Can Gulf ports outrun geography?

Can capacity solve a geopolitical problem? A port is built to control variables — turnaround times, capacity, expanding freezones. But conflict introduces an uncontrollable variable: access. The Gulf perfected the art of operational efficiency, now it’s being tested on whether this efficiency matters when the route itself is unstable.

The Gulf’s port hub model rose by combining geography with predictability — high liner connectivity and capacity, industrial freezones, inland logistics integration, and mainline frequency. Its strength wasn’t only location near key chokepoints; it was also the embedded network centrality. Location opened the door, but reliability built the moat.

On hard numbers: DP world pegs Jebel Ali at 19.4 mn TEU annual capacity, while AD Ports’ Khalifa processed some 6.6 mn TEU last year at roughly 69% utilization. Oman’s Salalah — positioned outside Hormuz — completed a USD 300 mn expansion, raising container capacity from 4.5 mn to 6.5 mn TEU, but its vulnerability sits around carriers rerouting the Red Sea and Gulf region entirely.

When a port gets hit by congestion, you throw productivity at it, but when a port gets hit by access risk, that’s a different story. Maersk, CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd recently suspended Hormuz transits and some are routing specific services around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea risk.

That combination targets ports along two dimensions at once: First, the ability to physically access the Arabian Gulf, and second, the economics of continuing to route capacity through a war-risk premium zone instead of shifting outside it.

Infrastructure only works if the service strings feed it: If mainline rotations omit the Gulf entirely, all the cranes, capacity, and berth depth become secondary. A hub is powerful because it sits inside the loop; outside the loop, it’s just capacity waiting for a call. In situations like this, the lever isn’t terminal capability, it’s carrier routing logic.

Surcharges are doing what geopolitics always does: repricing geography. War-risk premiums in the Gulf jumped sharply within days. Maersk published the “Emergency Freight Increase” for cargos to/from several Gulf markets, with increases of USD 1.8k–3k, alongside CMA CGM and Hapag-Lloyd publishing similar conflict-linked costs.

And some carriers are already moving beyond surcharges toward outright network adjustments: MSC issued an “End of Voyage” declaration for shipments bound to the Arabian Gulf — meaning cargo currently under its custody could be diverted to the next safe port of discharge rather than delivered to its original Gulf destination. It also imposed a USD 800 per container surcharge to cover deviation cost.

Cosco suspends Middle East bookings as regional conflict escalates: Chinese shipping giant Cosco has also suspended all vessel bookings on Middle East routes effective immediately — with no timeline for when services might resume. The decision comes as regional conflict continues to disrupt maritime stability in the area.

When moving through Hormuz costs materially more than moving around it, the detour stops looking inefficient — it starts looking rational. If a hub’s access requires a war-risk premium plus an energy cost in such a context, carriers start redesigning around safer nodes — even if the “old hub” is operationally excellent.

Alternative hubs aren’t winning yet — but they’ve gained optionality. “The age of the mega‑hub is not over, but the age of the disconnected mega‑hub is,” former head of supply chain and transport industries at the World Economic Forum Wolfgang Lehmacher tells EnterpriseAM. If carriers redesign strings to terminate in the Mediterranean, India’s west coast, or hybrid relay models that sit outside the chokepoint geometry, the effect can become sticky — network changes aren’t easily reversed (as we’ve seen in the Red Sea).

That doesn’t mean structural displacement — yet — but it does mean carriers are proving they can operate without a single chokepoint anchor, and optionality is the first step toward diversification.

What can ports do to stay inside the network?

Expand capacity outside the chokepoints. Several Gulf operators are pursuing this strategy through global terminal portfolios to capture cargo flows that shift elsewhere. AD Ports runs or holds stakes in critical terminals including the Port of Luanda in Angola — perfectly suited around the Cape’s route — and the Karachi Gateway Terminal in southern Pakistan on the Arabian Sea. DP World also runs London Gateway in the UK, Limassol in Cyprus, Dakar in Senegal, alongside Jeddah on the Red Sea.

Strengthen feeder networks: If mainline vessels avoid the Gulf temporarily, ports can maintain connectivity through feeder shipping. Cargo can move from to hubs in Med or India before being carried into Gulf ports on smaller feeder vessels. This increases cost and transit time, sure, but keeps the region connected even when direct mainline calls decline.

Go for port-to-land corridors: The Gulf hinted at such a strategy with regards to Red Sea disruptions, but now the chokepoints switched. Distribution networks could start assessing alternative rail routes — including corridors through Saudi Arabia — but such networks still remain a long-term vision.

Parallel routes or lost markets: “Boards should know by now that if they are not prepared or able to pay for spare capacity and parallel routes, they will pay with lost markets the next time the map changes overnight,” Lehmacher said

What to look for

Where does business stand? DP World confirmed all four terminals at Jebel Ali are operating normally after a brief suspension. AD Ports also confirmed its terminal and logistics operations remain fully operational. There have also been no confirmed reports of tenants in the Jebel Ali Freezone invoking force majeure clauses so far.

Keep your eyes open: The market will reveal whether this is a volatility spike or a rerouting system. Watch carrier behavior, including resumption, and ins. normalization. The decisive variable is whether carriers choose to circle back to Gulf calls.

The ports that gain will be those that can say, credibly and consistently, “We may not always be the cheapest route in a good year, but we are the route that still works when several bad things happen at once, and then prove it in their design, contracts and performance,” Lehmacher told us.