Gulf money is spreading across Syria’s rebuild, and Saudi Arabia holds the widest stake

Saudi Arabia now has money in most layers of Syria’s rebuild, from fiber and data centers to aviation, power, and water. A portfolio across sectors does not necessarily make an integrated system. John Calabrese, an assistant professor at American University in Washington, DC, sees a broader strategy in how the projects are bundled and sequenced. “The clearest evidence is the bundling of agreements across sectors and the focus on the grid and technical capacity,” he tells EnterpriseAM. He isn’t sure it becomes coordinated infrastructure: “It is possible that this is a one-off, the exception rather than the rule.”

Layer by layer

SilkLink is the one project that spans several layers of the same system. The SAR 3 bn project bundles more than 4.5k km of fiber with data centers and international submarine cable landing stations. STC owns 75% of the project vehicle, against 25% for the Syrian Sovereign Fund, and describes the investment as part of a wider cross-border connectivity strategy linking Arab, Asian, and European markets.

Aleppo’s airport and the new flynas Syria airline aren’t yet publicly linked. Elaf plans to develop a new Aleppo airport with a SAR 7.5 bn investment, upgrade and operate the existing facility during development, and finance an integrated navigation radar system. Work on the existing airport is expected to begin in early 2027, with the first phase targeting more than 2 mn passengers annually. Flynas is also taking a 49% stake in flynas Syria, with Syria’s civil aviation authority holding the other 51%, and operations are slated to begin in 4Q 2026. Neither company has said whether the airline will base aircraft at Aleppo, ensure traffic to the Saudi-backed airport, or coordinate cargo operations with Elaf.

A modern airport needs warehouses, customs, and links to industrial zones, Mustafa Ajlyakin, general manager at Jad United Services, tells us. It still needs bonded warehouses, cold storage, digital customs clearance, and links to industrial zones. At Jad’s 4k sqm distribution center in Aleppo, weak internet already slows shipment tracking, inventory visibility, and document exchanges with foreign partners. A reliable Saudi-backed fiber network could help ease those bottlenecks, he adds.

Saudi-backed airport, telecoms, power, and water projects are moving through separate ministries and contracts, Ajlyakin says. There is little evidence of coordination at the operational level, and he says Saudi investors, Syrian authorities, and private operators need to align construction schedules and infrastructure connections before individual projects come online.

The missing 400 km

Saudi Arabia and Turkey want a rail route through Jordan and Syria to Europe in three to four years. The route would carry goods, oil, gas, and passengers, but roughly 400 km of rail is missing between Syria and Jordan. Turkey is investing around USD 100 mn to rebuild the northern Syrian connection toward Aleppo and Damascus, and no broader financing plan has emerged.

Riyadh and Damascus have six months to find where their projects connect. They signed four MoUs in August covering roads, railways, civil aviation, and postal services, and the six months are for preparing an implementation plan. Separately, Saudi Arabia’s Al Rawaf and Syria’s Al Kawati secured a USD 300 mn contract to rehabilitate the Damascus-Palmyra-Deir Ezzor road, linking the capital with eastern Syria and routes toward Iraq, Sana reported.

The shared grid

Airports, data centers, industrial sites, and water systems all depend on the same grid. More generation won’t be enough without reliable transmission, infrastructure finance expert Ajay Pratap S. Hari tells EnterpriseAM. Syria’s electricity output has risen to 3.5 GW from 915 MW when the new authorities took over, while 8% of the transmission system has been rehabilitated. Energy Minister Mohamed Al Bashir has warned that new solar projects will also need additional substations and supporting infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia is building the software and control room for Syria’s grid, in a contract estimated at USD 60 mn. The announcement doesn’t name the company or say who will run it.

Gateways and handovers

Other companies already hold the gateways Saudi cargo has to use. CMA CGM holds a renewed 30-year concession to operate Latakia’s container terminal and has since moved into Syrian dry ports, while DP World holds a separate 30-year, USD 800 mn BOT concession at Tartus. Damascus International Airport is being redeveloped by a USD 4 bn Qatar-led consortium.

