{"id":114711,"date":"2026-05-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-05-01T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/?p=114711"},"modified":"2026-05-01T09:36:33","modified_gmt":"2026-05-01T09:36:33","slug":"from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/","title":{"rendered":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order"},"content":{"rendered":"

Does the UAE\u2019s departure from Opec leave Saudi Arabia as the organization\u2019s<\/strong> undisputed anchor? <\/strong>We won\u2019t dive deep into the political rift for now and, while that framing is correct as far as it goes, what would Saudi Arabia be anchoring really? An even more difficult question to answer is whether Opec could still credibly set a price level for oil that the rest of the market organizes around and what does this mean for our region. We think these days are behind us now.<\/p>\n

You see, in wonky terms, the dynamic between Saudi Arabia and other Opec members<\/strong> was less that of a cartel<\/strong>, in a traditional sense, and more of what economists speaking with marbles in their mouth would call a dominant firm model with a competitive fringe<\/a>. Saudi Arabia, sitting on one of the lowest marginal cost barrels and the largest spare capacity, set the price by adjusting output. Non-Opec producers (the US, the North Sea, later Russia) took the price as given and supplied what they could. The cartel structure held because Riyadh had the capacity to credibly threaten to flood the market with production and make all producers suffer from lower prices as a result. It also worked because the \u201cfringe\u201d was passive enough not to swamp the residual demand curve.<\/p>\n

Does this sound confusing and needlessly complicated?<\/strong> Don\u2019t worry. That model just had the last nail driven into its coffin.<\/p>\n

The dominant firm structure that gave Opec its pricing power from 1973 to about 2014 is <\/strong>now gone.<\/strong> What replaces it is genuinely unsettled, and the answer matters for every oil-importing economy in the region.<\/p>\n

The cracks in that Saudi-led Opec system have been compounding for a decade.<\/strong> US shale broke the fringe assumption in 2014<\/a>, making non-Opec supply materially more elastic than the dominant firm model required. Saudi\u2019s 2014 abandonment of the swing producer role was a recognition that defending high prices was funding the fringe\u2019s expansion. The 2016 Opec+ pivot \u2014 when Opec and 11 non-Opec members signed the Vienna Declaration of Cooperation to formalize Opec+ \u2014 effectively turned oil-price management from a Saudi-led project into a Saudi-Russia coordination problem<\/a>. <\/p>\n

From there, the structure kept shedding pieces.<\/strong> Qatar walked in January 2019, then Ecuador followed in January 2020 and Angola in Jan 2024, each citing a version of the same baseline-versus-capacity grievance. Chronic \u201ccheating\u201d by Iraq, Russia, and Kazakhstan ran in the background throughout.<\/p>\n

Coordination failed publicly in March 2020 during the Saudi-Russia price war and again <\/strong>in the July 2021 <\/strong>UAE-Saudi baseline dispute<\/a><\/strong> that was papered over rather than resolved. What happened then was that the UAE blocked an Opec+ production deal because its quota baseline (3.17 mn bbl \/ d, set off 2018 production) no longer reflected the capacity it had built (4+ mn bbl \/ d). After two weeks of public stand-off and a Brent spike, Saudi Arabia conceded a partial baseline raise to 3.65 mn bpd, which bought time without resolving anything. <\/p>\n

Quota tensions between Saudi and the UAE kept growing, and for good reason.<\/strong> As Bloomberg\u2019s Ziad Daoud notes<\/a>, while last year\u2019s average oil price of USD 67 \/ bbl meant the UAE managed to record a budget surplus of nearly 5% of GDP, Saudi Arabia faced a 5% deficit.<\/p>\n

The UAE kept building capacity, the mismatch kept widening, and this time, the UAE\u2019s <\/strong>exit is probably that same dispute reaching its terminal point.<\/strong> In essence, the UAE exit now is not a rupture, but rather the loudest piece of a slow and inevitable structural collapse.<\/p>\n

\n

So, what are we left with now?<\/p>\n

Essentially three large strategic producers (Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE) with a total <\/strong>sustainable production capacity between them of around 27-28 mn bbl \/ d.<\/strong> They each have different fiscal breakevens, different capacity trajectories, different geopolitical ambitions, and different posturing toward Washington \u2014 Russia is ambivalent at best, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE competing directly for attention, influence, and investment. We also still have a US shale fringe that is structurally elastic in a way the original model never assumed. Plus Iraqi, Iranian, and Libyan production that remain in theory viable, but currently volatile for political reasons rather than commercial ones. <\/p>\n

In a nutshell:<\/strong> Three distinct groups, no direct organization, and a complete mess.<\/p>\n

This is, formally, closer to a three-player coordination problem with imperfect monitoring<\/strong> and divergent payoffs.<\/strong> The economics literature on three-player tacit collusion is as unkind as it is complicated, and stable coordination there is harder by a non-trivial margin. As Hamzeh Al Gaaod put it in his note that we shared on Wednesday<\/a>, the exit signals \u201ca decisive shift toward an independent, state-driven oil strategy.\u201d Cheating, in cartel terms, is now done by more players \u2014 and who are no longer in the room.<\/p>\n

