Saudi Arabia’s food security strategy was built on a simple premise — buy farmland abroad, build massive domestic silos, and rely on open sea lanes to connect the two. That strategy is now facing its most severe stress test yet.

The ongoing geopolitical volatility in the region has created a “selective blockade.” The Kingdom is confronting the physical limitations of its massive food logistics network as Iran blockades the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi militants threaten shipping through the Bab Al Mandab Strait.

Saudi still relies heavily on imports to meet its food security needs, with imports covering up to70-80% of our total food demand. However, the Kingdom does maintain incredibly robust staple stock levels. The General Food Security Authority (GFSA) aggressively expanded its storage capacity to a massive 3.5 mn tons, sufficient for at least four to six months.

BUT- If maritime choke points are effectively closed, deep reserves only buy time. “Whether you own a farm somewhere or whether you buy the food on the open market, when the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab Al Mandab are closed, you have a problem,” Eckart Woertz, director of the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies, tells EnterpriseAM.

Why it matters

The Kingdom actively shifted from passive investments to controlling stakes in global food companies in recent years, leveraging state-owned entities like Salic to acquire agricultural assets worldwide. Most recently, Salic acquired 80% of Singapore’s Olam Agri for USD 1.8 bn, gaining access to food, feed and fiber, agri-industrials, and ag-services in over 30 countries.

The catch? Owning the commodity at its origin does not assure its safe passage. We do have alternative import outlets via Red Sea ports like Jeddah and Yanbu. However, the western ports have limited capacity to handle the large volumes needed to offset a complete disruption in the east. There are also underlying fears of Iranian attacks targeting Western port infrastructure, mirroring past strikes on energy facilities.

If the Houthis escalate their involvement and fully choke off Bab Al Mandab, Saudi Arabia’s maritime routes would be compromised on two sides, MENA Economist Hamzeh Al Gaood tells us. While Al Gaaod believes such an action would be met swiftly by coalition retaliation, the vulnerability itself is forcing a fundamental rethink in Riyadh.

While Riyadh is scrambling to fortify its supply lines, it still holds a massive structural advantage over its neighbors. Al Gaaod points out that the Kingdom’s sheer size and western coastline make it far less vulnerable than other GCC states. Countries entirely dependent on Hormuz or lacking deep Red Sea access are facing a much more precarious reality. Saudi Arabia is already leveraging its domestic production to export staples like dairy and eggs to neighbors like the UAE and Oman — but if Hormuz closes entirely, the entire region's supply chain could fracture.

A pivot to rail and dirt

If the seas are compromised, the Kingdom must look to the land. The most critical bottleneck in Saudi Arabia’s current overland logistics network is its reliance on trucks and a lack of robust rail systems connecting it to neighboring countries.

We are already seeing operators move to fix this. Saudi Arabia Railways recently announced that a corridor is being established between GCC ports and the northern border, allowing cargo to move through Jordan in both directions. Al Gaaod highlights the urgent need for “critical infrastructure connecting to the Levant and Iraq with its New Development Road initiative to diversify trade channels for physical goods.” Integrating closer with allies like Iraq and Syria can open access to regions with deep agricultural capabilities, such as the Euphrates and Tigris basins.

The viability of these overland routes is debated, however. Woertz remains skeptical of leaning on Jordan to bypass maritime chaos. “I wouldn't see Jordan as an alternative trade route. It's more or less landlocked," he argues. If ships cannot reach Aqaba safely, a railway through Jordan offers little relief. Meanwhile, the ambitious Iraq Development Road project remains hindered by the Khor Abdullah agreement dispute between Kuwait and Iraq.

Agritech versus aquifers

The supply chain shock of the Covid-19 pandemic previously pushed Saudi Arabia to address its overreliance on food imports. The Kingdom heavily subsidized local production, achieving self-sufficiency in some sectors. Saudi Arabia now exports dates, eggs, and dairy products to neighbors like the UAE, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, and Oman.

Al Gaaod points to an acceleration in local agriculture driven by innovation. The Kingdom is utilizing “special date-based fertilizers to grow crops in the desert,” expanding local peat moss fertilizer usage to reclaim arid land, and relying heavily on capital-intensive desalination. Saudi Arabia was recently hailed by the UN for restoring over 1 mn hectares of land.

Can agritech overcome the Kingdom's geographic reality? Woertz argues that the lack of resources — especially water — make this a long shot, pointing to purposefully phasing out large-scale wheat production in 2008 for this exact reason. Recent government initiatives have reintroduced limited domestic wheat farming quotas, but it remains a fraction of what is required to feed the population.

Some have suggested Riyadh could leverage its status as a major nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer exporter to secure food supplies from regional partners. Woertz, however, dismisses this diplomatic lever in the context of the current crisis, noting that Iran is also a fertilizer producer. Blocking the strait provides an incentive to disrupt global shipments of all commodities, ensuring gas and fertilizer shipments suffer alongside oil, Woertz argued.

What comes next?

The emergency measures of today are likely to become standard operating procedures. The current crisis is a stark “warning of the ease with which a hostile nation can cause so much chaos,” Woertz says. Expect our state-controlled food security model to become even more entrenched and highly capitalized, even after regional tensions ease.

In the near term, expect accelerated capital expenditure into northern rail infrastructure, further expansion of Red Sea port capacities despite their vulnerabilities, and continued state subsidies pushing the boundaries of what can be grown domestically via desalination.

The era of relying solely on open markets and uninterrupted sea lanes is over. Future food security requires factoring in the massive capital cost of overland optionality. Woertz summarizes the reality of maritime choke points: “If you have a diversified import portfolio and the Strait of Hormuz is closed, it doesn't help you. The wheat shipment is not sailing through.”