabilities, procurement, technical expertise, and defence-related aviation services. Shared infrastructure and coordinated investment could create genuine economies of scale,” Bauer argues. However, greater integration also carries risks, particularly if centralization weakens commercial accountability or adds organizational complexity, he adds.
Bigger top line, thinner margins: A 24.3% rise in MRO revenue to AED 6 bn lifted ADA’s revenue 22.9% y-o-y to AED 6.8 bn in 9M 2026, according to its financials (pdf). Net income fell 24.9% to AED 524.8 mn as margins tightened on regional disruptions, weaker third-party maintenance activity, and changes in the group’s revenue mix. The group ended September with net cash of AED 769 mn.
Ownership alone won’t fix margins: “ADA's financial performance suggests that profitability is a more immediate concern than revenue growth,” Hari says. Greater ownership could help L’imad push for tighter cost management and more disciplined capital allocation, but working-capital pressures and weaker margins point to operational challenges that share transfer cannot resolve. Any meaningful improvement will depend on how the business is run, he adds.
Talabat is growing faster but earning less: Talabat’s net income fell 15% y-o-y to USD 102 mn in 3Q 2026, even as revenue rose 18% to USD 1.2 bn, according to the company’s earnings release. Adjusted EBITDA slipped 3% y-o-y to USD 150 mn as the company spent on its food business and on grocery and retail to build its Everyday App.
Growth is coming from outside the GCC: Gross merchandise value (GMV) rose 16% y-o-y to USD 3 bn. Non-GCC markets grew 43% y-o-y to USD 736 mn, against 9% growth in the GCC, which still accounts for USD 2.3 bn. Revenue grew faster than GMV, driven by Talabat Mart — which offset lower commissions, more customer incentives, and lower fees — as more customers signed up for Talabat Pro.
9M tells the same story: Revenue rose 19% y-o-y to USD 3.4 bn in 9M 2026, while adjusted EBITDA fell 8% to USD 427 mn and net income fell 17% to USD 288.7 mn.
Guidance raised anyway: Talabat raised its FY 2026 outlook for the second time this year across all five metrics. It now expects GMV growth of about 16% and revenue growth of about 19% in constant currency, each up 1-3 points. Adjusted EBITDA guidance is now USD 560-570 mn (from USD 535-565 mn) and net income USD 360-370 mn (from USD 325-355 mn). The 90% dividend payout policy is unchanged.
Cost of growth
Higher direct costs and investment valuation losses cut Abu Dhabi Aviation’s 3Q net income 65.7% y-o-y to AED 104.2 mn, according to the company’s financials (pdf). Revenue rose 12.7% to AED 2.1 bn.
Costs grew nearly twice as fast as revenue: Direct costs rose 24.7% to AED 1.9 bn, cutting gross income 36.1% to AED 239.8 mn, and operating income fell 75.6% to AED 63.9 mn. The company booked an AED 37.1 mn fair-value loss on investments, compared with an AED 9.3 mn gain a year earlier. The year-ago quarter also included a one-off AED 54.6 mn impairment reversal on a blade shop facility.
Nine-month net income fell by a quarter even as revenue grew. The company’s net income dropped 24.9% to AED 525 mn over the nine months, while revenue rose 22.9% to AED 6.8 bn, according to the company’s results release (pdf). Margins reflected a changing revenue mix and the regional operating environment’s effect on third-party maintenance and general aviation, the company says.
MRO drove the nine-month revenue growth: Maintenance, repair and overhaul revenue rose 24.3% and made up 88.3% of group revenue over the nine months. GAL and AMMROC accounted for most of the growth, partly offset by lower third-party work at Etihad Engineering. General aviation revenue rose 9.6% to AED 838 mn, as stronger cargo operations at Maximus Air offset softer activity across the rest of the segment.