Ok, now, why does any of this matter?<\/p>\n

Well, the price floor for the oil markets is now probably weakened severely and <\/strong>permanently.<\/strong> For the next 12-18 months, the reality will be masked by the Strait of Hormuz blockade and lingering production disruptions, keeping prices higher regardless of structure. After is where the picture materially changes. If Saudi Arabia tries to defend prices through deeper unilateral cuts, those cuts could fail faster than they used to. <\/p>\n

If Riyadh accepts a lower realized price and goes for higher market share, the price band <\/strong>stabilizes even lower.<\/strong> This wouldn't bode well for its Vision 2030 expansionary fiscal policy \u2014 and it\u2019s not like they will be able to gather all major producers to set production quotas like before.<\/p>\n

The pain from this new order might not just be confined to the Gulf and other oil <\/strong>producers globally. <\/strong>The production levels that funded the GCC\u2019s spending also had a direct impact on the rest of the region\u2019s external accounts. A sustained oil price collapse potentially poses risks to Egyptian, Jordanian, Pakistani, and Indian fiscal positions through three channels at once: GCC remittances; FDI and project finance from Gulf sovereigns (the largest single source of new capital into Egypt over the last three years and rising fast in Pakistan); and goods trade and transit revenues. including Suez Canal receipts. <\/p>\n

The broader MENA-India corridor <\/strong>is also not immune<\/a><\/strong> as it relies on Gulf-funded demand at one end and Indian growth at the other. Even if India\u2019s direct GCC exposure has narrowed as remittances rebalance toward advanced economies, the corridor and trade channel still reaches Delhi.<\/p>\n

For the medium term, a significant external risk for the region\u2019s oil importers is no longer<\/strong> a sustained oil price spike.<\/strong> It could, oddly enough, be a sustained oil price collapse that would soften the Gulf\u2019s capacity to underwrite everyone downstream of it and with a complicated political rift to manage.<\/p>\n

Bahrain is the regional canary in the coalmine, though now with a <\/strong>complicating<\/strong> wrinkle, it <\/strong>might be where we first see the impact of this rift.<\/strong> It is the most exposed GCC state to a sustained oil price collapse by an order of magnitude, with a projected fiscal breakeven<\/a> at around USD 167 \/ bbl in 2030, a double-digit fiscal deficit, and a triple-digit debt-to-GDP<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The patronage channel that has historically backstopped Manama<\/strong>, most visibly the USD 10 bn coordinated GCC rescue in 2018, depended on a regional alignment mechanism<\/strong> that no longer exists in the same form. This channel has not disappeared so much as it has been reorganized. Three weeks before its OPEC exit, on 8 April, the UAE central bank signed a USD 5.44 bn five-year currency swap<\/a> with the Central Bank of Bahrain, on the back of an investment-protection agreement that entered into force in May 2025 and a bilateral tax treaty from 2024. <\/p>\n

Read together, these are the architecture of a soft bilateral backstop: <\/strong>Manama gets a peg-defense mechanism that does not run through Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi gets an explicit financial stake in Bahraini stability that competes, rather than coordinates, with Saudi influence. Sure, the canary survives for now, but the cage has changed. Bahrain becomes a place where Saudi-UAE rivalry now plays out on Manama\u2019s balance sheet directly \u2014 and that works as long as the UAE\u2019s commitment holds. It works less well if regional tensions escalate and Bahrain finds itself having to pick a side it didn\u2019t previously have to.<\/p>\n

None of these economic shocks are necessarily a done deal. <\/strong>Yet, from a political and policy point of view, we are in uncharted territory. The next Opec+ meeting could tell us what path Riyadh has chosen. We\u2019ll be watching clues from the language on quota discipline and the tone toward Russia while keeping an eye on potential surprises of news of countries potentially readmitted or added to the organization. <\/p>\n

The UAE\u2019s stance will also become clearer over the next few weeks and we\u2019ll see if it<\/strong> withdraws from more regional alliances and organizations<\/strong>. In the corporate world, we\u2019ll also keep a close eye on something like Adnoc\u2019s production trajectory: Capacity additions matter more than headline output now. And we\u2019ll continue to watch Saudi fiscal break-even commentary, which has been creeping toward USD 100 \/ bbl as spending accelerates. The marginal cost of defending that level has probably just risen.<\/p>\n