At the Tartus terminal, paperwork and handovers have caused more delays than infrastructure, Ajlyakin says. Drawing on Jad’s experience serving the Tartus International Container Terminal, he says “cargo moves smoothly when operators share data, documentation standards, and clear handover points. Problems arise at the seams: who holds the cargo, who is liable, and whose system records the transfer.”

Control by contract

Saudi investors hold control in several different forms: STC takes majority equity, flynas a minority JV, Riyadh Cables operating rights over a Syrian industrial asset, and Al Harfi contracted electricity sales for as long as 25 years.

Equity shares don’t show who runs what, Calabrese says. “Some are joint ventures, some are Saudi-funded development projects, and some remain at the study stage. Equity shares are indicators, but they alone do not tell us who will exercise operational control. The unpublished terms of the SilkLink agreement are particularly important.”

Who sets tariffs and approves capex can matter more than the ownership split. The same goes for who bears demand risk and controls revenue repatriation and termination protections. “A 49% shareholder with strong operating rights and contractual protections can sometimes have a better position than a 51% shareholder without them,” Calabrese adds.

Full ownership and long-term contracts signal a bid for long-term influence, Ben Todd, partner at Dispatch Risk advisory and a former US intelligence officer and diplomat tells us. “When I see Saudi investors pursuing full ownership or locking in long-term contracts, that is a signal that they are looking for long-term influence,” he adds. Smaller stakes and partnerships may offer goodwill and a foothold rather than control, Todd notes. The clearest way to assess who benefits is to look at who sets prices and who bears the losses when something goes wrong.

Syria’s investors can receive tax reductions of up to 80%, 100% foreign ownership, and up to 40% foreign labor. “These mega-projects will bring [USD] into the country in the short term, but the terms will see Syria forgo much of the public revenue that reconstruction could generate,” Haddon Barth, director at the Network for Syrian Legislative Studies, tells EnterpriseAM. Syria gets the most visible value first, including infrastructure, jobs, technical capacity, and in some cases direct equity. “Saudi Arabia’s return appears more strategic in the near term, with the financial benefits likely to come later,” Calabrese argues.

Syrian firms have mostly landed supply and building roles, Ajlyakin says. Local-content commitments, JVs offering Syrian companies equity and operating rights, and access to financing could help domestic operators expand alongside foreign investors. Jad is already pursuing partnerships with Saudi and Gulf logistics firms, and he says securing lasting operating roles will be key to keeping more of the infrastructure’s economic value in Syria.

The seams

Smaller roads, utility connections, and access infrastructure often lack a named financier, Ajlyakin says. Major Saudi projects have identifiable financial backers, but the links between them often depend on public budgets or have no clear financing arrangements. Operators are absorbing the costs: one Jad client has paid for reserved warehouse capacity for more than two months while its shipment is held up by customs and coordination problems, and another has been unable to release goods from storage for a month because of licensing delays. Neither delay resulted from insufficient warehouse capacity.

Who absorbs the loss when the system fails depends on the contract, Hari says. A PPA, minimum-revenue guarantee, or take-or-pay arrangement can shift part of demand risk onto the state, while termination payments and change-in-law clauses can protect investors if conditions deteriorate. “But these protections are ultimately only as strong as the counterparty standing behind them. That is why, in Syria, I would probably pay as much attention to payment security and risk allocation as to the projected IRR,” he adds.

More foreign investors haven’t yet added redundancy. More operators only create redundancy if their assets can substitute for one another when something fails. “Having Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, Turkish, and European players each building separate pieces of Syria’s economy looks more like a patchwork than a safety net, since every country is chasing its own goals rather than working from a shared plan,” Todd says.

The next Saudi investments may target the links between existing assets. “If the current sequencing continues, I would expect Saudi capital to look next at logistics and dry ports, industrial projects linked to its power investments, and maybe even banking and payments,” Calabrese says.

THE BOTTOM LINE- Five or six foreign investors now share Syria’s rebuild, which lowers the risk of any one of them controlling the system and leaves the handoffs between assets without an owner. For now, no single investor appears to control enough of those handoffs to make Syria’s infrastructure work as one.