Fuel burn
Higher costs and fuel price volatility tied to the regional conflict cut Air Arabia’s 3Q net income 40.3% y-o-y to AED 347.6 mn, according to its financials (pdf). The conflict also brought “persistent supply chain constraints,” Chairman Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammad Al Thani said in the press release. Revenue still climbed 9.6% to AED 2.3 bn even as passenger numbers fell 3% to 5.7 mn, which lifted revenue per passenger by c. 13%, by our math.
Costs grew more than twice as fast as revenue: Direct costs jumped 23.9% to AED 1.9 bn, cutting gross income 30.7% to AED 381.4 mn. Finance costs more than doubled to AED 37.5 mn from AED 14.9 mn, and income from associates and joint ventures nearly halved to AED 54.3 mn.
Nine-month net income is down almost half: Net income fell 44.8% y-o-y to AED 683.7 mn in 9M, while revenue rose 1.7% to AED 5.8 bn. Passenger traffic fell 10% to 14.4 mn, and the load factor held at 83%.
IN CONTEXT- 3Q net income was roughly four times 2Q’s, by our math. In 2Q it plunged 74.9% y-o-y to AED 87.9 mn as reduced capacity and higher costs hit operations.
Air Arabia is still adding aircraft and routes: It added 14 routes and 10 aircraft in 9M, taking its network to 224 routes and its fleet to 100 A320s and A321s, with four more aircraft due before year-end. It also opened a Dammam hub on 20 September for the new Saudi budget carrier it leads with Nesma Group and KUN Investment, flying to Jeddah, Madinah, and Riyadh.
Majid Al Futtaim and DP World want to ship more Egyptian produce to the UAE, with the two signing an MoU to scale up Egyptian agricultural exports to the Gulf country, starting with fresh fruit and vegetables, according to a press release (pdf). The partnership pairs the retailer’s Egyptian supplier network and regional stores with DP World’s ports, shipping, and logistics, aiming to raise container volumes and, over time, open new markets for Egyptian producers. No investment value, shipment target, or launch timeline was disclosed.
The produce will move by cold chain from Sokhna to Jebel Ali: The proposed plan will see suppliers’ produce consolidated in DP World’s temperature-controlled facilities at Sokhna in Egypt and shipped on its regional feeder services to the UAE. From there, it will move under refrigeration to Jebel Ali for distribution across Majid Al Futtaim’s stores. The model aims to cut handling and streamline customs clearance. The retailer already exports Egyptian products, from fresh produce and dairy to household goods and textiles, to seven markets across the GCC and Africa.
Arabian Pipes lands its tenth Aramco order of the year: The pipe maker has signed a SAR 104 mn contract with Saudi Aramco to manufacture and coat steel pipes, according to a Tadawul disclosure. That takes its Aramco orders this year to c. SAR 874 mn, Asharq Business reports. That’s c. 1.8x its 9M revenue, which fell 32.6% y-o-y as private-sector sales halved. Most of the Aramco contracts start contributing by year-end, and the new one shows up from 2H 2027.
Aramco is 81% of the sector’s announced orders: Four listed pipe makers have signed 19 Aramco contracts worth c. SAR 2.52 bn this year, according to Asharq’s count from company disclosures. Saudi plans to raise its crude pipeline capacity outside the Gulf to 10 mn bbl/d within two to three years, up from 7 mn bbl/d.
A new natural gas processing train is being built at Adnoc’s Habshan facility thanks to Shanghai-based Wison Engineering moving into full construction, Wison said in a press release. The development kicks off phase 2 of Adnoc Gas’ Rich Gas Development project, for which the state oil giant has awarded USD 13.2 bn worth of contracts across the total three phases.
IN CONTEXT- Awarded in August, the USD 3.9 bn EPC contract — which is bumped up to USD 4.04 bn when including an associated 220kV switch station — is the Chinese contractor’s largest project to date. This follows as Habshan bounces back from earlier operational disruptions. The complex comprises five trains and 14 processing units.
Feeding the petrochem machine: Rather than simply boosting raw gas output, the new train integrates gas treatment and deep natural gas liquids recovery units. That gives Adnoc Gas greater operational flexibility and high-value feedstock for the UAE’s expanding downstream and petrochemical industries.