At the end of it all, the dominant-firm era was, ironically, what made the market and oil<\/strong> price floor reliable.<\/strong> We probably just lost that and, with it, we probably lost the aspirations of a stable, policy-coordinated Gulf.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As the Saudi-led pricing floor possibly collapses, the shockwaves threaten to destabilize neighbors dependent on GCC for FDI and remittances<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":114712,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"newspack_ads_suppress_ads":false,"newspack_popups_has_disabled_popups":false,"newspack_sponsor_sponsorship_scope":"","newspack_sponsor_native_byline_display":"inherit","newspack_sponsor_native_category_display":"inherit","newspack_sponsor_underwriter_style":"inherit","newspack_sponsor_underwriter_placement":"inherit","ep_exclude_from_search":false,"_primary_brand":0,"newspack_featured_image_position":"","newspack_post_subtitle":"","newspack_article_summary_title":"Overview:","newspack_article_summary":"","newspack_hide_updated_date":false,"newspack_show_updated_date":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2831],"tags":[2539,2538,2830,2563,2562],"brand":[],"newspack_spnsrs_tax":[],"class_list":["post-114711","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinion","tag-energy","tag-enterpriseam","tag-opinion","tag-saudi-arabia","tag-uae","wpautop","entry"],"acf":{"mongo_id":"df13ce76-b8a1-41cc-b8bc-61c8e2fd124f","order":"3","is_powered_by":false,"story_type":"1","photo_url":"https:\/\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg","photo_position":"above","homepage_title":"","full_issue_title":"Bye-bye Opec, hello three-body problem","related_issue":[114706],"teaser":"As the Saudi-led pricing floor possibly collapses, the shockwaves threaten to destabilize neighbors dependent on GCC for FDI and remittances"},"yoast_head":"\nFrom pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order - MENA+ Edition<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"As the Saudi-led pricing floor possibly collapses, the shockwaves threaten to destabilize neighbors dependent on GCC for FDI and remittances\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"MENA+ Edition\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"enterpriseam admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"enterpriseam admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"8 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"enterpriseam admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/person\/ca597032db7e4db868359c123cec256d\"},\"headline\":\"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\"},\"wordCount\":1559,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1\",\"keywords\":[\"ENERGY\",\"EnterpriseAM\",\"Opinion\",\"Saudi Arabia\",\"UAE\"],\"articleSection\":[\"OPINION\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\",\"name\":\"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order - MENA+ Edition\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/\",\"name\":\"MENA+ Edition\",\"description\":\"MENA+ Edition\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization\",\"name\":\"MENA+ Edition\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/ent.news\/internal\/42998.svg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/ent.news\/internal\/42998.svg\",\"caption\":\"MENA+ Edition\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/person\/ca597032db7e4db868359c123cec256d\",\"name\":\"enterpriseam admin\",\"sameAs\":[\"http:\/\/enterpriseam.testing.projectsarea.com\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/author\/enterpriseam\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order - MENA+ Edition","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order","og_description":"As the Saudi-led pricing floor possibly collapses, the shockwaves threaten to destabilize neighbors dependent on GCC for FDI and remittances","og_url":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/","og_site_name":"MENA+ Edition","article_published_time":"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00","og_image":[{"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1","type":"","width":"","height":""}],"author":"enterpriseam admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"enterpriseam admin","Est. reading time":"8 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/"},"author":{"name":"enterpriseam admin","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/person\/ca597032db7e4db868359c123cec256d"},"headline":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order","datePublished":"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/"},"wordCount":1559,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1","keywords":["ENERGY","EnterpriseAM","Opinion","Saudi Arabia","UAE"],"articleSection":["OPINION"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/","url":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/","name":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order - MENA+ Edition","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1","datePublished":"2026-05-01T00:00:00+00:00","dateModified":"2026-05-01T09:36:33+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1","contentUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/2026\/05\/01\/from-pricing-power-to-peer-rivalry-the-structural-collapse-of-the-saudi-led-oil-order\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"From pricing power to peer rivalry: The structural collapse of the Saudi-led oil order"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#website","url":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/","name":"MENA+ Edition","description":"MENA+ Edition","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#organization","name":"MENA+ Edition","url":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/ent.news\/internal\/42998.svg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/ent.news\/internal\/42998.svg","caption":"MENA+ Edition"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/#\/schema\/person\/ca597032db7e4db868359c123cec256d","name":"enterpriseam admin","sameAs":["http:\/\/enterpriseam.testing.projectsarea.com"],"url":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/author\/enterpriseam\/"}]}},"featured_image_src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?resize=600%2C400&ssl=1","featured_image_src_square":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?resize=600%2C600&ssl=1","author_info":{"display_name":"enterpriseam admin","author_link":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/author\/enterpriseam\/"},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/ent.news\/2023\/12\/1616.jpg?fit=%2C&ssl=1","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114711","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=114711"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114711\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":114752,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/114711\/revisions\/114752"}],"acf:post":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/issue\/114706"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/114712"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=114711"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=114711"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=114711"},{"taxonomy":"brand","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/brand?post=114711"},{"taxonomy":"newspack_spnsrs_tax","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/enterpriseam.com\/menaplus\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/newspack_spnsrs_tax?post=114711"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}